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Abstract
Buying a home is among the most important choices that any individual is
likely to make in their lifetime. It has lasting consequences for happiness,
well-being and personal finances. Yet, given the infrequency with which
such decisions are made; the difficulty getting information from an opaque
and decentralised marketplace; and the high transactions costs involved,
there is a significant risk that decision making may depart from the high
standard imposed by the normative economic concept of rational choice.
This thesis uses the insights of the economic theory of choice – from be-
havioural economics in particular – to examine housing choice from a new
perspective. It considers the potential for estate agents, knowingly or oth-
erwise, to exploit behavioural biases in decision making to influence pref-
erence and, ultimately, choices over housing. This naturally is of interest
to estate agents and policy makers involved in housing markets; but most
importantly to individuals as decision makers: making better decisions re-
lies on understanding when and where vulnerability to manipulation may
lie.
Using evidence from a series of classroom experiments with 280 student
volunteers and from two online surveys with over 4,000 adult respondents,
significant areas where individuals may be consistently vulnerable to ma-
nipulation of judgement are found and recorded. In particular, both stu-
dent and adult respondents are susceptible to biases involving manipulation
of the decision making context, known as the choice frame. Students also
tend to rely on arbitrary ‘anchor’ points to make value estimates, which
results in significantly impaired judgements, even in the presence of incen-
tives for accuracy. Finally, evidence of a significant new form of behavioural
bias is found, in which elements of the choice frame have an unexpectedly
negative impact on perceptions. This new bias is persistent across several
experimental scenarios and is labelled the choice pollution effect.
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Part I
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Making choices is part of being human. It is also one of the central
concerns of economic theory. But choice goes beyond abstract theory.
Choices ultimately determine individual happiness and there can be
few more important single choices than buying a house. This chapter
introduces the thesis and motivates the research by describing why
the study of choice in the context of housing decisions is important in
three areas: for the theory of choice; for our understanding of housing
markets and the economic actors who are a vital part of them; and
for each individual ultimately to make better choices and improve
their happiness. It then considers the methods used to make this
contribution before setting out the structure of the following chapters.
1.1 The Importance of Choice
Making choices is a fundamental human activity. It is synonymous with con-
sciousness. Choices confront all individuals in every aspect of everything they
do. Humans are so experienced at making choices that many are made without
even thinking about them. Of course, some choices are more important, and have
more lasting effects, than others. What to wear; what to have for breakfast; how
to get to work – these choices will, in most cases, have little lasting impact. In
contrast, some choices are far more important. A choice which falls into this
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category is the choice of where and how to live. Housing decisions are among
the most important individuals make during a lifetime. They have lasting con-
sequences for happiness, well-being and personal finances. They have even been
enshrined as a fundamental human right1.
This thesis uses the insights of the economic theory of choice – of behavioural
economics in particular – to examine housing choice from a new perspective. It
considers the potential for the estate agent to exploit behavioural biases in deci-
sion making to influence preference and, ultimately, choices over housing.
The engagement of behavioural biases to influence preference is irrational in the
neoclassical paradigm of choice (led by von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) be-
cause it violates basic rules of that theory. This is important because the model is
normative, that is, it is a model of how individuals should make choices. Existing
evidence of violations of the theory has already led to a dramatic re-evaluation
of the meaning of rationality among economists, and this thesis takes that lit-
erature further still. It is important for housing economists because traditional
accounts of housing markets largely ignore these influences by assuming that the
individuals who make choices are rational. While this has intuitive appeal and
allows for tractable analysis at the market level, it obscures a great deal about
the psychology of decision making processes and so fails to capture the true dy-
namics of housing markets. It is also important for policy makers. Although they
have typically been more willing to adopt a less strictly neoclassical approach,
little policy research has adopted an approach that incorporates the insights of
behavioural economics.
Finally, the thesis acknowledges the increasingly important role that the inter-
net is having in our decision making lives, especially in consumer purchasing. It
presents a significant contribution to this nascent body of research by considering
explicitly how online consumer environments – in this case online property search
websites – can influence property choice.
1 Article 12, United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948).
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For economists, a model that describes human choice has been a major pre-
occupation since the early 20th century. The fundamental economic problem is
itself a choice: how to satisfy infinite wants with scarce resources. Choice theory
is the cornerstone of microeconomics. Its dominating paradigm, that of rational
choice, is generally traced back to the work of John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Their Behavioral Decision
Theory set out a series of axioms which should govern the rational decision maker,
ensuring that choices have some basic element of coherence and consistency and
that choices made maximise individual happiness.
However since the 1970s a critique of the theory has grown in importance and
impact, challenging the neoclassical account of choice. The body of work, which
is known collectively as behavioural economics, is led by the work of psychol-
ogists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky and their seminal work Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This behavioural critique has demon-
strated significant areas in which human decision making departs quite severely
from traditional rationality, with important consequences for the theory itself and
for individuals as decision makers. Understanding these consequences further in
the context of housing choice is the ultimate goal of this thesis.
1.2 Why Study Housing Choice?
This study of housing choices, most particularly those made when buying a house,
has several distinct lines of motivation which are considered in the following three
sections. They are: to make a contribution to the economic theory of choice; to
understand more about the dynamics of housing markets; and to help each of
us as individuals to make better choices through understanding how the use of
decision making rules of thumb (known as heuristics) can lead to biased choices.
All of these motivations share a common observation: housing choices are among
the most important decisions made by households or individuals during their
lifetime. Among all consumer choices they possess the power to have a funda-
mental and lasting impact on welfare. Thus the unifying theme of the discussion
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in this section is that, although the motivation may incorporate wider aspects,
understanding housing choices better is a worthy goal in its own right.
1.2.1 Choice Theory and Housing
A theoretical model of choice behaviour is at the heart of economics and the
study of choice has been an important part of economic inquiry from its earliest
beginnings. Adam Smith considered decision making and in particular the role
of emotions in his work The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759 well before
his more famous 1776 volume. Several important contributions from utilitarian
Jeremy Bentham explored decision making, explicitly focusing on psychological
aspects. However the coalescence of ideas into a model of choice was not forth-
coming until the mid-20th century with the work of John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) who gave the theory of ra-
tional choice axiomatic foundations, bringing to the fore the idea that in making
choices humans acted as self-interested utility maximisers.
The important aspect of this theory is that it gained widespread acceptance as
the solution to the choice problem. The theoretical decision maker even gained
a name: homo economicus. Significant theoretical developments across microe-
conomics were built upon its foundation. Areas of economics as wide as envi-
ronmental resource valuation and inflation targeting policy; and as unrelated as
crime modelling2 and stock market valuation use assumptions about the ratio-
nality of individuals as the starting point for that which follows. Rational choice
theory is normative: it prescribes the ways in which a decision maker ought to
make choices, but guarantees that the choices made will reveal preferences and
will, in turn, maximise individual happiness.
However, although elegant and widely applicable, the rational choice model has
come under serious pressure since the 1970s. A growing behavioural critique of
the rational model’s descriptive account of choice struck at the heart of the ax-
ioms and assumptions on which the theory is built. This body of work, known
2 Thanks largely to Gary Becker (Becker, 1968).
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today as behavioural economics, is led by the work of psychologists Daniel Kah-
neman and Amos Tversky and their foundational contribution: Prospect Theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Beginning as a series of isolated paradoxes showing situations in which violations
of standard rationality seem to occur, the work of these behavioural economists
has gained credence and acceptance by demonstrating that the underpinnings of
rational choice theory are assumptions about behaviour that are psychologically
flawed. Chapter 2 considers in more detail both the neoclassical model of choice
and the opening of this new paradigm in the theory.
This thesis picks up the story by considering choices in the context of a relatively
under-researched and yet vitally important area of decision making: housing.
Housing choices share many of the characteristics of other types of consumer and
quasi-consumer choices, but are also very different. These differences allow signif-
icant inferences to be made which go beyond those that exist in current research.
In the first instance, the factor which makes housing choices stand out from other
consumer decisions is that the stakes are high. Buying a house is not a small-
scale purchase like buying a chocolate bar, or a consumer durable such as a TV.
It can be a lifetime-defining decision. Research into choice theory, particularly
from the behavioural perspective, has largely used as test objects such consumer
goods as cars (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982), beer (Huber and Puto, 1983), TVs
(Ratneshwar, Shocker and Stewart, 1987), baked beans (Doyle, Reynolds and
Bottomley, 1999) and chocolate (Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2003).
Housing choices are significantly more important than any of these choices, yet
have not been the subject of nearly as much research (although there have been
exceptions, such as Northcraft and Neale, 1987, and Genesove and Mayer, 2001,
which are considered further in Chapter 3). The high stakes involved are vital
from the perspective of choice theory because a common criticism of behavioural
economists who have attempted to demonstrate anomalies in choice behaviour
is that their experiments, largely done on smaller consumer purchases as above,
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are not applicable to those which decision makers consider more important. The
reasoning is that when the decision really matters, the decision maker will take
the time and cognitive effort to make a ‘good’, by which we mean rational, choice
(see Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992, for a further discussion on this point). Hous-
ing presents a choice scenario when a direct assessment of this claim can be made.
Another aspect which divides housing choices from other consumer decisions
is that they are not made very frequently. According to the Council of Mort-
gage Lenders, in the UK home-owners move only once every 15 years on average
(CML, 2004). This is important because it is unlike most consumer purchases
which are made regularly (such as buying food or consumer durables). Thus it
renders unimportant another prominent defence of rational choice theory: that
individuals are less likely to make ‘mistakes’ in decisions they are experienced at
making, and that greater experience will result in learning and less errors. The
reasoning is thus that, although consumers may make errors in their choices once
or even twice, they will soon learn from their mistakes and so are not likely to
deviate from rational decision making in the long run.
Several articles have supported the idea that greater experience in making a choice
can lead to less ‘mistakes’ in choices (for example Knez, Smith and Williams,
1985; List, 2004). This reasserts the supremacy of the rational model of choice
theory, in effect suggesting a kind of economic Darwinism – those who continue
to make irrational choices will be ‘competed away’ by repeated market forces.
This situation does not apply to housing choices. They are made extremely in-
frequently meaning that few making them could be described as ‘experienced’.
It is an observation which suggests that the risk of errors is significantly higher
than for other consumer purchases.
Related to this is the observation that when choices are made over housing,
feedback on how good a choice has been made is not forthcoming in the same
way as with other types of consumer purchases. If an individual makes a mistake3
3 For clarity: by ‘mistake’ this analysis means some departure from rational choice rather than
a simple error.
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and buys a chocolate bar they do not actually like, this will become clear upon
eating the item, for example. Or if a consumer chooses a brand of washing ma-
chine but it turns out to break frequently then this becomes obvious reasonably
quickly and the consumer will realise a poor choice has been made. Housing is a
very long term consumer purchase with many aspects of the choice hidden from
immediate feedback. The consequences of a poor choice – for example the third
bedroom being too small for an expanding family – might not become clear for a
considerable period.
Although not impossible, it is very difficult to amend decisions over housing once
they are made because of the transaction costs involved compared with other
consumer goods. Transaction costs buying and selling houses run to many thou-
sands of pounds, including legal and other professional fees, as well as property
taxation. Poor choices cannot be corrected easily in this environment.
Another aspect to housing decisions is that houses are not merely a consumer
purchase. They are an investment, certainly the single biggest such investment
in the lives of most of the over 15 million households who own their own home
in the UK4. This thesis does not focus on the investment side of house purchase,
specifically excluding this element in many of the tests reported. There are two
reasons for taking this approach. The first is theoretical: the investment potential
of a property does not ultimately determine housing choices in the majority of
cases. Individuals may believe a priori that housing is a good investment, but
when it comes down to the choice between individual houses, which is the focus
of the research here, the potential for capital appreciation is but one of a series
of factors which come into the decision makers’ calculations. There are models
which consider house purchase from the investment perspective (Shiller, 2005,
2007) but this is largely achieved through emasculating the consumer elements
of the decision process rather than incorporating them into a complete model.
The second reason is practical: including time-dependent investment concerns
into the choice scenarios considered here would entail an infeasible level of com-
plexity without aiding the analysis significantly although, as Chapter 9 explains,
4 Source: Census 2001. Available at www.statistics.gov.uk.
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such a complete model should be the ultimate goal of research into housing choice.
Returning to the choice theory which this thesis contributes to, behavioural
economists have shown that our psychological composition may prevent us from
making decisions in the way prescribed by the classical rational choice model
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Thaler, 1980). Their research suggests instead
that a series of regularities in their thought processes might cause individuals to
depart from this normative standard of choice, thus compromising decisions.
Behavioural economists have gone further however, suggesting that these psy-
chological regularities might be exploited by economic actors who have a reason
to intercede in individual choice processes (Huber et al., 1982; Simonson, 1989;
Ariely et al., 2003). In effect, the suggestion is that we as consumers might be
vulnerable to choice manipulation in certain circumstances. The precise ways in
which this can be accomplished are considered in Chapter 4. In that chapter it
is further demonstrated that estate agents are economic actors with a significant
motivation to intercede in exactly this way. They are choice architects (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2008) who are, given the significant asymmetry of information, in
a position to construct the scenario in which the choice takes place and so signif-
icantly influence decision making.
As discussed above, neoclassical economists have typically sought to undermine
evidence of behavioural anomalies, and so of the alternative formulations of choice
theory, by suggesting that anomalies exist either only when the choices are not
that important or the stakes are low. Housing is a good scenario to test this
claim. The stakes are unambiguously high: the decisions are likely to be the
most important that are made from a personal finance perspective in a lifetime,
with vital and long lasting effects on household welfare. Of all choice situations,
housing decisions – particularly house purchase – are surely ones which individ-
uals will take the time and effort to make an appropriate choice?
Moreover what makes housing even more interesting as a scenario to understand
decision making is that it possesses several unique features which ensure the po-
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tential for the manipulation of choices is far greater than elsewhere. Choices are
made infrequently by decision makers with limited experience, so it hard to learn
from mistakes; there is limited feedback so that errors may only become clear
after a significant period; and transaction costs are high making it difficult to
correct mistakes when they are made. Finally, marketplaces for residential prop-
erty are decentralised and relatively opaque; information is limited and difficult
to obtain5; and estate agents must be relied on for direction. These conditions
are a breeding ground for behavioural phenomena to occur.
By providing a unique scenario in which choices are made, housing presents an
opportunity to provide evidence which contributes to the theory of choice and in
particular the growing behavioural paradigm that has already done so much to
change the way economists think about rationality.
The next section considers the contribution that this approach makes to our
understanding of housing markets.
1.2.2 Understanding Housing Market Dynamics
Away from the theoretical contribution to our understanding of choice processes,
an important reason for this research is to provide greater understanding of the
dynamics of housing markets. This is already the subject of a lively debate in aca-
demic literature. Housing market economics looks at topics such as inequality of
accessibility and affordability (Aoki, Prudman and Vlieghe, 2001; Barker, 2004);
wealth implications of uneven house price appreciation (Smith, 2005; Thomas
and Dorling, 2004); and the transmission of mortgage market dynamics into the
macro economy (Attanasio et al., 2006; Maxwell, 2005).
Housing market dynamics are typically analysed with reference to economic vari-
ables employing models predicated on individuals’ more or less rational behaviour
according to Munro and Smith (2008). Adopting a microeconomic perspective
5 Although it is becoming easier due to the internet, which is discussed further later in this
chapter.
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and focusing on individual behaviour is one way to gain greater understanding
of the dynamics of housing markets. A strand of urban economics research does
adopt this more pluralistic approach6. It suggests that in analysing sub-markets
for housing we must go beyond the single-model framework for market clearing
and price determination favoured by neoclassical approaches which rely on ratio-
nal actors. This thesis complements that research by incorporating the insights
of behavioural economics into the microeconomics of housing markets. Through
understanding individual action at the level of choices, important implications
can be drawn for policy makers and real estate practitioners.
There are have been some promising attempts to broaden the theoretical un-
derpinnings of this market dynamics perspective by incorporating aspects of bias
or non-rationality. For example, Lin and Vandell (2007), who focus on pricing
biases due to illiquidity at a local level. Genesove and Mayer (2001) examine
whether individuals are prone to a behavioural bias known as loss aversion when
selling their houses7. This psychological regularity implies that individuals will
be more reluctant to sell for a given price when that sale price represents a ‘loss’
as against when it is a ‘gain’ compared to their purchase price. They find strong
evidence to support this suggestion. Individuals selling houses for amounts which
would results in ‘loss’ tend to set higher asking prices and keep houses on the mar-
ket far longer than those who sell corresponding houses for prices which to them
represent a ‘gain’. This result holds even controlling for all relevant characteris-
tics of the house and seller.
Most recently Levitt and Syverson (2008) consider whether estate agents ma-
nipulate individuals in their decision over when and at what price to sell their
property. They find evidence that supports this assertion. When estate agents
sell their own homes they sell for significantly higher prices after leaving their
property on the market for longer than if selling on behalf of others.
6 A good summary of this early literature is Bourne (1976).
7 Loss aversion is a key part of the Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). It is
explored in Chapter 2.
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This thesis builds on the current research, using a behavioural approach to con-
sider housing market dynamics from the individual level. In this regard, it offers
further evidence in the spirit of Genesove and Mayer (2001) and Levitt and Syver-
son (2008). However it goes beyond their work, considering home buyers and not
home sellers as their research does. It also focuses explicitly on the active manip-
ulation of behavioural regularities by estate agents rather than justifying error-
making by reference solely to information asymmetry (as Levitt and Syverson do).
The resulting evidence on the extent and efficacy of behavioural manipulation
strategies in house purchase decisions will be of interest to policy makers, prac-
titioners and real estate academics.
1.2.3 Making Better Decisions
A final motivation for the work in this thesis lies with the decision maker him-
self or herself. The work of behavioural economists has shown conclusively that
there are situations in which human decision makers make ‘mistakes’. Whatever
the source and importance of these lapses, significant amounts of research show
that we frequently fall below the standard required in von Neumann and Mor-
genstern’s original theory of choice.
Tversky (1977) has suggested that the errors discussed are often like optical
illusions. Figure 1.1 is a classic example. It is based on an illusion in Shepard
(1990)8. When asked about the dimensions of the tables in the image, most peo-
ple’s intuitive opinion is that the one on the left is much longer and thinner than
the one on the right. However, if a ruler is used to physically measure the long
side of both tables it can be seen that they are the same. In this case perspective
has been used to alter our perception of the tables’ dimensions.
This result and others like it are generally are regarded as being little more than
‘quirks’ in our overall sensory apparatus, yet the principle of optical illusions has
important lessons for the biases that affect our decision making lives. A primary
8 Although the idea to use it in this case lies with Thaler and Sunstein (2008).
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Figure 1.1: Illustation of an optical illusion with two tables. Based on Shepard (1990).
observation is that they are powerful; very few individuals can resist the obvious
conclusion that the tables are different. This means that, if the biases which
behavioural economists hypothesise about are truly based on psychological flaws,
as they suggest, then we are likely to be highly vulnerable to them.
Thus a final motivation for this thesis is to help us, as decision makers, better
understand when and in what ways we might be vulnerable to choice and judge-
mental biases. Understanding them is the first step to making ‘better’ choices
and improving happiness.
Moreover, as has already been noted, there can be few more important decisions
for the individual than buying a house. This choice is likely to have significant
and long lasting implications for wealth and happiness. Thus making a ‘good’
choice, and understanding our vulnerabilities to making ‘bad’ choices, is likely
to be more vital than elsewhere, even ignoring the idea that housing choices are
ones in which we might be more vulnerable than others to error and manipulation
owing to the nature of the decision making scenario.
1.2.4 Summary
Housing choice is a high-stakes, one-shot game which is likely to have a significant
and long lasting impact on our happiness. Getting the decision right is clearly
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more important than for most of the other choices which have been the subject
of study in the past 30 years.
This thesis investigates choice biases and manipulation in housing choices with
three primary motivations. The first is to contribute to the economic theory of
choice. Choice theory has been an important area of study for economists for at
least 100 years, particularly so in the latter part of the 20th century. It is also
important because large parts of economic theory use assumptions about human
behaviour and rationality at their heart. Choice theory has undergone a dramatic
change in the past 30 years with the opening of a new paradigm in the theory,
that of behavioural economics. This study of housing choices contributes to the
theory because housing choices are different in several ways to those which have
formed the basis of most studies. The stakes are high, yet because the decision
to buy a house is made extremely infrequently it is rare that the decision maker
is experienced when making the choice. Feedback on the choice is limited and
transactions costs are high. Finally, owing to the opaque nature of the market-
place, individuals must frequently rely on the advice of an economic actor who
has significantly more information than them: the estate agent. These conditions
suggest that individuals might be more vulnerable to choice manipulation than
in other scenarios which have been considered by the literature.
A second motivation is to understand the dynamics of markets from a differ-
ent perspective. The workings of housing markets are a prominent concern of the
real estate literature, yet many papers implicitly adopt a ‘rational’ approach to
individual action. Those which do incorporate non-rational elements either do
not consider home buyers – focusing instead on sellers – or do not incorporate the
idea that there is an economic agent who might find it in their interest to actively
manipulate decision making processes and thus influence market outcomes. This
thesis addresses that gap in the literature adding further to our understanding of
what is really going on in housing markets.
The final motivation for the thesis is to help individuals to make better choices.
By understanding decision making weaknesses, points of vulnerability to the sub-
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tle influence of others, individuals can hope to make ‘better’ choices and thus
improve their happiness for the long run.
With these motivations in mind the following section considers how the thesis
investigates the issues at hand.
1.3 Methods
The primary methodology used to study the nature of biases and manipulations
affecting housing choice is economic experiments on students and controlled sur-
veys on adults in the tradition of the field of experimental economics.
Although some economists have questioned the suitability of experimental meth-
ods in economics, from its beginnings in the 1950s, experimental economics has
established itself as an important part of mainstream economic research. It is
an established methodology in its own right offering significant insights into a
variety of economic questions, including those posed here.
Two key principles run throughout the experimental work that economists have
undertaken, which ensure its validity for studying judgemental and choice bias
in housing. The first of these is experimental control: experiments give signifi-
cant control and so allow more powerful inferences to be made than from more
natural sources of data. Such methodological control can be more powerful than
the econometric techniques used to make inferences from this natural, or hap-
penstance data (Freidman and Sunder, 1994). The second principle is the use of
careful design to isolate and leave unchanged the essential underlying conditions
of the natural environment to allow researchers to induce how the results would
likely be played out in a real world scenario.
This latter argument directly addresses the external validity of experimental re-
sults, undoubtedly a concern for economists not familiar with experimental meth-
ods. Freidman and Sunder (1994) note that scepticism about the generalisability
of experimental results has existed since at least the time of Gallileo when critics
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did not believe the motions from his now-famous pendulum experiment could
be applied to planetary motions. For Gallileo, as for experimental economists,
this abstraction from the full complexity of the real world, that is the essence of
performing an experiment, does not automatically destroy the external validity
of the work.
This principle is known as induction. It provides is that regularities observed
in systems – such as behaviour in economic experiments – will persist in new
situations provided the relevant underlying conditions remain largely unchanged.
What counts as ‘relevant’, and to what extent conditions are ‘largely’ unchanged
is a matter for debate, but the principle of induction itself is an axiom of experi-
mental work, not a deductible proposition.
Vernon Smith calls this the parallelism precept (Smith, 1982, page 936). Ac-
cording to this axiom it must be presumed that results will carry over to the real
world. Thus the sceptic has the burden of stating what is different about the real
world that might change the results observed in the experimental situation. The
goal of the researcher is to design and re-design the experiment to counter these
points of scepticism. Chapter 5 considers the nature of the designs to ensure the
external validity of the work in detail. Two key points stand out: the use of
incentives and the replication of decision frames.
For all economic experiments, incentives are necessary to gain control over sub-
jects’ motivations. A simple reward structure is constructed within the confines
of the experimental scenarios such that all participants understand the way to
ensure they earn more of the reward. Usually paid in money at the end of the
experiment, it is assumed that subjects always want to earn more reward. As
Chapter 5 discusses, the experiments exploring judgemental bias in housing use
incentives extensively to provide a motivator for ‘good’ judgement. Such a struc-
ture replicates the real world situation in which better judgement when buying a
house is rewarded financially, often considerably.
For those situations where incentives are not possible and so the work is more
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accurately a controlled survey, the scenario – or decision frame (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981) – in which decisions are taken is designed to replicate closely
the real world situation. In this vein, this thesis reports a large-scale survey of
over 4,000 users of the property search website www.rightmove.co.uk (hereafter
referred to as “Rightmove”) where choices are presented in a manner almost iden-
tical to how houses are viewed in real situations on their site. This design presents
a compelling case for the external validity of the results.
This thesis reports results from three separate experiments which employ two
distinct methods. They are summarised in Table 1.1. The Student Experiments
involved the use of classroom experimental techniques on over 280 volunteer par-
ticipants. They were all members of the University of Cambridge recruited on
campus through advertising and online. A number of choice and judgement exper-
iments involving housing were used, with a variety of treatment effects considered.
Incentives were paid where appropriate and were designed to replicate the binary,
high-stakes nature of housing decisions. This first method was complemented by
a second which forms the bulk of the remaining research work: online controlled
surveys. Two separate controlled surveys were conducted. The first, completed
with the help of the website Rightmove, used over 4,000 participants of their site.
Name Description
Student Group Experiments Series of experiments of choice and judgement
in classroom settings with over 280 student vol-
unteers. Incentives paid for judgement experi-
ments.
Rightmove Survey Large-scale controlled survey of over 4,000 users
of website Rightmove. Used online design to
closely resemble the real choice scenario in which
house preference decisions are made
Stamford Adult Group Survey Controlled survey of 600 residents of the town
of Stamford, South Lincolnshire. Replicated the
Rightmove survey but using different online de-
livery methodology.
Table 1.1: Summary of experiments reported in this thesis.
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The research creates a choice scenario involving a selection of homes, from which
the participant is asked to pick their preferred option. Fourteen treatments were
used to control the context in which the decision is taken (the “choice frame”)
including the composition of the choices seen (the “choice set”) and the order
of viewing. Finally the Stamford Adult Group Survey is an online controlled
experiment of over 600 residents of the town of Stamford, South Lincolnshire.
This survey replicated the scenarios and treatments of the Rightmove Survey but
used a different online delivery methodology which altered the emphasis of some
aspects of the property choice (including the prominence of location).
Thus the three experiments encompass two distinct participant groups: university
students and adults. The former are more available for research and have lower
recruitment costs, which is a significant benefit for research purposes. Perhaps for
this reason, the use of students is entirely standard in experimental economics.
However, it is incumbent upon the researcher to design the experiments so that
they are generalisable to as broad a context as possible. Although representative
of a sophisticated group of potential renters, the student group are not, in all
likelihood, representative of home buyers as a whole. In contrast the adult vol-
unteers recruited from the website Rightmove are representative of home buyers
in the UK, and more: the vast majority are currently searching for homes (hence
their being on the website) so represent an ideally suited subject group. This
dual approach lends far greater weight to the results reported than if they were
presented in isolation.
A survey of the origins of experimental economics and the key techniques used, as
well as a detailed description of the methodology used in this thesis is presented
in Chapter 5. The following section considers the contribution that the research
makes to the literature given the motivations expressed in Section 1.2.
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This thesis makes three primary contributions. The first is to choice theory.
Through three experiments which examine choice and judgement manipulation
in real estate, significant new evidence about the nature of these biases is uncov-
ered. This is important because housing is a very different type of choice scenario
to those considered by current research. The stakes are large and the decision is
typically a one-off, with little chance to learn from mistakes. The results confirm
that high stakes do not significantly reduce decision making errors. Even when
offered the opportunity to earn a one-off bonus of £100 for accurate judgement
(Student Group Experiments, Chapter 8) participants’ estimates of value were
significantly influenced by arbitrary anchors.
Evidence of biases resulting from choice set composition including asymmetric
dominance (Huber et al., 1982) and compromise effects (Simonson, 1989) are con-
firmed in written tests (Student Group, Chapter 6) backing up existing research in
this new choice scenario. The results go beyond this, however. In complex choice
set scenarios where participants are presented with real descriptions of houses
including photos there is evidence that judgements are biased both according to
the precise composition of the set (Student Group Experiments, Chapter 6) and
the order in which properties are shown (Student Group Experiments, Chapter
7). When the testing is carried out on adult users of a property search website
using a design which matches almost exactly the way in which properties are ac-
tually viewed, these biases persist (Rightmove Survey, Chapters 6 and 7). These
errors apply across a very large sample set – over 4,000 people – representing
a broad demographic of home buyers in the UK. An online survey of over 600
residents of a medium-sized town, which presents house choices using a delivery
mechanism that places less emphasis on photographic data and more on textual
descriptions of properties, largely repeats these findings (Stamford Adult Group
Survey, Chapters 6 and 7). In general those less experienced with property are
more vulnerable to choice manipulation.
Furthermore the findings are confirmed using simple difference in proportions
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tests and logit analysis which controls for variables of interest including age, gen-
der, location and experience buying property.
Most significantly these tests show evidence of a new form of behavioural bias.
The bias occurs when one of the options in the choice set acts as a negative in-
fluence on another choice, causing a change in aggregate preference away from
the other choice when the ‘bad’ choice is added. I label this finding the choice
pollution effect to reflect the idea that it results from one option ‘polluting’ in-
dividual perceptions of an alternative choice. Choice pollution effects are found
among students (Student Group Experiments, Chapter 6) and adults (Rightmove
Survey and Stamford Adult Group Survey, Chapter 6).
Another source of contribution is to our understanding of the dynamics of hous-
ing markets. Traditional theories which consider housing markets have frequently
used at their heart a rationality assumption about the behaviour of individuals.
Such an assumption results in easier modelling at the macro level, but obscures
significant detail at the micro level about what is really going on in housing mar-
kets. Although promising moves have been made in this direction (such as Munro
and Smith, 2008; Levitt and Syverson, 2008; Levy and Frethey-Bentham, 2010)
little considers the role of home buyers, or adopts the non-rationality perspective
which arises from the behavioural economics literature (Simonsohn and Loewen-
stein, 2006, is perhaps the closest to follow this path).
Furthermore, research into housing markets has not largely considered the role
of the estate agent actively manipulating individual home buyer behaviour. This
thesis brings these strands of the literature together. There is significant evidence
that home buyers are highly vulnerable to behavioural manipulation. The results
show it is reliably possible to influence preference over housing options through
altering the choices which are shown and even the order in which they are shown.
Judgements over value are particularly liable to manipulation also. These are
influenced in a predictable direction by the use of an arbitrary anchor.
The research therefore gives new importance to the role of the estate agent in
20
1.4 Contribution
housing decisions on an individual level. This is likely to be of interest to estate
agents themselves, but also policy makers and finally individual home buyers.
The final contribution is methodological. As Chapter 5 explains, experimental
economics has evolved into being a significant part of today’s economists’ toolkit.
Experiments today are used in fields as wide as industrial organization, finance
theory and environmental economics. A significant part of the experimental work
in this thesis uses an online research design for delivering experiments which has
rarely been used in published research into consumer choices. The online experi-
ment has significant advantages in terms of volunteer recruitment. However the
contribution arises from using this method to replicate an actual decision frame
of interest. Online property search has revolutionised the way individuals buy
property in the UK in the last 10 years. It is now a vital platform for advertising
properties for sale. Over 90% of UK agents are registered with the market leader,
Rightmove9.
A growing research body considers online consumer behaviour. Kumar, Lang
and Peng (2005) and Rose and Samouel (2009) examine how consumers search
for information on the internet. The latter present a model of online consumer
information search, concluding that cognitive processing and motivation are im-
portant impacts on the amount of time spent searching, more so than factors
such as cost.
Wu, Cheng and Lin (2008) is, to the best of my knowledge, the only paper
which uses online experimentation to investigate the role of behavioural biases
in e-commerce. They find evidence that anchoring is important in online value
judgements. This thesis also directly addresses how consumers might be manip-
ulated in online environments, but is the first to use this method to consider
how individuals might be manipulated in the online decision frame by altering
their preference between products. Chapter 5 considers in detail the design of the
online experimental work. With online consumer markets growing rapidly this
contribution is likely to become even more significant in the coming years.
9 Source: Rightmove figures.
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Behavioural economics provides a new perspective on choice theory, a subject of
great concern to economists, by placing our models of human decision making
on a firmer psychological footing. Leading behaviouralists Colin Camerer and
George Loewenstein echo this sentiment: “behavioural economics increases the
explanatory power of economics by providing it with more realistic psychological
foundations.” (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004, page 3).
This thesis makes an important contribution both to choice theory and to our
understanding of the dynamics of housing markets by answering the following
question: to what extent, and by what means, can housing choice be manipu-
lated in non-rational ways by a willing economic agent?
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 concludes Part I by considering why
economists are so interested in choices and what they mean by rationality. Through
reviewing the literature in choice theory, it shows how the dominant paradigm,
that of rational choice according to the von Neumann and Morgenstern analysis
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), was compromised by a series of papers
which cast doubt on the fundamental axioms of that theory. The behavioural
critique, led by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and for
which Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in 2002, has fundamentally altered they
way economists think about choice.
Having set the background to the research, Part II considers non-rational choice
manipulation and how it may apply to housing choice. Chapter 3 considers the
non-rational approaches that have been used in real estate markets already. The
review highlights a clear gap in the literature to explore non-rational decision
making by home buyers who are being manipulated by a willing economic agent.
It also reviews the core literature into behavioural bias in consumer choice sce-
narios, highlighting three areas of bias which form the basis of the research in
this thesis.
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Chapter 4 applies the theory of choice manipulation into specific predictions
about how choice manipulation might take place in housing scenarios. These
are considered under three headings: biases arising from choice set manipulation;
biases due to viewing order; and biases in value judgements. It makes hypotheses
which form the basis of the experiments reported later. Estate agents are an
important part of the story of choice manipulation being presented in this thesis.
The second part of Chapter 4 considers conceptual models which confirm that
estate agents are economic agents who are motivated to manipulate home buy-
ers’ behaviour. Manipulations are expected to be particularly important – and
potentially valuable – in the growing market for online property listings where
agents compete with each other for sales across a common platform.
Finally in Part II, Chapter 5 reviews the methodology and data collected. Experi-
mental techniques are employed throughout the research so considerable attention
is devoted to the evolution of this method, illustrating its coming to prominence
as well as its validity today. The three specific experiments which form the re-
sults: the Student Group Experiments; the Rightmove Survey; and the Stamford
Adult Group Survey are considered in detail.
Part III presents the results. It is split into three chapters. These match the
definitions of the behavioural biases that are presented in Chapter 4. Thus Chap-
ter 6 reports the results from experiments investigating the effect of choice set
manipulations on decision making. Chapter 7 shows that ordering effects are
potentially important in preference construction and therefore choices. Finally
Chapter 8 finds that it is possible to manipulate value judgements through the
use of arbitrary anchors placed before decision makers when making judgements.
This suggests that more subtle forms of value judgement manipulation, which
could allow an agent to increase property sales values, thus increasing his com-
mission, is not only possible but a source of significant vulnerability for consumers.
The thesis is concluded by Chapter 9. This chapter considers the importance the
findings have for three groups in particular: estate agents for whom it presents
clear ways in which they might influence home buyers for their own ends; policy
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makers, for whom consumer protection is an important aspect of their regulatory
scope; and finally for decision makers themselves. By understanding our own lim-
itations and vulnerabilities we can hopefully make better, more informed choices.
When the choice is as important as buying a home, this is a significantly positive
outcome.
Chapter 9 also considers the limitations in the research, a feature of all aca-
demic endeavours. Finally future directions for research are suggested, both in
terms of improving and building on the work contained here and more generally
considering alternative applications for behavioural insights into real estate mar-
kets.
There is no doubt that the behavioural paradigm and the field of behavioural
economics has revolutionised research into large parts of economics today. There
is significant potential for a similar effect in real estate economics.
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Decision Making Under Risk
This chapter considers the models that explain how humans make
choices. Models of decision making typically have at their heart the
normative concept of rationality, which demands that choice patterns
display a certain level of consistency and coherence. The leading
neoclassical model of rational choice, Behavioral Decision Theory, is
examined as the solution to the choice problem. Although elegant,
widely applicable and very tractable, this model has come under seri-
ous pressure since the 1970s. The growing behavioural critique of some
of rational choice theory’s central predictions culminated in the pub-
lishing, in 1979, of an alternative model of choice, Prospect Theory.
This perspective represents a different paradigm in the way economists
think about choice.
2.1 Choice, Reason and Rationality
Desire is at the heart of choice and so of the theory of choice. Humans are driven
to make choices by their individual desires, a process that is as natural to being
human as speaking, talking, even breathing. Yet there is more to choice than
desire alone. Reason must form a central part of any story of choice. Moreover,
these two concepts, desire and reason, are fundamentally linked. As Allingham
(2002) notes, choices using reason but lacking desire are vacuous. But desire with-
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out reason is self-defeating: it is the crying child who both wants to go home and
not go home. Our earliest philosophers also identified the connection; Aristotle
said: “The origin of action... is choice and that of choice is desire and reasoning
with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist without... reason.” (Aris-
totle, 1980, Book VI, Line 32).
So it is a central part of the concept of choice that actual choices will be based
on some element of reason or reasonableness. A synonymous term for this idea
is rationality. But what does it mean for choice to display reason, or for actions
to be rational? The answer to this question often depends on who is asking the
question, there is by no means agreement over a unique definition.
A good starting point might be to consider actions or choices which are clearly
not rational1. Actions which clearly result in self-harm such as smoking or excess
drinking would seem to fall into the category of ‘irrational’ behaviour on that ba-
sis. A more general definition of rationality in this spirit might be that it includes
only those actions and choices which are made in self-interest. In an everyday
sense when we refer to people acting rationally this usually means that they are
using reason rather than being under the influence of visceral or instinctive pres-
sures. For example, emotion is recognised by most people as being a powerful
force that may interfere with their powers of reason.
Ludwig von Mises (1949) takes a different tack, arguing that by definition any
action must be rational. This method essentially defines rationality in terms of
revealed preference. If we make a choice or take an action then it must be be-
cause we have a preference for doing so. Such an approach is echoed in Berridge
who says “individual tastes are not a matter for dispute, nor can they be deemed
rational or irrational.” (Berridge, 2001, page 17). This view, while clearly co-
herent, obscures all the factors that are involved in the determination of revealed
preference, essentially putting them into a black box. Thus it is not particularly
useful in aiding our analysis and understanding of choice or, therefore, making
1 This section is based on the arguments in Chapter 9 of Wilkinson (2008) titled “The Nature
of Rationality”.
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policy decisions, which are the goals of this thesis.
Baumeister suggests that “a rational being should... pursue enlightened self-
interest.” (Baumeister, 2001, page 3). This may be a good starting point, but
runs into problems when the terms are defined in detail. For example, does
‘enlightened’ imply that an individual has perfect knowledge, surely a highly
restrictive requirement? What is in the ‘self interest’? What happens if we mis-
judge what is in our self interest, or factors in our self interest come into conflict?
Self interest could mean ‘happiness’ or it could mean ‘pleasure’, two related, but
distinct, ideas which frequently come into conflict, for example when choosing
a dessert in a restaurant which causes pleasure in the short term, but reduces
happiness in the long run through its effects on health.
For economists, the definitions considered in this discussion, while useful, are
too imprecise as building blocks for a theory of choice. They have tended to use
a rather narrower definition, incorporating the idea that rational choices are ones
which maximise individual happiness or utility. To ensure that decision making
does maximise individual utility most economists agree that certain irrefutable
features of choice construction are necessary. In their analysis these irrefutable
conditions become the criteria for rationality. Among other things they include
a specific condition that choices should display some element of consistency and
coherence, for example that a choice pattern should not contradict itself. This
requirement in turn involves most essentially the concept of transitive preferences
which is discussed below.
In other words, for neoclassical economists rationality is an important part of
choice theory because it lends normative status to decision making which uses
it. That is, it allows a prescriptive model of choice to be developed that equates
pursuing desire with maximising individual happiness, or utility, which is the goal
of making choices. The leading neoclassical model in this vein is the Behavioral
Decision Theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As will be explored
in Section 2.2, in the decades after its publication this classic work was widely
adopted as the solution to the fundamental economic choice problem expressed
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in Chapter 1.
Significant theoretical developments across economics were made using this model
of choice and utility maximisation at their heart (for example Sharpe, 1964). It
was taken as a self evident truth that revealed preferences expressed through ac-
tual choices maximise individual happiness which in turn implies that they are
generated by a rational preference structure; and more: that a rational preference
structure implies that choices will maximise individual happiness. Thus to say
that a choice or action is irrational means that that individual’s decision making
apparatus is in some way compromised and so the resulting choice is not optimal2.
For this reason the critiques of the neoclassical choice model, which emerged from
the early 1950s (Allais, 1953) and gathered pace in the 1970s (Slovic and Lichten-
stein, 1971; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Grether and Plott, 1979), presented a
fundamental challenge to choice theory and so to one of the cornerstones of mi-
croeconomic theory. They showed prominent and important situations in which
choices were clearly not rational in the neoclassical sense. Initially dismissed as
demonstrating only isolated paradoxes, this behavioural critique gathered pace
and gained influence. It showed that the assumptions which underpinned the
rational model were psychologically implausible at best, casting doubt on the
relevance of the model as a whole. This set the scene for a dramatic re-thinking
of economists’ concepts of rationality, choice and reason.
This critique is considered in Section 2.3. It begins with the Allais Paradox (Al-
lais, 1953) which demonstrates a simple situation in which individuals violate a
key axiom of the rational model. Further paradoxes and anomalies followed, each
pointing to problems with the assumptions of the rational model or areas where
its applicability seems limited (such as Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971; Grether and
Plott, 1979). An important finding of this early literature arises from analysis of
these papers: that context – also known as framing – matters in decision making.
This concept is vital in creating the possibility of the choice manipulation that is
2 Wilkinson (2008) considers a particularly stark case of failures in decision making apparatus
at page 460.
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the subject of this thesis.
By the late-1970s the collection of problems and paradoxes of the rational model
were unfortunately still just that: a collection. They were without a unifying
intellectual framework; a complete alternative model of choice which could chal-
lenge the rational model in its own terms. This was remedied by the publishing
in leading economic journal Econometrica of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tver-
sky’s Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
This alternative account of decision making under uncertainty unified many of the
themes of the behavioural approach to choice theory. It presents an alternative
account of choice to challenge the von Neumann and Morgenstern model based on
what Kahneman and Tversky call psychological regularities. These include: ref-
erence point effects, the idea that utility is assessed by considering gains or losses
from a reference point rather than absolute amounts; loss aversion, the concept
that perceived losses from the reference point are viewed far more negatively
than gains of a corresponding magnitude; and decision weighting, an alternative
non-Bayesian probability estimation framework by which outcomes are weighted.
Representing the high watermark of this paradigm in economic thought, it is ex-
amined in Section 2.4.
Before considering Prospect Theory though, we must begin by returning to the
economic concept of rationality. The discussion thus far has noted how a precise
definition of rationality is central to choice theory. Next I explore in more detail
why normative models of choice, which invoke rationality, are important and how
one such model became the dominant school of thought in microeconomics.
2.2 Behavioral Decision Theory
A theoretical model of choice behaviour is at the heart of microeconomics. Econo-
mists need a model of choice that describes the way in which humans make de-
cisions because it is a vital part of economics’ usefulness as an academic subject.
The theory of choice has implications that are fundamental to concepts as ab-
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stract as human happiness; to issues as important as government policy; and to
problems as intractable as global environmental protection. Without a suitable
model of choice economists are unable to offer individuals guidance on the ways
in which they might improve their own welfare; or governments on the effects of
policies; or supra-national bodies on how they might effectively tackle the issues
that confront us.
Moreover, economists generally see their own discipline as scientific in philosopher
Karl Popper’s sense of the word, meaning that it is the job of economic theory
to make predictions of how systems work in the world around us and confirm –
or refute – these predictions, with the aim of building better models. Working
towards this ‘ideal’ model is the ongoing concern of economic research.
Also as we have seen, creating a model that has normative as well as positive
implications is desirable. A model that describes that which is is a useful start-
ing point, but for most economists having something to say about that which
ought to be is also at the centre of their world-view.
2.2.1 Formal Model of Choice under Uncertainty
The vast majority of choice involves at least some uncertainty. In their book,
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, John von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
genstern present four axioms which formalise the theory of choice under uncer-
tainty which they call Behavioral Decision Theory. The result is an elegant,
tractable and highly general model of human decision making which was quickly
adopted as the solution to the choice problem. It is normative as well as descrip-
tive, prescribing a way that individuals should make decisions to maximise their
happiness.
Under the assumption of uncertainty, decision making is considered as a pro-
cess of choosing between different gambles, or prospects. Each prospect consists
of a number of outcomes with associated probabilities for each occurring. So for
example, a gamble which will gain the decision maker an apple with probability
30
2.2 Behavioral Decision Theory
0.3 and a banana with probability 0.7 is written as:
g = (apple, 0.3; banana, 0.7)
or, in more general terms:
g = (xi, pi; . . . ;xn, pn)
where xi represents outcomes, and pi represents probabilities.
The formal axioms of preference under uncertainty are presented below.
1. Completeness. This requires that individuals can compare any two gambles,
x and y. The comparison leads to one of three mutually exclusive outcomes:
either x is better than y; y is better than x; or both in which case you are
indifferent between the gambles. This is expressed as follows:
A1. For all x and y: either x  y, y  x or x ∼ y
This requirement has a similar formulation in a model of choice under cer-
tainty. It establishes that for all prospects a preference relation can always
be made.
2. Transitivity. A decision maker considers three different gambles, x, y and
z. If he prefers x to y and y to z then he must prefer x to z. This is
expressed as follows:
A2. x  y and y  z =⇒ x  z
This condition is an essential building block of the normative theory because
it ensures that choices do not contradict themselves. But it is not restrictive
– it is a condition that most people would express that they want to follow
since it is clear that choices which do not follow it do not make sense.
3. Continuity. This principle ensures that choices can be represented by a
preference function that attaches real value to every prospect. It says that
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for all prospects x, y and z where x  y  z there is a probability, p,
which will make the decision maker indifferent between the middle-ranked
prospect, y and a gamble consisting of the other two prospects weighted by
p and (1− p) respectively. It is expressed in formal terms below:
A3. For all x  y  z, there exists a unique p such that px + (1− p)z ∼ y
This axiom ensures that there are not jumps in preference3.
4. Independence. This axiom is the most restrictive building block of the
theory of choice under uncertainty. It has also been called the cancellation
principle, and is known as the substitution axiom in the most important
critique of the theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Broadly it suggests
that preference between two options cannot be altered by the presence of
a third option. Wilkinson (2008) explains the axiom by saying it says that
any state of the world which results in the same outcome regardless of the
choice made should be ignored. It is presented in formal terms as follows:
A4. If x  y, then px + (1− p)z  py + (1− p)z for all z and p ∈ (0, 1)
The axiom makes it clear that if x is preferred to y then the presence of
prospect z, which will happen with probability (1−p) in both cases, makes
no difference to that preference. It can be ‘cancelled’ in the decision maker’s
thoughts.
3 To see why this is important consider the following example. The decision maker has a choice
of snack. The options are apples, biscuits and chocolate. He prefers apples to biscuits and
biscuits to chocolate. He also prefers apples to chocolate which ensures that the transitivity
axiom is met. However, he will prefer biscuits to every gamble which gives either apples or
chocolates, however low the probability of getting chocolates. This set of preferences seems
reasonable if we imagine that the decision maker detests chocolate. But it means there is
a jump in preferences. The decision maker will choose biscuits rather than face the gamble
(apples, p; chocolate, 1 − p). for all values of p which are less than 1. But when p = 1, in
other words when the gamble becomes just a choice of apples or biscuits, the decision maker’s
preference will jump without him ever being indifferent between the two. This may not seem
unsatisfactory in this case, but Allingham (2002) provides an example which illustrates a
situation where it may be. Imagine that the choice of apples is replaced by £1m; biscuits
becomes nothing; and chocolates becomes instant death. Without the continuity axiom the
implication would be that there is no probability that would ever make the decision maker
cross the road, incurring a minute probability of death, to pick up £1m on the other side.
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Together these axioms prescribe the restrictions which must be placed on the
preference function. In addition the theory adds a method for relating preference
to utility (remembering that the goal of choice is to maximise utility). This is
known as the expectation principle and states that the overall utility of a prospect
is the expected utility of its outcomes. Formally:
U(x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn) = p1u(x1) + . . .+ pnu(xn) (2.1)
Thus the method is that each outcome in the prospect is evaluated using the
utility function then weighted according to its probability of occurring. These
can then be summed in the traditional way to generate an overall utility for
the prospect. Thus the decision maker’s task when making choice using the
four axioms and the expectation principle is to maximise the following objective
function:
V (g) =
∑
piu(xi) (2.2)
where g is a prospect and u(·) is a utility function defined on the set of outcomes
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) with probabilities (p1, p2, . . . , pn). A final aspect of the model is
four assumptions which usually accompany the formal axioms. These are desribed
below4.
1. Asset Integration. This says that a prospect is acceptable if and only if the
utility from integrating the prospect with one’s own current assets exceeds
the utility from one’s assets alone. In mathematical form we may write
that we would only accept gamble (x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn) from our current asset
position ω if:
U(ω + x1, p1; . . . ;ω + xn, pn) > u(ω) (2.3)
This condition is fairly simple, just requiring that all prospects are con-
sidered in the round, including our current wealth. They should not be
considered in isolation. This rule is the basis of the capital budgeting con-
cept of Net Present Value (Fisher, 1907). As we will see, there is significant
evidence that this requirement is not met in many scenarios.
4 The are presented in this form in Wilkinson (2008).
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2. Risk Aversion. This is an objective description of choice behaviour which
it is assumed all individuals adhere to. Risk aversion is the preference
for a certain prospect (a) over a risky prospect with expected value a.
A numerical example makes this clear: for a gamble which pays £10 with
probability 0.5 and £20 with probability 0.5 the expected value is £15 using
the procedure in Equation 2.1. If offered the choice between the gamble
and a certain £15, risk aversion says that the certain amount will always be
preferable. To not prefer the certain prospect makes the individual a risk
lover. Investment theory uses this concept in building the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964) which expresses the relationship between the
risk and return of securities.
3. Dominance. This condition says that if x is preferred to y in one state
and at least as good in all other states then x is dominant over y and so
should be chosen. In situations of uncertainty this is known as stochastic
dominance and essentially describes the minimum conditions for decision
makers to find one option better than another.
4. Invariance. This assumption states that different representations of the
same choice problem result in the same preference. Preference relations
should not depend on the description of the options (description invari-
ance) or the method of elicitation (procedure invariance). Although it is
essentially implied by the completeness and transitivity axioms, it is impor-
tant to restate it because it is fundamental to the theory. Without stability
of preference across descriptions and elicitation procedures it becomes im-
possible to represent a person’s choices as utility maximising. Rational
preference as a normative concept is lost.
2.2.2 Summary
For a significant period of the 20th century the rational choice paradigm was the
dominant school of thought in microeconomics. Together the collection of con-
ditions that form the model of choice under certainty and the more general von
Neumann and Morgenstern model present an elegant and tractable solution to
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the choice problem. The latter in particular is extremely general, allowing it to
be applied far and wide in microeconomic theory (and beyond). The status of
the theory is confirmed by the widespread practice of using individuals with ‘von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences’ and that being synonymous with rational ac-
tion itself.
Not only that but it is intuitively compelling, prescribing only the simplest of
rules for choice determination which most individuals would want to follow. Kah-
neman and Tversky noted the theory’s position in economics theory:
“It is accorded all the methodological privileges of a self-evident truth,
a reasonable idealisation, a tautology and a null hypothesis.”
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, page S273).
However, even as the theory was meeting widespread acclaim after its first publi-
cation in 1944, some economists were asking questions about aspects of its formu-
lation and its descriptive accuracy. Existing at first as little more than isolated
paradoxes, these coalesced into a powerful critique that ultimately created a new
paradigm in the theory of choice.
2.3 The Behavioural Critique
Today behavioural economics is a mainstream field of economic enquiry. Be-
havioural theories are used widely to explain phenomena from stock market re-
turns (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995) to why it is impossible to get a taxi on a rainy
day (Camerer et al., 1997); from the way environmental resources are valued
(Hanley, Kristrom and Shogren, 2009) to betting patterns at racetracks (Mc-
Glothlin, 1956). Its founding fathers, psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky have been widely acclaimed for their groundbreaking work, the former
being awarded the Nobel Prize for his contribution in 20025. They have success-
fully challenged the status of the once-dominant rational choice paradigm, forcing
a dramatic re-thinking by economists of the nature of choice and rationality. This
5 Amos Tversky died in 1996.
35
2.3 The Behavioural Critique
body of work presents a new way to think about choice problems which this thesis
aims to use and make further contributions towards.
This change was not immediate, however. It began as a simple critique of the
dominant theory of the day, the neoclassical Behavioral Decision Theory. Sev-
eral isolated studies published in the 1950s cast doubt on the rational model’s
descriptive account of choice, striking at the heart of the axioms and assumptions
on which it is built.
2.3.1 The Allais Paradox
Among the first critiques of the von Neumann-Morgenstern model is Allais (1953)
which presents the now-eponymous paradox. It shows a simple violation of the
independence axiom. The description of it here is taken from Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) exploiting what they call the certainty effect. In the paradox the
decision maker is faced with two problems in which he has to make choices:
Problem 1: Choose between winning
A: 2,500 with probability 0.33, B: 2,400 with certainty.
2,400 with probability 0.66,
0 with probability 0.01.
n=72 [18] [82]*
Problem 2: Choose between winning
C: 2,500 with probability 0.33, D: 2,400 with probability 0.34,
0 with probability 0.67. 0 with probability 0.66.
n=72 [83]* [17]
where n = the number of respondents. The figures in parentheses indicate the
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proportion of respondents who made each choice and * indicates a significant
preference at the 0.01 level. The modal choice of the two was BC, chosen by 61%
of respondents. This pattern violates expected utility theory. To see how, it is
first noted that u(0) = 0. The first preference of B over A implies:
u(2, 400) > 0.33u(2, 500) + 0.66u(2, 400)
or:
0.34u(2, 400) > 0.33u(2, 500)
The second preference of C over D implies the reverse, however. This violates
the independence axiom considered in the previous section because Problem 2 is
obtained from Problem 1 by removing a 0.66 chance of winning 2,400 from both
prospects. Thus it should not affect the preference between the options.
2.3.2 Further Paradoxes
The Allais Paradox presents a challenge to the neoclassical theory because the
violation of one of its central axioms is stark as well as being predictable (ie. not
a random variation). However, far from being an isolated paradox, significant fur-
ther evidence of judgemental errors in decision making was presented in published
work from the early 1970s. Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) and Grether and Plott
(1979) document a series of major inconsistencies in choice behaviour; there are
elementary errors in probabilistic reasoning in Tversky and Kahneman (1983)
casting doubt on the Bayesian operation that is enshrined in the expectation
principle; and Kahneman and Tversky (1984) report violations of the dominance
assumption. Another violation of independence is reported in Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) with the following problem set:
Problem 3: Choose between winning
A: 6,000 with probability 0.45. B: 3,000 with probability 0.90.
n=66 [14] [86]*
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Problem 4: Choose between winning
C: 6,000 with probability 0.001. D: 3,000 with probability 0.002.
n=66 [73]* [27]
Problems 3 and 4 have the same payoffs, with the same relative probabilities
of success (Problem 4 is obtained from Problem 3 by reducing the probability of
success by a factor of 450). Thus an individual who chooses A should also choose
C, while one who chooses B should also choose D. However the choices do not
reflect this. The modal choice is BC which is a violation of independence.
At this stage it is important to emphasize again that these are elementary vi-
olations of the axioms of a model which aims to be the normative solution to
the choice problem - a model of action which individuals do follow and that they
should want to follow to maximise their utility. Kahneman and Tversky con-
clude from the example that common attitudes towards risk and probability are
not being adequately captured by the expected utility model. Grether and Plott
(1979) go further, saying the following of their findings:
“Taken at face value the data are simply inconsistent with preference
theory and have broad implications about research priorities within
economics. The inconsistency is deeper than the mere lack of transi-
tivity or even stochastic transitivity. It suggests that no optimization
principles of any sort lie behind even the simplest of human choices
and that the uniformities in human choice behavior which lie behind
market behavior may result from principles which are of a completely
different sort from those generally accepted.”
(Grether and Plott, 1979, page 623).
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2.3.3 Framing and Choice
As well as these direct violations of individual axioms, Tversky and Kahneman
published other studies showing that individuals may fail to make entirely ra-
tional choices in a variety of situations through the use of rules of thumb to aid
decision making. These heuristics can seriously impair judgement, particularly
with respect to estimates of probability (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
Decision makers are also shown to be particularly vulnerable to errors associated
with the way in which problems are presented. This is known as framing. The
assumption of invariance states that choices should be invariant to the method
of description and of preference elicitation. Yet a series of studies showed that
framing effects can be vital in altering the pattern of choice made. In Tversky
and Kahneman (1981) the psychologists introduce the following problem to illus-
trate their concept of framing. It has become a classic example of behavioural
processes at work in direction violation of the rational choice model.
Problem 5: Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to
combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate
of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved,
and a 2/3 probability that no one will be saved
Which of the two programs would you favour?
In response to this problem the vast majority, 72%, opt for the risk-averse choice:
the prospect of certainly saving 200 lives is preferable to a gamble with an equal
expected value. A second group of participants were given the same cover story
as Problem 5 but with the following outcomes:
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Problem 6:
If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die
If Program B is adopted there is a 1/3 probability that no one will die, and a
2/3 chance that 600 people will die
Which of the two programs would you favour?
It is clear that the options given in Problem 6 are identical to those in Problem
5; the only difference is the way they are expressed. Problem 6 has a ‘negative
frame’ which talks about patients being killed whereas Problem 5 talks in posi-
tive terms of lives saved. Seventy-eight per cent of the respondents to Problem 6
opted for choice B in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) study. This demonstrates
risk loving: respondents do not prefer the certain death of 400 patients over a
gamble which has an equal expected value of deaths. The combination of the
two sets of responses is incompatible with rational choice theory and illustrates
vividly the possibility of framing to manipulate choice.
Other framing problems are presented in Tversky and Kahneman (1986), Thaler
(1985) and Johnson et al. (1993). In Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer
Choice (1980) leading behavioural economist Richard Thaler illustrates framing
effects in a consumer environment. Credit card companies lobbied the United
States Congress to ensure that a new law on credit card charges at store check
outs was expressed as a cash discount rather than a credit card surcharge. Why
this difference given that the two situations are equivalent6? Thaler argues that
the different framing significantly impacts customer attitudes to the charge. Peo-
ple are far happier to forgo a saving (an opportunity cost) than pay a direct
charge (an out of pocket expense), a fact appreciated by credit card companies
who did not want people discouraged from paying by credit card.
6 It will cost more to pay by credit card in both situations.
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The failure of decision making due to violations of invariance on account of
framing are described by Kahneman and Tversky as disturbing: “Invariance
is normatively essential, intuitively compelling, and psychologically infeasible.”
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984, page 344). As Chapter 4 will describe, the im-
portance of the decision frame, which can also be called the context in which the
decision is made, lies in the fact that is leaves the decision maker open to being
manipulated by an economic agent who can alter the decision frame and has the
motivation to do so.
By the 1980s the behavioural critique had gained significant momentum, showing
that, although many of the assumptions of the neoclassical rational choice model
were simple and intuitively compelling, they were untenable from a psychologi-
cal point of view – that is, people simply did not abide by them in real world
situations involving economic choices. Suddenly alarming variations from the
standard story were uncovered and increasingly validated in experimental and
real world settings, including in consumer budgeting (Thaler, 1980, 1985); labour
markets (Camerer et al., 1997); consumer goods (Huber et al., 1982; Simonson,
1989); stock market investment (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Odean, 1998); bet-
ting (McGlothlin, 1956); and insurance (Cicchetti and Dubin, 1994)7. Several of
these form the basis of this thesis and are explored in greater detail in Chapters
3 and 4.
2.3.4 Bounded Rationality and Other Approaches
A natural response to the violations discussed is to reformulate or relax some of
the axioms of the original theory and several papers follow this reasoning. Fried-
man and Sunder (1948) propose that the utility function which arises from the
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) analysis does not fully account for read-
ily observable human choices. Most particularly they point to the simultaneous
purchase of both insurance – to protect against the small risk of a significant
loss – and lottery tickets – to earn the small chance of a significant gain – as
7 Camerer (2000) presents a useful synopsis and summary of behavioural anomalies in real
world choice situations.
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being incompatible with their Behavioral Decision Theory. These actions imply
that individuals cannot have a concave-shaped utility function, as they must to
satisfy risk aversion, over all wealth levels. Instead they argue that the utility
function must have several turning points, yielding areas of risk aversion and risk
loving. Markowitz (1952) points out this formulation of the utility function has
several significant problems of its own and proposes an alternative shape albeit
one which is based on the idea that the utility function might have several turn-
ing points. Also Markowitz’s function is centred around current wealth8 9. This
means abandoning the assumption of asset integration which is a key part of the
von Neumann and Morgenstern analysis. This observation forms the heart of
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) which is reviewed in the next
section.
Some attention focuses specifically on the independence axiom, the source of
many of the violations. Chew and MacCrimmon (1979) introduce weighted util-
ity theory. It is axiomatised in Chew (1983). Essentially the theory says that
people become more risk-averse as the prospects they are faced with improve10.
This modification solves the violations of independence reported by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) but represents simply an ad hoc solution to these problems.
It is not a comprehensive alternative model based on psychological observation.
Bell (1985) proposes disappointment theory as an extension to expected utility
theory. It augmented the objective function expressed in Equation 2.2, including
a term relating to the prior expected utility of the prospect. If this were to be
higher than the evaluated utility then the decision maker would feel disappoint-
ment. Individuals are assumed to be disappointment averse, which accords more
closely with psychological intuition and is able to explain several of the preference
switching violations of the traditional theory.
The most radical changes from neoclassical rational choice models invoke a con-
8 This interpretation is drawn from Levy and Levy (2002).
9 Levy and Levy (2002) present a good analysis of these suggested modifications to the utility
function.
10 This interpretation is drawn from Wilkinson (2008).
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cept known as decision weighting. These functions transform objective proba-
bilities (associated with each outcome of the prospect) into subjective decision
weights. These decision weighting functions often incorporate non-linear transfor-
mations of probabilities and thus give scope for many of the psychological biases
observed in the earlier critiques of the basic models. Once such is the subjective
expected value model of Edwards (1955, 1962).
While such models have intuitive appeal for they explicitly account for the large
bulk of evidence reporting that human subjective assessments of probability are
subject to significant biases (most notably Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), many
allow for violations of dominance which is a significant problem for their status as
normative theories. Quiggin (1982) develops a form of these models which solves
this problem. His rank-dependent expected utility theory uses a decision weighting
function, but ensures that it is sophisticated enough to ensure dominance (also
known as monotonicity). It does this by specifying that the weighting attached to
an outcome depends not only on the objective probability of an event but also its
ranking relative to other outcomes in the prospect. These models generally offer
a better fit to empirical reality than the expected utility theory. However there
remains a significant class of problems which they cannot explain, including the
widely reported violations of invariance and transitivity. None of these models
have become widely accepted as alternative solutions to the choice problem.
Another approach is adopted by Simon (1957). He emphasises that decision
makers can depart quite significantly from the optimal behaviour imposed by the
neoclassical model, but that this may simply reflect their own cognitive limita-
tions. He terms this approach bounded rationality. It acknowledges that human
decision makers have a finite ability to acquire and process information. This may
be due to intellect, but might also stem from other quite reasonable constraints
such as time. In this framework the individual has limited time to make a deci-
sion and so may not devote his entire cognitive energy to making an absolutely
optimal decision when a near-optimal one will do in most cases. Rationality is
then bounded by limitations of cognitive capacity and conscious necessity.
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2.3.5 Summary
The neoclassical model came under attack in the years after its formulation from
a variety of sources. Early papers represented isolated studies casting doubt on
individual axioms of the theory. But these criticisms grew in number and impor-
tance as violations of independence, dominance and even transitivity – accepted
by most as essential for a normative theory – were seen and validated in experi-
mental and empirical work.
Attempts have been made to relax or reformulate some of the axioms. Simon’s
model of bounded rationality has become a key defence of neoclassical economists
who seek to maintain rational choice theory as a normative model in the face of
these criticisms.
The majority of the criticisms have one thing in common: they note the psy-
chological implausibility of the central tenets of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
analysis. Friedman’s (1953) ‘as if’ principle is frequently cited as a justification
for models which make unrealistic assumptions: providing individuals behave as
if they were following the axioms then its status as a descriptive model is not
compromised. The behavioural critique successfully challenged the descriptive
accuracy of the model. By providing further evidence of a choice scenario where
decision making may be compromised this thesis aims, among other things, to
contribute to that body of literature.
A fortunate aspect of the behavioural critique is that it provides an obvious
place to start formulating an alternative model of choice: by looking towards
the mental processes underlying the violations observed and formulating more
psychologically plausible assumptions on which to build a theory.
2.4 Prospect Theory
The central plank around which this paradigm has coalesced is an alternative
model of choice. Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory was published in
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leading journal Econometrica in 1979. It has become one of the most influential
papers in economics. A recent survey found that it was the second most-frequently
cited work in the subject in the last thirty years11.
As with the burgeoning field of behavioural economics as a whole, the aim of
the model they propose is to improve economists’ theory of choice. Arguing that
the neoclassical rational choice model is based on flawed psychological reasoning
about the way human decision processes occur, they aim to use psychological
observations to place the theory on a firmer footing. This, they argue, results in
a model with greater explanatory power. Importantly Kahneman and Tversky
do not propose that their model is normative, merely that it provides an accurate
descriptive account of choice. In other words their model makes no claims as to
how humans should make choice; it recounts simply how they do make choice.
The basis of the model is the observation of four regularities in human choice, all
at odds with the neoclassical theories of choice and all incorporating aspects of
psychology that are not captured by the von Neumann-Morgenstern analysis.
2.4.1 Psychological Regularities
The first psychological regularity which forms the backbone of Prospect Theory
(henceforth, PT) is that outcomes are defined relative to some reference point
which acts as the zero point on the value scale. In other words, outcomes are
all seen as gains and losses to this reference point. This is in contrast to the
principle of rational choice theory, which suggests that individuals will consider
outcomes in terms of final states integrated with their current wealth position
(as in Equation 2.3). The determination of the reference point depends on the
context, although it is expected that the current position, or status quo, will
naturally form the reference point.
This is not always the case though. Aspirations may come into play, so that
11 The most cited paper, according to Kim, Morse and Zingales (2006) is White’s “A
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity”
Econometrica (1980).
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if an individual is told they are receiving a pay rise of £5,000 they would be
happy, but when they learn that a colleague has got £6,000 this acts the natural
reference point. In this situation joy at a gain would quickly turn into anger at a
perceived ‘loss’. Such a reaction is essentially inadmissible in the plainest reading
of rational choice theory12.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that the reason for this regularity is that
our perceptual apparatus are more attuned to recording changes than absolute
magnitudes. They argue that this is the case for human responses to attributes
such as brightness, loudness and temperature. Wilkinson (2008) points out that
this regularity is not an innovation of the PT model however. Its history in eco-
nomic thought lies at least as far back with the work of Markowitz (1952) and
Helson (1964).
Reference point effects are a widespread finding in many of the studies of be-
haviour already discussed, particularly among stock market investors (Shefrin
and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998) and gamblers (McGlothlin, 1956). Odean finds
a marked reluctance to sell stock investments in which the investor is currently
making a loss compared to those in which the investor is making a gain com-
pared to the purchase price. Investors seem to hang on to their losers and sell
their winners to avoid the psychological pain of crystallising a ‘loss’ from the ref-
erence point. This observation is not a direct proof of irrationality however. Such
a regularity could be the result of individuals’ rational belief that the fortunes of
their loss-making investments will improve and revert to their mean performance,
but if that is the case the beliefs are certainly misplaced: Odean shows that the
decisions turn out to be sub-optimal far more frequently than not.
The second regularity, which combines with reference point effects is summarised
succinctly by Kahneman and Tversky (1979):
“A salient characteristic of attitudes to changes in welfare is that
losses loom larger than gains. The aggravation that one experiences
12 Although it clearly accords more closely with disappointment theory of Bell (1985).
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in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure as-
sociated with gaining the same amount.”
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, page 279).
Kahneman and Tversky dub this finding loss aversion. Once again there is no
place for this psychological intuition in the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory13.
However studies have found consistent evidence of it. The findings relating to
stock market investments of Shefrin and Statman (1985) and Odean (1998) in-
corporate elements of both reference point effects and loss aversion. In housing
markets too Genesove and Mayer (2001) find evidence that the price paid for a
property forms a significant reference point, below which owners are significantly
more reluctant to sell14.
A third aspect vital to the alternative model of choice proposed by Kahneman and
Tversky is diminishing marginal sensitivity. This suggests that the importance
of both gains and losses decreases with their magnitude. From a technical per-
spective this property is desirable because it ensures that the preference/ value
function is concave, as it is in the rational choice theory. In that theory it is
known as the law of diminishing returns. A discussion on the precise way in
which this observation influences the PT value function is deferred until the next
section.
A final psychological regularity in the Kahneman and Tversky analysis is decision
weighting. This aspect has been incorporated into other alternative theories of
choice and says, in its broadest form, that humans are not Bayesian probability
operators in the manner that the expected utility theory suggests they will be.
In this analysis, risky outcomes are multiplied by a decision weight in a manner
similar to the weighting of outcomes by their Bayesian probability (whether sub-
jective or objective) in the expectation principle, but that these decision weights
13 The previous section discussed changes to the utility function which might accommodate
observations such as this, including Friedman and Sunder (1948) and Markowitz (1952).
Prospect Theory builds on this observation but takes it further by incorporating it into a
comprehensive alternative model.
14 Behavioural aspects of real estate markets will be considered further in Chapter 3.
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are not probabilities and are not measures of belief of likelihood.
The decision weighting function is denoted pi(p). According to Kahneman and
Tversky: “decision weights measures the impact of events on the desirability of
prospects, and not merely the perceived likelihood of these events.” (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979, page 280). If the expectation principle holds then pi(p) = p
but not otherwise. As expected, pi is an increasing function of p, and it is bounded
so that pi(0) = 0 and pi(1) = 1 meaning impossible events are ignored and cer-
tain events are weighted in full. Otherwise the key properties of the weighting
function are below:
1. The weighting function is a subadditive function of p. In other words
pi(rp) > rpi(p) for 0 < r < 1. This is seen in Problem 4 (Section 2.3.2). In
that problem (6, 000, 0.001) is preferred to (3, 000, 0.002). Hence:
pi(0.001)
pi(0.002)
>
v(3, 000)
v(6, 000)
>
1
2
where v(·) is a value function. The relation is maintained by the concavity
of v which is guaranteed by the diminishing marginal sensitivity property.
Subadditivity does not necessarily hold for larger values of p.
2. Overweighting of low probabilities. The following problems illustrate15:
Problem 7: Choose between winning
A: 5,000 with probability 0.001. B: 5 with certainty.
n=72 [72]* [28]
15 Reproduced from Kahneman and Tversky (1979), page 281.
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Problem 7*: Choose between winning
C: -5,000 with probability 0.001. D: -5 with certainty.
n=72 [17] [83]*
In Problem 7 people prefer what is in effect a lottery ticket over the ex-
pected value of that ticket, whereas in Problem 7* they prefer a small loss,
which can been seen as the payment of an insurance premium, over the
small probability of a large loss. The preference for the lottery in Problem
7 implies:
pi(0.001)v(5, 000) > v(5)
hence:
pi(0.001) >
v(5)
v(5, 000)
.
Since the concavity of the value function implies that:
v(5)
v(5, 000)
> 0.001
we can write:
pi(0.001) > 0.001
3. Subcertainty. It is suggested for all 0 < p < 1, pi(p) + pi(1 − p) < 1.
This property can be seen from the Allais-type violations. Thus the slope
of pi in the interval (0, 1) can be viewed as a measure of the sensitivity
of preferences to changes in probability. Subcertainty ensures that pi is
regressive with respect to p, in other words preferences are generally less
sensitive to changes in probability than the expectation principle would
suggest.
4. Subproportionality. This property is implied by the violations of the substi-
tution axiom. These violations conform to the rule that if (x, p) ∼ (y, pq)
then (x, pr) is not preferred to (y, pqr) for 0 < p, q, r ≤ 1. If this is applied
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to a value function, v(·):
pi(p)v(x) ∼ pi(pq)v(y)
implies:
pi(pr)v(x) ≤ pi(pqr)v(y);
hence:
pi(pq)
pi(p)
≤ pi(pqr)
pi(pr)
This means that for a fixed ratio of probabilities the ratio of correspond-
ing decision weights is closer to 1 with low probabilities than with higher
probabilities.
A weighting function which satisfies these properties is illustrated in Figure 2.2
in the next section (page 54).
There is a significant amount of evidence that humans are bad at probability
judgements. These are most comprehensively discussed in Tversky and Kahne-
man (1974) which shows that individuals frequently use rules of thumb to help
them make probability judgements. These are often biased by such factors as the
ease with which events can be recalled, or the extent to which the assessment
matches pre-existing probability estimations. As a result judgement is seriously
compromised. But beyond that there is evidence pointing towards the properties
of the weighting function that Tversky and Kahneman suggest including Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) and Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992). Prelec (1998) also
discusses the nature of the decision weighting function extensively.
Having put these regularities in mind, we can proceed towards Kahneman and
Tversky’s full model of choice under uncertainty.
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2.4.2 Formal Model
Prospect Theory distinguishes two phases of the decision making process: an ini-
tial phase known as editing which consists of an initial analysis of the offered
prospects and often includes simplifications of them; and a second phase of eval-
uation in which the prospects are evaluated and the one offering the highest value
is chosen. In this latter sense Kahneman and Tversky’s conception of choice is
of an optimisation exercise that is similar to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s,
only using a starkly different method for doing so. The editing phase is also vital
since it is not expected to be independent of the frame or method of presenta-
tion of the prospects. This means that the invariance assumption is likely to be
violated consistently, as well as suggesting that the order in which prospects are
considered is likely to be important. In the choice scenarios that are the focus of
this thesis, the presentation frame makes the editing phase especially critical, so
a discussion of the nature and importance of it is left until the next section.
All prospects are gambles of the form (x, p; y, q) which pay x with probability
p and y with probability q. If q = 0 then that outcome is omitted. Following the
editing phase, as mentioned above, the decision maker evaluates the prospects
and is assumed to select the prospect with the highest value.
The overall value of an edited prospect, denoted V , is expressed in terms of
two scales pi and v. The former associates with each probability, p, a decision
weight, pi(p), which reflects the impact of p on the overall value of the prospect.
The latter scale, v, is a value function, assigning to each outcome, x, a number,
v(x), which reflects the subjective value of the outcome. All outcomes are defined
relative to the reference point, which serves as the zero value of the scale. Thus,
v measures the value of deviations from the reference point (gains and losses).
The basic version of the theory includes simple prospects with a maximum of
two non-zero outcomes. In the prospect above one receives x with a probability
of p, y with a probability q, and 0 with a probability 1− p− q, where p+ q ≤ 1.
An offered prospect is said to be strictly positive if its outcomes are all positive,
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ie. if x, y > 0 and p+ q = 1; it is strictly negative if its outcomes are all negative.
Any prospect not satisfying these restrictions is regular.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) form the basic equation of the theory which de-
scribes the manner in which p and v are combined to determine the overall value
of a regular prospect. If (x, p; y, q) is a regular prospect such that either p+q < 1,
or x ≥ 0 ≥ y, or x ≤ 0 ≤ y, then:
V (x, p; y, q) = pi(p)v(x) + pi(q)v(y) (2.4)
where v(0) = 0, pi(0) = 0 and pi(1) = 116.
For strictly positive or negative prospects the rule is slightly different. For these
types of prospects, in the editing phase there is segregation into two components:
the riskless gain or loss which is certain to be obtained; and the risky compo-
nent which is dependent on the outcome of the gamble. The evaluation of these
prospects is as follows. If p+ q = 1 and either x > y > 0 or x < y < 0, then:
V (x, p; y, q) = v(y) + pi(p)[v(x)− v(y)] (2.5)
So the value of a strictly positive or negative prospect equals the value of the
riskless component plus the value-difference between the two outcomes multi-
plied by the decision weight associated with the more extreme outcome17. Thus
the critical feature of Equation 2.5 is that the decision weight is not applied to
the certain component, y.
The value function incorporates several of the features discussed in the previous
section. These include that the carriers of wealth are changes in wealth rather
than final states; that gain and loss functions display diminishing sensitivity; and
16 See the Appendix of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) for an axiomatic analysis of the theory
including the conditions needed to ensure the existence of a unique pi and a ratio-scale v
satisfying Equation 2.4.
17 This equation has echoes in the Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964). There is
no evidence that Kahneman and Tversky intended the link however, especially given the
particular features of the functions v(·) and pi(·) which have already been discussed.
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Figure 2.1: The value function. Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979), page 279.
that losses loom larger than gains so that the pain associated with losing an
amount of money is greater than the pleasure associated with winning an equal
amount. The result is an S-shaped function which depicted in Figure 2.1.
The key characteristics are clear: the function is defined relative to the refer-
ence point and is kinked around it to reflect that. Losses are worse than gains
of corresponding magnitude by the fact that the function is steeper for losses
than gains. The diminishing sensitivity property is seen by the concavity of the
function in the region of gains and convexity in the region of losses. As a result
there will be risk aversion in the domain of gains, and risk seeking in the domain
of losses (an observation evident in the stock market behaviour reported earlier
in this chapter).
The weighting function has been discussed in the previous section and is reported
in Figure 2.2. It is relatively shallow in the middle and changes abruptly near the
end-points. It has discontinuities, especially at very low probabilities indicating
that there is a limit to how small a decision weight can be attached to an event
(otherwise it is disregarded).
Equations 2.4 and 2.5 show that the attitude towards a risky prospect is not
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Figure 2.2: Decision weighting function. Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
page 283.
solely determined by the utility function, but by the combination of v and pi. It
is possible to analyse when risk seeking and risk aversion is expected to occur
using this functional form. Kahneman and Tversky illustrate with the choice
between the gamble (x, p) and its expected value (px). If we are in the domain
of gains (ie. x > 0) risk seeking is implied whenever pi(p) > v(px)/v(x) which
is greater than p if the value function for gains is concave. Hence overweighting
(pi(p) > p) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for risk seeking in the do-
main of gains, contrary to what is usually seen. The opposite is true for losses
(ie. when x ≤ 0). This means that risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for
losses is expected to occur only at small probabilities where the overweighting
condition is expected to hold. It is the overweighting of small probabilities that
favours both gambling and insurance, whereas the S-shaped value function acts
against both types of behaviour. These are the typical conditions under which
lottery tickets and insurance policies are sold, behaviour contrary to the expected
utility model.
Responding to criticisms of the initial form of the model, particularly with respect
to the decision weighting function, an updated version of the theory was devel-
oped and is reported in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Known as Cumulative
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Prospect Theory it modifies the decision-weighting function to ensure that certain
properties, such as dominance, are assured18. But the underlying psychological
observations have remained unmodified in the 30 years hence.
2.4.3 The Importance of the Editing Phase
Kahneman and Tversky reserve some of their discussion for an analysis of the
editing phase of the theory. To summarise again: in this part of the decision pro-
cess it is argued that prospects are considered in their initial form and perhaps
simplified before evaluation. These operations can have an important impact
on the ultimate decision if choice frames are manipulated to exploit the way
prospects are perceived in this phase. Searching for property – particularly on-
line as discussed in Chapter 4 – involves significant amounts of ‘Kahneman and
Tversky editing’: making quick judgements based on salient characteristics, dis-
carding certain prospects (properties) and so on. Thus editing is likely to be an
important part of the behavioural manipulation strategies that are the focus of
this thesis.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) consider six operations that may be part of the
editing phase. These are considered below.
1. Coding. In this operation the prospects are assumed to be categorised into
‘gain’ or ‘loss’ according to the psychological regularity discussed earlier in
relation to reference points.
2. Combination. Here prospects can be simplified by combining probabilities
associated with identical outcomes, for example the prospect (50, 0.2; 50, 0.3)
will be reduced to (50, 0.5) and evaluated in this form.
3. Segregation. Some prospects contain riskless elements which are segregated
from the risky components and evaluated separately. For example, the
prospect (200, 0.60; 300, 0.2) is more naturally separated into a sure gain of
200 and the prospect (100, 0.2) and evaluated as such.
18 In the 1979 version of the model this is not guaranteed, something that is widely regarded
as unacceptable in a theory of choice.
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4. Cancellation. This operation was described earlier in respect of reported
violations of the independence axiom. If prospects share certain identical
components these may be discarded or ignored. The following problems,
reported in the 1979 paper, illustrate:
Problem 8: Choose between winning
A: 4,000 with probability 0.20. B: 3,000 with probability 0.25.
n=95 [65]* [35]
Problem 9: Consider the following two stage game. In the first stage
there is a probability of 0.75 to end the game without winning anything,
and a probability of 0.25 to move into the second stage. If you reach the
second stage you have a choice between:
C: 4,000 with probability 0.80. D: 3,000 with certainty.
n=141 [12] [78]*
In Problem 9 the decision maker has a choice between a 0.25× 0.80 = 0.20
chance to win 4,000 and a 0.25×1.0 = 0.25 chance to win 3,000. So in terms
of final states Problems 8 and 9 are identical. Yet the majority choice is
different in the two problems. Kahneman and Tversky say that the reason
for this violation of invariance is that when faced with Problem 9 individu-
als ignore (cognitively ‘cancel’) stage one of the game because it is common
to both prospects. They also term this an isolation effect because stage two
is isolated from stage one in the decision maker’s mind.
This pair of problems demonstrates clearly how an operation in the editing
phase can have an important – and non-rational – impact on the decision
maker.
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5. Simplification. This operation is on some levels a description of the entire
editing process. But it also refers to certain rounding operations associated
with outcomes and probabilities. For example the prospect (199, 0.51) is
likely to be coded as an even chance to win 200. Or extremely unlikely
events may be discarded. This contributes to Allais-type violations, among
other things.
6. Detection of Dominance. In this operation the prospects are scanned to
detect dominated options, which are discarded without further evaluation.
The editing phase is not expected to be independent of the presentation frame
of the decision, or the order in which editing operations occur, so they have the
potential to exert a powerful influence on ultimate choices.
Moreover, as discussed above, for certain choices this element of the process
is propelled to the fore. In particular, where there are many choices one could
expect that the initial phase of simplifying and narrowing down the options to
engage this function heavily. Chapter 1 discussed the housing choice scenario that
is the basis of this thesis, one which, while vital for overall welfare and hence a
choice over which considerable deliberation is made, nonetheless involves a great
deal of simplification. There may be hundreds of options which must be narrowed
down to make the choice process feasible19. Important simplifications in the edit-
ing phase seem inevitable. For example a house may be labelled according to just
a few salient characteristics, such as “big garden” or “good period features” or
it may be discarded because it does not have a certain feature (eg. “no parking
space”). All this before the options are evaluated.
Adding to this, Chapter 5 discusses the methodology for completing the experi-
ments and reports how one of the studies incorporates a design which replicates
a choice frame that has grown explosively in the last 10 years: online. Estate
agents and others marketing houses have embraced the online forum for this
19 Note that at this stage no assumption on the form of the utility optimisation that is part of the
choice itself is strictly necessary. It could be an optimisation in the spirit of the von Neumann-
Morgenstern model, or incorporate elements of Kahneman and Tversky’s behavioural theory.
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choice perhaps more than any other, with the leading websites boasting property
listings in the millions in the UK alone, and billions of individual page views.
The way online listings are set up provides a more natural role for editing in
the Kahneman and Tversky sense than ever before. It is easy to imagine that
where housing choice begins with an online search, initial preferences, which are
so powerful in conditioning ultimate choices made, are likely to be powerfully
influenced by the initial phase of searching and editing. Although discussed by
Kahneman and Tversky in their original analysis, the majority of research into
choices that utilises the behavioural paradigm does not attempt to focus explic-
itly on the editing phase. This thesis provides evidence which fills this gap in a
choice scenario where it is expected to be vital.
2.4.4 Criticisms
In the years after its publication, Prospect Theory became the leading theoretical
work in the new field of behavioural economics, in turn influencing vast swathes
of the economics discipline. But it has been subject to criticism.
Some of the criticisms relate to the editing phase discussed in the previous section.
As Wilkinson (2008) discusses, they are not defined precisely or incorporated in a
comprehensive sense into the model. Rather they sit outside the main framework
of the model as a collection of decision making operations which may influence
decision making in certain situations. This is somewhat unsatisfactory because it
makes the model less parsimonious. It is also undesirable from a more technical
point of view because one implication of the editing phase is that violations of
dominance and transitivity are possible20. Quiggin (1982) calls this an undesir-
able result and other economists have doubted that it is possible to have a model
of preference that incorporates such a violation.
To a certain extent this criticism is remedied with the publication of Cumula-
tive Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) which incorporates aspects
20 It is typically regarded as a minimum pre-requisite of all models of choice that they satisfy
the basic property that dominated alternatives should never be chosen. The 1979 version of
Prospect Theory does not guarantee this.
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of editing into the main model, ensuring in particular that violations of domi-
nance are not possible.
Technical criticism also comes from Levy and Levy (2002) who dispute the accu-
racy of the S-shaped value function. Instead they argue that a reverse S-shape,
as originally proposed by Markowitz (1952) is more applicable in most situations
involving mixed prospects, that is, prospects with both positive and negative out-
comes. This interpretation is disputed by Wakker (2003) though, who counters
that the Levy and Levy interpretation is incorrect because it entirely neglects
the weighting function, the second key pillar of PT. In respect of the weighting
function Prelec (1998) offers some criticism and proposed modification of its func-
tional form, though does not dispute the underlying rationale of the theory.
Section 2.3.4 (page 41) discussed that one response to the behavioural critique
and the behavioural regularities observed in experimental data is to reformulate
aspects of the rational choice theory to render the alternative model unnecessary.
Altering the shape of the utility function, as Markowitz (1952) does, or relax-
ing specific axioms, such as independence in Chew and MacCrimmon (1979) are
partial fixes for the problems uncovered in the theory. However no reformulation
of the original theory has managed to fully repair the breach caused by Kahne-
man and Tversky’s fundamental observation: that the process of decision making
which is implied by the axioms of rational choice are not psychologically plausible.
Another line of criticism is to limit the scope of the violations of rational choice.
For example there is some evidence that individuals do make improved – by which
we mean more rational – decisions when they are more experienced at making
a particular decision (List, 2003, 2004). Furthermore the bounded rationality
approach of Simon (1957) acknowledges that individuals will not always make
strictly rational decisions, but says that this is driven not by a fundamental flaw
in the rational choice model. Rather, the time and effort spent making a rational
choice will be conditioned by the importance of the decision. For minor deci-
sions, such as buying household items like food, the observation of judgemental
errors should not therefore be regarded as particularly significant. This approach
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argues that where the choice is important the decision maker will take the time
and effort to make a good (rational) choice.
This criticism naturally extends to the methodology used to uncover many of
the purported biases in choice. Much of the initial research work, in particular
that by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), is based on experimental choice data
with low stakes and arguably unimportant decisions. Chapter 5 discusses these
criticisms of experimental techniques in economics. Here it should suffice to say
that experimental economics is today a widely accepted methodology for which
one of the founders, Vernon Smith, earned a Nobel Prize. Moreover there is a
considerable body of empirical evidence which also points to consistent viola-
tions of rational choice (for example McGlothlin, 1956; Thaler, 1980; Camerer
et al., 1997; Odean, 1998). Also, as discussed in Chapter 1, this criticism pro-
vides a natural motivation for the research in this thesis because buying a house
is among the most important ever made by an individual. If there is one situation
where an individual should take time and effort to make a rational choice it is this.
An important criticism of the theory and of the behavioural paradigm in general
is its non-normative status. The neoclassical rational choice theory prescribed
a method of choice that would maximise individual utility. In other words it
prescribed the way individuals should make choices. In contrast to Behavioral
Decision Theory, PT attempts only to provide a descriptive account of choice. It
offers no norms of behaviour that individuals should follow.
This criticism can be addressed in two distinct, but related, ways. Earlier in
this chapter it was argued that economists generally see their discipline as being
scientific in the sense that its aim is to formulate theories to explain naturally
occurring phenomena and use evidence to confirm or reject them, with a view to
developing more accurate theories. Thus it seems odd to reject a model which can
offer better predictions because it does not have certain normatively appealing
characteristics, as Starmer (2000) suggests:
“There should be no prior supposition that the best models will be
the ones based on the principles of rational choice, no matter how
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appealing those may seem from a normative point of view.”
(Starmer, 2000, page 363).
Whether it offers normative prescriptions or not, the behavioural approach offers
a new perspective on choice, and a different way forward in the quest to produce
better models. This alone makes it a worthy area of inquiry.
Moreover, even if this criticism of PT is accepted, it may be irrelevant in re-
spect of the purpose of this thesis: to investigate the extent to which, and by
what means, housing choice can be manipulated in non-rational ways by a will-
ing economic agent. In this sense the behavioural approach offers a method of
analysis for the problem, with the different insights into human decision making
informing the models of choice manipulation used.
Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) agree, saying that behavioural economics is
a collection of tools and ideas. They suggest that the field should be conceived
of as a power drill: using a wide variety of drill bits to perform different jobs.
While such an approach does reduce its parsimony, it is clear that generality is
the beneficiary.
2.4.5 Summary
Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory is intended to be an alternative de-
scriptive account of human decision making. It aims to put choice theory on
a firmer footing by using more psychologically plausible assumptions on which
to build the theory. Four principle psychological regularities form this founda-
tion: reference points, loss aversion, diminishing marginal sensitivity and decision
weighting. Kahneman and Tversky were not the first to use any of these insights,
but they were the first to place them together in a unified theory that could be a
better predictor of behaviour than the neoclassical model based around the von
Neumann and Morgenstern analysis.
The theory has become one of the most influential papers of the past 30 years in
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economics and sits, with its successor Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992), at the heart of the paradigm of behavioural economics.
This alternative paradigm has so far tended to steer clear of normative pre-
scriptions. Although this has resulted in some criticism, it does not blunt its
usefulness as a method of analysis for the phenomena that are the focus of this
thesis: choice manipulation in housing choice scenarios.
2.5 Conclusion
Having a satisfactory model of choice is important because making choices goes
to the heart of the economic problem: how to get the most utility from our unlim-
ited desires but with scarce resources. Understanding how to make good choices
is, therefore, vital in securing human happiness. It is also important for policy
making, for if we are to make good policies it is critical that we know how indi-
viduals are likely to alter their behaviour in reaction to them. It is for this reason
that formulating and improving our models of choice has pre-occupied microe-
conomists for the best part of the 20th century and there is evidence that desire,
reason and choice were important considerations for our earliest philosophers too.
Having been accepted as the normative solution to the choice problem with its
de´nouement in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), the rational choice model
has come under significant pressure. At first the gaps in its applicability and
accuracy were seen as little more than isolated paradoxes, but these doubts grew,
particularly in research published from the early 1970s (for example Slovic and
Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Grether and Plott, 1979; Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979).
Attempts have been made to improve neoclassical models of choice by relaxing
and reformulating assumptions (such as Quiggin, 1982; Chew, 1983; Bell, 1985)
or by suggesting natural limitations of the theory such as bounded rationality (Si-
mon, 1957). However the weaknesses exposed by the behavioural critique – that
the underpinnings of rational choice theory are assumptions about behaviour that
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are psychologically flawed – set the stage for a re-evaluation of choice theory. Led
by Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory (1979) a new paradigm in choice
theory was opened. It is a process that continues so that in its simplest form,
as discussed in Chapter 1, the primary motivation for this thesis is to provide
further evidence to this end: understand decision making in an important area
of decision making to contribute to improved models of choice.
However in a more specific sense the motivation behind this thesis lies in the
insights the behavioural paradigm explored in this chapter can give us into our
field of interest. Even if it is accepted that the rational choice model is the nor-
mative solution to choice and that it does provide an adequate description of
choice behaviour in the majority of cases, it is clear that there are significant
areas where decision making falls short of the standard required. Whatever the
underlying cause, it is clear that lapses of judgement are possible and even likely
in certain situations. Thus, in the very least, it is important to explore when,
and in what situations, we are vulnerable to these lapses and the situations when
others might look the exploit this weakness.
As will be seen in Chapter 3, some areas of consumer decision making have been
subject to behavioural analysis and many important results already achieved.
This thesis will, in first instance, build upon these results. But, as discussed in
Chapter 1, among consumer choices, house purchase stands out as among the
most significant. Yet that research which does look at decision making in this
area rarely uses behavioural insights. Significant advances in our understanding
of the dynamics of housing markets are possible using this perspective.
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 3 will review the research that has been
undertaken in both real estate markets and consumer choice theory. Chapter 4
considers the ways in which choice and judgement may be vulnerable to manip-
ulation and consider why it may be in the estate agent’s interest to do so. It
makes several hypotheses in this regard. Chapter 5 concludes Part II by explor-
ing the methodology that will be employed to investigate the hypotheses before
the results are reported in Part III and conclusions drawn in Part IV.
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Chapter 3
Review of the Literature
This chapter surveys two literatures which form the background to
the work in this thesis. First it considers the varied research which
has examined behaviour in real estate scenarios. It finds that, al-
though a behavioural perspective has been used in some studies of
real estate markets, such as professional valuation, our understanding
of the microeconomics of housing choices would benefit greatly from
a behavioural perspective. In particular there is scope for a new focus
on the role of an agent capable of manipulating preference construc-
tion and so influencing choice. Secondly it considers the studies into
consumer decision making which have highlighted the precise ways in
which choices can be manipulated in non-rational ways. These can
be thought of under three headings: biases arising from choice set
manipulation; biases due to option viewing order; and biases in value
judgements.
3.1 Introduction
In the years since its publication in 1944, many papers have shown that human
decision making and choice can fall well short of the standard required in the
Behavioral Decision Theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). But just
how important are these failings? This question is the subject of significant con-
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troversy that has gone to the heart of microeconomics, for the doubt its answer
may cast on the normative theory of rational choice.
It has certainly had a spectacular impact on the theoretical underpinnings of
the field. Chapter 2 considered the theory of choice and its evolution from these
neoclassical foundations, which claimed to offer a normative solution to the choice
problem, to the behavioural insights of the 1970s and the dramatic re-thinking
of our concept of rationality. In the very least it is clear that limitations in in-
formation processing and short term memory (Newell and Simon, 1972; Simon,
1978) can lead to systematic errors of judgement which must be termed ‘irra-
tional’ under the neoclassical formulation. The work of behavioural economists
has taken the theory a great deal further, most particularly showing how the use
of cognitive short-cuts, or heuristics, can lead to systematic errors of judgement
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971).
The work contained in this thesis will make a contribution to the theory of choice
directly, but it has a further source of motivation. The general aim, expressed
in Chapter 1, is to consider the extent to which, and by what means, housing
choice can be manipulated in non-rational ways by a willing economic agent. In
this sense, the evolving field of behavioural economics offers a new perspective to
consider housing choice and the dynamics of housing markets.
There is a varied body of research which considers behaviour in real estate sce-
narios. It is considered in the next section of this chapter. The existing research
that could be included under the heading of “behaviour and real estate” has
tended to fall into two camps. Firstly there is research examining behavioural
anomalies in a real estate context, particularly in value judgements. However
this typically focuses on commercial real estate or the decisions of professional
valuers and agents. Secondly there is a literature considering the microeconomic
dynamics of housing markets which has gone beyond neoclassical approaches.
However it does not employ a behavioural approach in the sense now recognised
by economists and largely ignores the role of market participants in producing
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outcomes by manipulating decision making1. Our understanding of the microeco-
nomics of housing choices would benefit greatly from this behavioural perspective.
The second part of this literature review, which begins in Section 3.2, consid-
ers the studies into consumer decision making which have highlighted the precise
ways in which choices can be manipulated in non-rational ways. Prior research
has considered both the psychological aspects which contribute to judgemental
errors and more specifically how and when manipulations in choice can occur.
These are best considered using three headings, as in the following sections in
this literature review.
Firstly there are biases arising from manipulating choice sets, that is, the op-
tions seen by decision makers. The independence assumption of rational choice
theory ensures that the choice between two options cannot be affected by the
presence, or lack thereof, of other options. This also implies that the context,
also known as the decision frame (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), is not impor-
tant in determining choice. However there is significant evidence contradicting
this theoretical proposition which suggests how decision frames may be used re-
liably to influence choice.
Another way in which decision making can be manipulated is through the or-
der in which options are viewed. As previously discussed, traditional rational
choice models do not admit this part of the decision frame to influence decision
making, but, through a psychological process known as anchoring (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974), there is some evidence that viewing order is important in de-
termining choice patterns. This is potentially an important finding in the context
of housing choice because here options are naturally viewed in a sequential way.
Finally we consider biases in value judgements. Given the importance of house
purchase from a personal finance perspective, judging value correctly is likely to
be vital and the consequences of errors significant. Yet a review of the literature
1 An exception is the literature on redlining by credit bodies (such as Munnell et al., 1996;
Jones and Maclennan, 1987). Also, Pearce (1979) considers racial steering by estate agents.
67
3.2 Real Estate, Housing and Behaviour
suggests that psychological processes underlying numerical judgement can be se-
riously flawed and open to manipulation.
As Chapter 1 made clear, by presenting evidence of non-rational decision making
in a new, and arguably more important, scenario than has been done before, this
thesis makes a contribution to the economic theory of choice. But, perhaps most
importantly, the research offers a clear path to deepening our understanding of
how housing choices come to be made, and therefore to the dynamics of hous-
ing markets themselves. The review that follows establishes this as a powerful
motivation for the work at hand.
3.2 Real Estate, Housing and Behaviour
As was argued in Chapter 1, real estate and housing are a vital part of our
modern economy. For consumers, house purchase decisions are among the most
important for personal finance and individual happiness made during a lifetime.
Thus it is an important area for economic research. The insights of the field of
behavioural economics have not gone unnoticed by academics interested in the
field of real estate economics. A significant body of behavioural research exists in
the real estate context, although the majority focuses on valuation by ‘experts’
in a commercial setting. It is considered in the next sub-section.
Providing further understanding of the microeconomic dynamics of housing mar-
kets is a significant concern of the real estate literature. The implications of
this understanding are useful for consumers, practitioners and policy makers. It
forms one of the motivations for the work in this thesis. Current research is ex-
amined in Section 3.2.2. The literature in this area does not, however, typically
use a behavioural approach in the spirit of the literature covered in Chapter 2,
ie. considering deviations from rational action due to psychological regularities;
and little focuses on the role of estate agents in manipulating decision making.
A reading of these two strands of literature presents a clear opportunity for
research to consider the dynamics of housing markets using the insights of be-
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havioural economics. Can the manipulation of non-rational aspects of behaviour
by estate agents have a significant role in explaining individuals’ choices and
therefore housing market outcomes?
3.2.1 Behaviour and Real Estate
The literature which considers behavioural anomalies in real estate can be broken
up into three areas: modelling the valuation process; biases in valuation; and the
role of feedback.
Diaz (1990) is among the first studies to document the behavioural processes
that take place during real estate appraisals. Studying the behaviour of 12 ex-
perts conducting a hypothetical appraisal case, he concludes that experts deviate
significantly from the prescribed appraisal process. This is the case in both famil-
iar and unfamiliar settings. This finding is confirmed in a more in-depth paper
studying residential valuation behaviour in three countries (Diaz, Gallimore and
Levy, 2002). Gallimore and Wolverton (1997) conclude that price knowledge
causes distortion in valuation behaviour, reflected both in the choice of less than
“best” comparables and in the actual value estimate.
The finding that experts use non-normative cues as part of their valuation pro-
cess leads to the possibility of systematic biases in valuation behaviour. Citing
the foundational work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Slovic and Lichten-
stein (1971), much of the work seeks to examine whether anchoring and reference
point-type effects are commonly present. Gallimore (1994) uses a large sample
questionnaire to uncover evidence of an anchoring effect. Respondents were asked
what they thought was the typical percentage variability of property prices, ei-
ther side of the average price. Manipulating the suggested point above or below
which variability was estimated to occur was a reliable way to influence responses.
Several studies examine the types of reference points or anchors which might
bias appraisal valuations. Diaz and Hansz (1997) and Diaz (1997) ask whether
valuers are influenced by previous expert judgemental in their own appraisals.
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Such effects are significant compared with control groups who received no such
cues, although only in areas of geographic unfamiliarity to the participants. In a
follow up study, Diaz and Hansz (2001) conclude that, among experts in unfamil-
iar locations, there are a variety of reference point effects. In order of significance
these are: the uncompleted contract price of a comparable property; the un-
completed contract price of the subject property; and the value opinion of other
experts.
Feedback may be an important part of the appraisal process, and another source
of behavioural bias. Survey evidence points towards a belief among respondents
that feedback is a significant conditioning factor in both appraisal goals (Wolver-
ton and Gallimore, 1999) and final estimates (Levy and Schuck, 1999). Hansz and
Diaz (2001) examine the issue experimentally, finding an important asymmetry
in responses to feedback, finding clear evidence of an upwards-only bias in valu-
ations in response to feedback. Havard reports conflicting evidence of a similar
phenomenon among student volunteers (Havard, 1999, 2001). Returning to the
issue of negotiation, Diaz, Zhao and Black (1999) find that the use of contingent
rewards, a form a feedback, does reduce anchoring biases.
More recently the Journal of Property Research has devoted a special edition
to the issue of behavioural real estate research2. In it guest editor, Julian Diaz,
notes the growing importance of behavioural research in real estate economics
(Diaz, 2010). Sah, Gallimore and Sherwood Clements (2010) offer further evi-
dence on the impact of experience on real estate valuation processes. Similarly
Levy and Frethey-Bentham (2010) find that perceptions of probable sale prices
of houses can be influenced by the experience in property of the decision maker,
although their subjects were all students who were not incentivised. They also
find that manipulation of the context in which the decision is made, namely by
altering the comparable properties shown to participants, has an effect on deci-
sion making. Jin and Gallimore (2010) also focus on the effect of choice frames
on perception in the real estate market, finding that they were able to influence
perceptions of even sophisticated market participants. Finally, illustrating the
2 Journal of Property Research, volume 27, issue 3, September 2010.
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wide applicability of behavioural research, in the same issue Gibler and Taltavull
(2010) use a behavioural perspective to examine how preferences for retiree hous-
ing segments markets, based on a survey of the retirement housing market in
Alicante, Spain.
A small group of papers focus more explicitly on behavioural anomalies in real
estate by consumers. Northcraft and Neale (1987) examine judgemental bias
among non-experts who were given the opportunity to visit the property before
estimating its fair market value in an attempt to recreate the information-rich,
real world environment in which decisions are commonly taken. Knowledge of
the list price of the property proved a reliable anchor in final estimates, although
participants were not incentivised for accurate judgement.
Simonsohn and Loewenstein (2006) hypothesise that when making decisions over
how much to spend on housing, households are prone to draw upon salient cues
to help them. This occurs even though in many cases these cues have no obvious
information content. Simonsohn and Loewenstein argue that this mechanism is
important in housing choices because people experience significant uncertainty
over how much to spend, in particular when they move to a new location. Fur-
thermore, they do not have much opportunity to learn from experience. They
hypothesise that when households move from more expensive locations they tend
to spend more in their destination city, ceteris paribus, because previously they
were exposed to high prices. They expect a similar trend for households moving
from cheap to expensive locations.
Using a sample of 928 household moves drawn from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics they confirm their hypothesis. In other words, households moving from
an expensive city to a cheaper one initially spend more on housing than would
be expected of a similar household and vice versa. Such effects are not explained
by wealth or taxes or imperfect information.
Behavioural anomalies in seller behaviour are examined by Genesove and Mayer
(2001). They note several puzzling features in the residential housing markets,
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including a strong positive correlation between prices and sales volume and a neg-
ative correlation between prices and time on the market. In good times houses
seem to sell quickly at, or above, asking prices. In a downturn however, houses
stay on the market for long periods with asking prices set well above the prevail-
ing market price. The obvious implication, as Genesove and Mayer point out, is
that sellers’ reservation prices may be less downwardly flexible than buyers’ offers.
They propose a model in which loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
helps to explain sellers’ choice of list price and whether to accept an offer or not3.
When house prices fall after a boom period, many homes have a value below the
price the current owner paid (ie. they are facing a ‘paper’ loss). Owners who are
averse to these losses are incentivised to attenuate that loss by setting a reser-
vation price that exceeds the one they would have set in the absence of a loss,
so set a higher asking price, spend longer on the market, and receive a higher
transaction price when the property does sell.
Using data from the downtown Boston apartment market in the 1990s, they
find significant evidence in support of nominal loss aversion explaining seller be-
haviour. Both owner-occupiers and investor-owners are susceptible to loss aver-
sion, though investor-owners less so. Although liquidity constraints play a role
in determining list and selling prices (Genesove and Mayer, 1997) these appear
much less important than loss aversion.
3.2.2 Housing Market Dynamics
The dynamics of housing markets are a significant concern for researchers and
policy makers (for example Aoki et al., 2001; Barker, 2004)4. Areas of particular
interest include: inequalities in housing accessibility and affordability (Bramley
and Karley, 2005; Havard, 2001); the wealth implications of uneven house price
appreciation (Smith, 2005; Thomas and Dorling, 2004); and the transmission
of mortgage market dynamics into the macro economy (Attanasio et al., 2006;
3 See Chapter 2 for an explanation of the behavioural phenomenon of loss aversion.
4 This section of the literature review is drawn from Munro and Smith (2008).
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Maxwell, 2005).
These dynamics are traditionally explored with models which have at their heart
individual actors who are rational in the normative sense envisioned by von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern. Together this work has been called urban consumer
theory (Turnbull, 1995). This research ultimately uses utility maximisation argu-
ments which are based on rational decision processes of economic agents. Current
work examining housing market dynamics, on topics such as optimal waiting time
for sellers (Inaltekin et al., 2009) and structural change (Andrew and Mean, 2003),
still frequently employs rational actor arguments to support the analysis.
However, housing market dynamics have not proved entirely amenable to this
type of precise analysis. This is partly because of the complexity of the issues
involved. It is clear that market dynamics – particularly cycles – are heavily
segmented into local markets which have varying degrees of interconnectedness.
Adopting a microeconomic perspective and focusing on the heterogeneous nature
of individual behaviour is one way to gain greater understanding of the dynamics
of housing markets. A strand of urban economics research does adopt this more
pluralistic approach. It includes topics such as behavioural aspects of housing sup-
ply (Kaiser, 1972); the process of neighbourhood status change (Grigsby, 1963);
the role of aspirations (Canter and Thorne, 1972); and discrimination including
racial steering (Munnell et al., 1996)5. Several papers consider the role of emo-
tions in decisions over housing, including Khoo-Lattimore, Thyne and Robertson
(2009), which takes a qualitative approach to motivations for housing decisions;
and Levy and Lee (2004) and Levy, Murphy and Lee (2008), which both use
the same method to consider housing decisions at a family level. Together, this
litertaure suggests that in analysing sub-markets for housing we must go beyond
the single-model framework for market clearing and price determination favoured
by neoclassical approaches which rely on rational actors.
There are some promising attempts to broaden the theoretical underpinnings
of this market dynamics perspective by incorporating aspects of bias or non-
5 A good summary of this early literature is Bourne (1976).
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rationality. Lin and Vandell (2007) focus on pricing biases due to market illiquid-
ity on a local level. Munro and Smith (2008) shed light on the microstructural
nature of the property market of a city through 90 qualitative interviews. They
characterise housing markets as “collective calculating devices” in which multiple
inter-relationships generate pricing outcomes. They argue that “price is an af-
fective as well as economic affair, whose volatility is... an expression of sociality
and emotional intelligence...” (Munro and Smith, 2008, page 349).
Levitt and Syverson (2008) consider whether estate agents manipulate individu-
als in their decision over when and at what price to sell their property. They find
evidence that supports this assertion. When estate agents sell their own homes
they sell for significantly higher prices after leaving their property on the market
for longer than if selling on behalf of others. In their discussion the source of
this bias is the information asymmetries which are important in the seller-agent
relationship.
Most promisingly among attempts to consider biases in real estate market dynam-
ics is the attempt to incorporate psychological aspects of human behaviour into
the research agenda. In the vanguard of this approach is Robert Shiller (Shiller,
2003, 2005, 2007). He argues that rational expectations models, although elegant
and simple, do not capture everything about market dynamics, however much
researchers wish they could:
“One could easily wish that these models were true descriptions of the
world around us, for then it would be a wonderful advance for our
profession... Wishful thinking can dominate much of the work of a
profession for a decade, but not indefinitely.”
(Shiller, 2003, page 84).
In place of models of rational expectations should be a psychological theory which
explicitly models housing dynamics (particularly pricing dynamics) in terms of
feedback mechanisms or social epidemics. Kishore (2006) also argues that sig-
nificant insights into property markets can be gained through the use of the
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behavioural economics paradigm.
There is significant scope for further work into housing market dynamics to adopt
a behavioural approach. This would be complementary to – and in the spirit of
– Shiller’s work: put to one side the idea that individuals acting in housing mar-
kets are always rational and seek to understand the dynamics accordingly. One
step along this road is to consider the extent to which it is possible to induce
non-rational decision making, especially given an economic agent with the ability
to do so. This is considered further in Chapter 4.
3.2.3 Summary
There are two strands to the literature into housing markets which are of inter-
est here: a body of work which examines behavioural and judgemental biases in
professional real estate valuation in the spirit of Chapter 2; and a body which
explores housing market dynamics. The latter is a particularly important con-
cern for practitioners and policy makers. However, current research in this area
does not, in the main, use a behavioural approach, considering deviations from
rational action due to psychological regularities, and little focuses on the role of
estate agents in manipulating decision making.
Thus there is a clear opportunity for research to consider the dynamics of hous-
ing markets using the insights of behavioural economics. Can individual housing
choice be reliably manipulated using non-rational aspects of behaviour and thus
play a significant role in housing market outcomes?
The section which follows explores the second body of literature referred to in the
introductory paragraphs of this chapter. A large body of experimental and em-
pirical work has studied consumer decision making to highlight the precise ways
in which choices can be manipulated in non-rational ways. These three sources
of bias will form the basis of the research presented in Part III.
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3.3 Choice Set Manipulation
The insights of psychologists studying cognitive anomalies in the 1970s were a
revelation to economists because they undermined much that was taken as given
about human decision processes. Humans were meant to be ruthless utility max-
imisers, considering all relevant evidence in making choices, and acting at all
times in a thoroughly predictable and consistent manner. On the contrary, the
work of Tversky, Kahneman and others suggested that humans might be “wired
differently than economic rationality in the sense of the standard model requires”
(McFadden, 1999, page 75). As Chapter 2 reported, suddenly alarming variations
from the standard story were uncovered and increasingly validated in experimen-
tal and real world settings.
One area where these counter-intuitive results first came to prominence was in
studies which showed the possibility of choice set manipulation to affect con-
sumer decisions. The neoclassical view is expressed in the independence axiom
considered in Chapter 2, which can be summarised as saying that the preference
between two options cannot be altered by the presence, or lack thereof, of alter-
natives. Preference must be independent in this way in the rational choice model
because of the way the theory implies that choice occurs, ie. that each option
available is evaluated, a ‘utility’ assigned, then the option with the highest utility
among the choice set picked. If it is the case that a decision maker chooses A
from a choice set of {A, B} but changes his mind and chooses B when the choice
set becomes {A, B, C} then this concept is undermined. However, as already
emphasised, restricting rational choice to avoid such preference structures seems
entirely reasonable. After all, to change one’s mind in this way does seem some-
what odd.
In consumer studies, an early model in this spirit is that by Luce (1959) which
assumed proportionality, that is, when a new offering is added to a choice set it
will take market share from others in proportion to their original shares. However
this was quickly contradicted by Debreu (1960) and latterly by McFadden (1972).
Instead it seemed as though when new products were added to a choice set the
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new product took market share most from the choices most similar to it. This is
labelled the similarity hypothesis by Tversky (1972).
Huber et al. (1982) point out that both proportionality and the latter contra-
dictions make an implicit assumption, which is that the addition of a new op-
tion cannot increase the proportion choosing a member of the original set. This
they call regularity. However their evidence contradicts this assumption: choice
patterns could be manipulated in this way. They call this effect asymmetric
dominance.
3.3.1 Asymmetric Dominance
In the simplest case Huber et al. (1982) consider a choice set with two ‘core’
options, Competitor and Target. For simplicity these are considered on only two
scales of value, allowing them to be represented by a graph as in Figure 3.1. Nei-
ther of these two options is dominant over the other – Competitor offers more in
Dimension 1, but less in Dimension 2 than Target. Thus an individual’s choice
will depend on their relative preference for the two dimensions. However, the ad-
dition of a third option can significantly alter the situation. This option, known
as Decoy, can be added so that it is anywhere within the shaded box in Fig-
ure 3.1. This positioning means that Decoy is dominated by the Target option
because it offers less in both dimensions of value; but is not dominated by the
Competitor option. In this sense the dominance is asymmetric. Furthermore the
manipulation is made most effective when Decoy is placed so that, as well as
being asymmetrically dominated by Target alone, it is actually similar to Target,
ie. it lies within the shaded box, but very close to the option labelled Target.
In their experiment 153 student volunteers were asked to pick from choice sets
across a range of consumer products such as cars, restaurants, beers and TVs.
They found that the effect of adding the asymmetrically dominated alternative
was to significantly increase the popularity – measured by participants choosing
that option – of the dominant alternative (Target) at the expense of the non-
dominant original (Competitor). Using a variety of different placement strategies,
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Figure 3.1: Asymmetric dominance in consumer choices. Reproduced from Huber
et al. (1982).
Huber et al. (1982) show that the magnitude of this effect is an average increase
of popularity of over 9%6.
The regularity implied by both Luce’s (1959) proportionality model and Tver-
sky’s (1972) similarity hypothesis cannot accommodate this change in preferences.
That is, it is irrational to choose Competitor when the choice set is {Competitor,
Target} but choose Target when the choice set is expanded to {Competitor, Tar-
get, Decoy}. Those models predict that the dominated alternative is not chosen
by any decision maker – which was confirmed in the study – and thus that its
inclusion can have no effect on the relative popularity of the original options. For
the dominated alternative to have an effect on the relative proportion choosing
between original options is a violation of regularity and the independence axiom
of rational choice which underlies it.
Their findings are supported by studies using a range of consumer-based products
including: batteries and beer (Huber and Puto, 1983); orange juice, light bulbs,
6 In other words if Target were chosen 50% of the time from the choice set {Target, Competitor}
then it would be chosen on average 59% of the time from the choice set {Target, Competitor,
Decoy}.
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BBQ sets and TVs (Ratneshwar et al., 1987); and branded pens (Simonson and
Tversky, 1992). More recently it has been confirmed using a real supermarket
test of branded baked beans (Doyle et al., 1999) and among couples making joint
decisions (Munro and Popov, 2009). A more general discussion of the importance
of decoys can be found in (Wedell and Pettibone, 1996).
What is the psychological mechanism that provides for this significant violation of
rational choice? An important part of the story is uncertainty. All choice involves
uncertainty. In the context of buying decisions there is uncertainty about the true
values of certain attributes by which alternatives are considered (a measurement
error problem). Additionally, however, a consumer may be uncertain about the
weights of the attributes and about their preferences for different combinations
of attribute values (Simonson, 1989). In this case the choice set itself can pro-
vide the answer to some of this uncertainty in the consumer’s mind, acting as a
kind of cue to aid decision making when the consumer is not certain of their own
preferences. The cost of this psychological mechanism is the kind of regularity
illustrated above.
Choosing between Target and Competitor is difficult because they are quite dif-
ferent in both attributes of value. The addition of Decoy changes the situation.
Now the choice set contains two options which are similar to each other (Target
and Decoy). Thus they are easier to compare and contrast with each other in a
pairwise way. Target will, by design, offer more in both dimensions of value and
so emerge ‘victorious’ from the comparison. The positive perception of Target
as a result has an important impact when the decision maker then considers be-
tween Target and Competitor. This impact, which has been called the halo effect
in this stand of the literature (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977), ensures that Target’s
popularity is greater than when it was considered alone.
A similar analysis comes from Simonson (1989). He argues that in situations
of uncertainty, particularly where the uncertainty is in respect of our own pref-
erences for attribute weightings, consumers appear to make decisions according
to a psychological mechanism where they look for available reasons or justifica-
79
3.3 Choice Set Manipulation
tions against each alternative. Thus in a situation where decision makers find it
difficult to assess which alternative would provide them with the highest utility,
they tend to make a choice which is supported by the best overall reasons. In the
current situation, this interpretation says that the addition of Decoy changes the
perception of Target because it manipulates the context in which that percep-
tion is constructed allowing a cognitively easier way of justifying choosing Target.
Simonson’s study finds even greater evidence of asymmetric dominance effects
when decision makers know they are going to be made to justify their decision af-
terwards, which he concludes is further evidence of this psychological mechanism.
Simonson and Tversky (1992) hypothesise that asymmetric dominance is part
of a wider phenomenon of choice in context which they call trade-off contrast.
This states that the tendency to prefer an alternative is enhanced, or hindered,
depending on whether the trade-offs within the set are favourable or unfavourable
to that option. This is an extension to pure asymmetric dominance because it
suggests that the addition of a decoy to the analysis in Figure 3.1 to the lower
right of the current shaded area will also increase the attractiveness of the target,
even though the decoy option is not strictly dominated. This perception change is
affected by making Target the centre of two trade-offs – that between Competitor
and Target and that between Target and Decoy. The rate at which the attributes
must be traded off is more advantageous to Target in the first comparison than
the second; and in the second the option Decoy is not attractive to most. Thus
the presence of Decoy serves only to enhance Target in the ‘main’ comparison
between Target and Competitor. Using experiments in which the subject was the
choice over types of camera and computer memory, they find strong evidence in
support of their ideas.
The implication of this research is clear, as stated in Huber et al. (1982): it may
be possible to increase the profitability of a product line by adding a dominated
(relatively inferior) alternative that hardly anyone chooses. The implications of
this will be addressed further, and will be the subject of a hypothesis for the
current study, in Chapter 4.
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A related effect incorporating the same psychological intuition is considered in
the next section.
3.3.2 Compromise Effect
Decision makers find it easier to choose a particular option when they have more
available reasons to justify that choice (Simonson, 1989). The choice set itself can
be used to provide subtle, but effective, cues to the decision maker, steering his
decision towards a target choice by providing these reasons and thus disrupting
the thought process that the neoclassical rational man will complete. This insight
helps contribute to the compromise effect.
Simonson (1989) highlights the finding in Huber and Puto (1983) that in de-
briefing sessions following a dominance study “subjects expressed the feeling that
[the relatively superior option] was the ‘safe,’ ‘compromise’ alternative.” (Huber
and Puto, 1983, page 38). He points out that this suggests a second justification
for choosing the target above and beyond its relative superiority. This second
reason is that the addition of the relatively inferior option (the decoy) means
that the relatively superior option (the target) can be seen as a compromise al-
ternative in terms of its attribute values between the original competitor and the
newly added decoy. In Simonson’s reasoning, if the decision maker is not sure
which of the two attributes is more important the selection of an alternative that
is seen to combine both attributes is much easier to justify (and hence more likely
to actually be chosen). This suggests that an alternative’s popularity increases
when it is made a compromise through the addition of other options, even in the
absence of dominance relationships.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. With an original choice set of B and C the
addition of A – to make B a compromise – or D – to make C a compromise – is
expected to increase the popularity of B and C respectively.
Simonson and Tversky (1992) extend the analysis, labelling it extremeness aver-
sion. This analysis incorporates the concept of loss aversion (discussed earlier
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Figure 3.2: Compromise effect in consumer choices. Reproduced from Simonson
(1989).
in this chapter and in Chapter 2). In choice situations this concept is modified
slightly in the sense that gains and losses – or advantages and disadvantages –
will be evaluated relative to other options. Nevertheless it is expected that dis-
advantages will loom larger than advantages.
Consider Figure 3.3 which illustrates. There are three options which vary ac-
cording to two attributes. The option y is placed such that it is in the middle for
both attributes, ie. x > y > z for Attribute 2 and x < y < z for Attribute 1. Each
of the extreme options (x and z) has a large advantage and a large disadvantage
relative to the other. Each of the extreme options also has a small advantage
and a small disadvantage relative to the middle option (y). The middle option
has small advantages and small disadvantages relative to both extreme options.
Thus if (pairwise) disadvantages loom larger than the corresponding advantages
the middle option will perform better when the choice set is {x, y, z} than when
it is either {x, y} or {y, z}.
Both Simonson (1989) and Simonson and Tversky (1992) find significant evidence
in support of the compromise effect, the former on a wide range of products in-
cluding beer, cars, TVs, apartments, calculators and mouthwash. In the latter
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Figure 3.3: Extremeness aversion in consumer choices. Reproduced from Simonson
and Tversky (1992).
the popularity of a brand of camera was increased from being as popular as the
competitor (ie. its relative popularity was 50%) to being 72% more popular than
that competitor, a significant increase.
Studies of the compromise effect have proliferated. Bettman, Luce and Payne
(1998) provide a useful review of much of the outstanding literature. Dhar, Nowlis
and Sherman (2000) use time pressure as a variable to analyse in more detail the
source of compromise effect-type biases. Their results show that time pressure
on choices reduces the impact of compromise effects. Reducing time available for
making a choice would be expected to minimise one source of error – an exces-
sive focus on the relational characteristics of the alternatives offered – whereas
it would be expected to increase another source of error – effort minimisation.
Thus they interpret their findings as supporting the former idea, that the source
of error is an excessive focus on the relational characteristics of the alternatives
offered, the kind of psychological regularity discussed in Huber et al. (1982) and
Simonson (1989).
Drolet, Simonson and Tversky (2000) provide further evidence that preferences
are largely not determined by absolute attribute values, instead being mainly the
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result of the relative positioning of alternatives in choice sets. In this sense they
conclude that indifference curves can be said to be relative and ‘travel’ with the
choice set. Drolet (2002) provides further analysis of context effects in preference
construction.
Despite the clear importance of these psychological insights and their potentially
wide application, little research has to-date focused on larger-scale decisions such
as over housing. Does the presence of estate agents with the power to construct
the choice set provide an implicit way to construct preferences and bias choices
in a similar manner to that found in the consumer choice literature? This will be
the subject of consideration and hypothesis in Chapter 4.
3.3.3 Summary
Behavioural literature into choice set manipulations has uncovered two types of
bias which stand out, especially in the field of consumer choice. The first of these
is asymmetric dominance, which suggests that, by adding an option to the choice
set that is dominated in an asymmetric way (that is, by one of the original op-
tions but not by the other), it is possible to influence preference between the two
original options. Specifically it has been found that the option which dominates
the new choice, and so is the target of the manipulation, gains a psychological
‘halo’ which is enough to sway decision makers.
Second is a bias known as compromise effect which suggests that, if a decoy
option is added to a choice set so that it makes one of the existing options seem
like a compromise, the effect will be to significantly increase its popularity. This is
by taking advantage of a psychological regularity uncovered by Simonson (1989):
individuals find it easier to make choices which can be easily justified.
Both biases are significant to choice theory because they are both significant
departures from the neoclassical theory of rational choice. Its axiom of indepen-
dence cannot allow the preference between two mutually exclusive options to be
influenced by the presence of an alternative.
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3.4 Ordering Bias and Choice
The receipt of information to inform choice is an important part of the decision
making process. But it is undoubtedly a complex and multi-faceted mechanism.
A precise investigation of the nature of information receipt is beyond the scope
of this thesis; however one aspect of it is of interest for our current purposes:
its sequential nature. According to Anderson (1981): “In everyday life, infor-
mation integration is a sequential process. Information is received a piece at a
time and integrated into a continuously evolving process.” (Anderson, 1981, page
144)7. Thus in its simplest form the natural question to ask is whether the order
in which information is received has an impact on choice.
Chapter 2 explored the neoclassical rational choice model, one of whose central
assumptions was invariance. Simply put, this assumption states that preference,
embodied by choice, cannot be influenced by the alterations in the description
of options providing the descriptions impart the same information. Naturally
included in the word ‘description’ is the order in which information is received.
According to this assumption then, preference should be invariant to the order
in which choices are considered or information about them received. However, as
with the behavioural critique of other aspects of neoclassical choice theory, there
may be more to the story.
Cognitive psychology has led the research into the role of ordering in opinion
formation and belief revision, although the importance of the work goes much
wider than that field alone. In their comprehensive summary of the literature,
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) note its importance in areas as broad as probabilistic
inference (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971); decision theory (Raiffa and Schlaifer,
1961); social cognition (Nisbett and Ross, 1980); jury decision making (Davis,
1984); attitude change (Cooper and Croyle, 1984); and causal inference (Einhorn
and Hogarth, 1986). It should be noted from the beginning however that rela-
tively little research has directly examined the extent to which ordering impacts
choice and particularly consumer choice.
7 Drawn from Hogarth and Einhorn (1992).
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Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought competing with the asser-
tion of the rational choice model that ordering has no effect on choices. These
are that information received first will have a special significance, or primacy ;
and that information received last will hold sway, known as recency. Nisbett and
Ross (1980) espouse the former view stating that “several decades of psychologi-
cal research have shown that primacy effects are overwhelmingly more probable.”
(Nisbett and Ross, 1980, page 172)8. However this conclusion is questioned by
Davis (1984). His review finds more evidence of recency in studies of jury decision
making. Anderson (1981) finds evidence supporting both theories.
The psychological intuition which supports primacy goes by another name: an-
choring. In their classic study of judgement under uncertainty, Tversky and Kah-
neman (1974) explain anchoring as one of a series of cognitive rules of thumb,
known as heuristics, which are used to aid decision making and judgement. These
rules of thumb reduce the complexity of judgement but their use can lead to sys-
tematic and serious errors, many of which were discussed in Chapter 2.
Anchoring occurs when an individual, faced with making a judgement, uses some
initial value as their starting point before making adjustments to that to yield a
final answer. Significantly, the adjustment will typically not be sufficient (Slovic
and Lichtenstein, 1971), which means the final judgement will not be independent
of the initial value. In its purest form, anchoring relates most specifically to value
and probability judgements, and will be examined in more detail in the following
section. For our present purposes however it is sufficient to draw from the theory
that anchoring means that in decision making information received initially will
take on a special significance in final outcomes. Thus for choice theory it provides
a basis for hypothesising that first-viewed options may prove more popular than
those options viewed later, ceteris paribus.
In contrast, the concept of recency invokes the kind of bounded rationality ex-
planation of Simon (1956). Faced with limited time and cognitive capacity in
8 Drawn from Hogarth and Einhorn (1992).
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which to make decisions, under this theory information received most recently
achieves a special significance, so in choice situations it would be expected that
more recently-viewed options would be more popular.
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) present a model of belief updating suggesting key
variables for the determination of ordering effects. These include the complex-
ity of the information, its length and the nature of the information (whether it
confirms or contradicts earlier information). Broadly they find evidence that or-
dering effects are not important for simple tasks in which information receipt is
consistent. When the tasks become longer and the information contradictory (or
‘mixed’ in their terminology) there is evidence of recency.
Two papers examine ordering effects in a professional setting. Ashton and Ashton
(1988) is one of a series of papers examining belief revision in auditing (Koch,
Pei and Reed, 1989; Butt and Campbell, 1989). They find evidence that belief
updating does depend on the order in which it is received. And Gallimore (1994)
examines commercial real estate appraisals, finding that greater weight is typi-
cally applied to more recently-received information. These results were largely
not statistically significant, however.
There is little evidence directly studying whether ordering effects are significant
in choice. Houses are naturally viewed in a sequential way, creating an infor-
mation receipt mode which might be conducive to the behavioural phenomena
discussed. This is discussed further in Chapter 4.
3.5 Biases in Value Judgements
The use of rules of thumb in decision making, which can lead to serious judge-
mental biases, has become one of the most important areas of psychology to reach
into economics. It has particularly important implications for choice theory as
discussed in Chapter 2.
The classic work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) reports some of the most sig-
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nificant including: representativeness, where assessment of probabilities is biased
according to the extent to which an event is representative of another; availabil-
ity, where probability estimates of the likelihood of a event are affected by the
ease with which examples can be recalled; and anchoring. Significant areas of
literature which can be included as additions to this list of psychological biases
in judgement include: loss aversion which results in a reluctance to part with
owned assets known as the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980; Kahneman, Knetsch
and Thaler, 1990) and is one of the bases of Prospect Theory ; and framing ef-
fects which result in phenomena such as preference reversal, where altering the
description frame reverses preferences (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1983; Tversky,
Slovic and Kahneman, 1990).
The current interest is largely confined to the bias of anchoring which was al-
luded to in the previous section. It is one of the purest forms of behavioural
phenomena which Daniel Kahneman has said is among the most robust obser-
vations in the psychological literature (Kahneman, Ritov and Schkade, 1999).
Anchoring is, as discussed, a form of heuristic which individuals use to aid their
decision making process. It is best summed up in the authors’ own words:
“In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial
value that is adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial value, or
starting point, may be suggested by the formulation of the problem, or
it may be the result of a partial computation. In either case, adjust-
ments are typically insufficient. That is, different starting points yield
different estimates, which are biased toward initial values.”
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, page 1128).
The use of a mechanism where an initial value is selected and adjustments made
to yield a final answer is not a serious flaw in judgement making per se. It is
the fact that the selection of the initial value is not independent of the problem’s
framing and that the adjustments made are typically not sufficient which lead to
bias.
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In their illustrative experiment, participants were asked to estimate quantities,
such as the number of African countries in the United Nations, expressed in per-
centages. Prior to this a number between 0 and 100 was determined by spinning
a wheel in the presence of the participants. Having been asked whether they
thought the percentage they were being asked to estimate was above or below
the number they had just seen, subjects were then asked what they thought the
correct number was. Despite the initial number – the anchor – being demonstra-
bly random, judgements were significantly correlated with it. The effect was not
reduced by increasing payoffs for accurate judgement.
The implications of this for choice, particularly in the context of value judge-
ment, are clear and a significant amount of research has followed. Anchoring is
found to be significant in a simulated economy setting (Sterman, 1989); in choices
over lotteries (Johnson and Schkade, 1989); in answering factual questions (Ja-
cowitz and Kahneman, 1995) and over the valuation of public goods (Green et al.,
1998). A useful review, which suggests reasons for the phenomenon, is Chapman
and Johnson (2002).
Ariely et al. (2003) move the literature on from its predominant concern of how
anchoring corrupts subjective judgement to the impact it can have on valuation
or preference9. They focus explicitly on consumers’ valuation of goods. Util-
ising a procedure first adopted by Wilson et al. (1996) they asked subjects to
write down the last two digits of their social security number (SSN) as a price.
Thus, someone whose digits were -23 would have written $23. They then showed
subjects a series of consumer products such as computer equipment, wine and
chocolates, and asked them whether they would be willing to accept each in turn
for the price they had written down using the SSN. Finally, subjects were asked
the maximum dollar price they would be willing to pay for each product10. The
social security number – patently an arbitrary anchor – proved a reliable indicator
of willingness to pay in each case.
9 Although they say that Johnson and Schkade (1989) was the first to do so.
10 Note that the procedure uses the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure (1964) for eliciting
willingness-to-pay and guarantees that some of the transactions – determined randomly –
will be carried out, thus ensuring the reality of the situation to participants.
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Their results are hugely significant. Subjects with above median SSNs stated
values between 57% to 107% greater than subjects with below median SSNs.
The gap between the bottom and top quintiles was up to a multiple of 3. For the
cordless keyboard the bottom quintile estimated a value of $16 on average. The
value for those with the highest quintile SSN was $56.
The authors present further evidence in support of the proposition that sub-
jective valuation of goods can be influenced by anchoring. They term the effect
arbitrary coherence. It encompasses the idea that values in a subject’s mind can,
relatively easily, be established arbitrarily using anchoring. After that they can
shape decision making significantly. They become coherent and form the basis of
future judgements.
More recently research has examined anchoring in consumer judgements in more
depth (Simonson and Drolet, 2004); in field experiments (Alevy, Landry and List,
2008; Mazar, Koszegi and Ariely, 2009); and in fields far removed from consumer
economics including medicine (Brewer et al., 2007) and the valuation of environ-
mental goods (Hanley et al., 2009).
House purchase is among the most important personal finance decisions made
during an individual’s lifetime so it is natural to ask whether anchoring can be
used to influence judgements in this area too. Hypotheses related to this are
considered in Chapter 4.
3.6 Conclusion
House purchase is among the most important consumer choices, yet little work
has considered how behavioural biases might be important in decision making in
respect of housing. As discussed in Chapter 1, a reason for this might be that
neoclassical researchers tend to respond to criticisms of their model by arguing
that two factors will minimise the extent of errors: stakes and experience. It has
already been noted that the stakes could hardly be higher. Individuals should,
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and do, take great care over their choice given the profound incentives to get the
choice right. However, they make the choice with necessarily little experience,
meaning that for only the minority could it be true that their preferences are
strongly formed prior to initiating the choice process. Thus study of housing
choices presents an excellent test bed for these claims in first instance.
However the study of the dynamics of housing markets is a significant concern
of research in its own right. One strand of this work goes beyond modelling
outcomes built on models with rational man-type assumptions. It adopts a mi-
croeconomic perspective and focuses on the heterogeneous nature of individual
behaviour to gain greater understanding of the dynamics of housing markets. The
incorporation of non-rational insights is also a promising area of development in
the study of housing markets. Examining the ways in which housing choice can
be influenced through actively engaging individual behavioural biases may prove
a fruitful way to go beyond the existing literature and Shiller’s irrational exuber-
ance approach; deepening further our understanding of housing markets.
Three sources of behavioural bias in particular stand out from the literature
into consumer choice and they have been reviewed in this chapter. First are what
have been labelled choice set biases. These are biases which arise from the make-
up of the choice set itself. Rational choice models have at their heart a principle
known variously as regularity, invariance and independence which says that the
preference between two options cannot be affected by other, mutually exclusive,
choices. A rational set of preferences cannot accommodate a decision maker who
prefers A to B, but will change his mind and choose B if he is choosing from A, B
and C rather than A and B alone. Yet prior research suggests there is significant
scope for manipulating choice sets in this way to affect choice.
A second source of bias lies in the order in which information is processed when
individuals make decisions. More specifically, this research asks whether the or-
der in which options are shown – and considered – has an effect on the ultimate
choice. The von Neumann and Morgenstern rational model of choice does not
allow such an effect to be important in preference formation. There is limited
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empirical work considering this avenue of choice bias.
A final significant area of choice bias lies in numerical judgement. Evidence
shows that humans are not always good at making these types of judgements
because of the use of psychological rules of thumb known as heuristics. These
help simplify decision processes, but can result in significant errors. A particu-
larly important bias is known as anchoring, which can result in value judgements
which are biased according to a (possibly arbitrary) value in the decision maker’s
mind. The possibility of placing these arbitrary values into consumers’ minds and
affecting their judgement has been specifically confirmed in an important study
by Ariely et al. (2003), though the scope of the bias in consumer choices has not
been otherwise widely considered.
There is a significant opportunity to bring these strands of the literature to-
gether, using behavioural theory, particularly with respect to choice and decision
making, to shed light on the dynamics of housing markets. This will contribute
both directly to choice theory and to our understanding of what is really going
on when we make the decision to buy a home.
Thus the main focus of the work which follows in this thesis is choice manipula-
tion in house purchase decisions. Chapter 4 considers in more detail the methods
which could be used to alter choice patterns in non-rational ways, building on
the research reported in this chapter. It makes hypotheses in this regard which
will be the basis of the experiments reported later. An important part of the
story is the economic agent who it is hypothesised could use the insights to affect
preference construction and alter choice. The second part of Chapter 4 considers
the motivation of the estate agent who is assumed to be that economic agent,
presenting conceptual models to show how it could be in the agent’s interest to
manipulate home buyers’ choices in this way.
Chapter 5 concludes Part II by reporting the methodology used to investigate
the issues at hand. Part III reports the results before Part IV concludes and
suggests avenues for further research.
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Chapter 4
Choice Manipulation: Methods
and Motivation
This chapter considers specific ways in which house purchase be-
haviour can be biased using the behavioural insights considered in
Chapter 3. These are considered under three headings: biases aris-
ing from the choice set; biases due to viewing order; and biases in
value judgements. It makes hypotheses in this regard, which will be
the basis of the experiments reported later. The biases are important
because of the possibility an economic agent may use them to pre-
dictably manipulate choice. The second part of the chapter explores
why the estate agent is motivated to use the manipulations, with sev-
eral conceptual scenarios suggested. Manipulations are expected to
be particularly important – and potentially valuable – in the growing
market for online property listings where agents compete with each
other for sales across a common sales platform.
4.1 Introduction
As the literature review in Chapter 3 established, making good decisions can be
difficult. There is a significant body of evidence which has shown that a variety of
psychological regularities can lead to non-rational decision making. Incomplete
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information is an important catalyst for these psychological regularities. For ex-
ample, Chapter 3 illustrated that where the decision maker is uncertain about his
own preferences in trading off two attributes of value, a choice architect (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2008) may place decoy options in the choice set to manipulate the
perception of these attributes, thus favouring one of the options (Huber et al.,
1982). Similarly, when asked to make a value judgement in a situation where they
have relatively little experience, individuals frequently rely on an anchoring-and-
adjustment heuristic which can lead to bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
Regularities in the way individuals react to uncertainties like this leads, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, to the possibility of manipulation by an external economic
agent with the motivation to do so. This chapter explores both these concepts
in respect of housing choice. First it considers the precise ways in which be-
havioural bias can impact decision making in a housing context. In aggregate
these effects – which are split into three sections: biases due to the choice set,
biases due to viewing order, and biases in value judgements – may cancel each
other out or simply add a certain unpredictable element to choice. However it is
proposed that it is possible for an external agent, in this case the estate agent, to
manipulate these biases to produce regularities in decision making to suit their
own purposes. This is the second strand to the analysis in this chapter1. Having
considered the manipulations in the following section, the primary motivations
for them by estate agents is examined in Section 4.3.
4.2 Methods of Manipulation
The foundational work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979) caused a dramatic re-evaluation of the theory of choice, in which
the model of rational action of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) had pre-
viously been accepted as the solution to the choice problem. Since then a sig-
nificant body of research has established that there are a series of ways in which
human psychological processes may result in choices that are not rational from
the neoclassical perspective, and more, that it is possible to use these processes
1 I am grateful to Professor Colin Lizieri for pointing out this explicit division.
94
4.2 Methods of Manipulation
to manipulate choices and judgements.
A literature review has found that decision making over housing is one area
where these behavioural biases may have a particularly important impact, but
that has been largely neglected by current research.
In the course of this literature review several specific areas of bias have been
considered, including: biases arising from the choice set, biases due to viewing
order and biases in value judgements. In the sections that follow, the methods
by which these biases could be used to influence choice in housing scenarios are
considered and hypotheses made. These hypotheses will form the basis of the
experiments in Part III of this thesis.
4.2.1 Biases Arising from the Choice Set
There are two manipulations of choice sets which prior literature has found can
have an impact on decision making in consumer choices, in violation of the inde-
pendence principle of rational choice.
The first of these, after the work of Huber et al. (1982) discussed in Chapter
3, is known as asymmetric dominance. It is depicted in graphical form in Figure
4.1. Decision makers are faced with evaluating choices based on two scales of
value, which they must trade-off. In the initial situation the choice set is {A, B}.
In this scenario neither option dominates the other so that the choice will depend
on the relative value placed on each attribute by a decision maker. In a latter sce-
nario a third option, C, is added. This changes the situation significantly because
option C is dominated by B. That is option B offers more of both attributes. A
rational decision maker should never choose option C.
The purpose of the addition of C is not, however, to check this proposition, but to
take advantage of a halo effect (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977) which benefits option
B for ‘beating’ option C in a direct comparison of the two. Options B and C are
naturally compared because the dominance is asymmetric – option C is similar
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Figure 4.1: Asymmetric dominance manipulation of preference between two options.
to option B, but not particularly like option A. In Huber et al.’s (1982) analy-
sis, option B is known as Target and option C as Decoy. Option A is known as
Competitor. A change in preference from Competitor to Target as a result of the
addition of the addition of the decoy option would be a significant violation of the
independence axiom of rational choice considered in Chapter 2. To re-state, this
says that the preference between two options cannot be affected by the presence
– or lack – of other options.
It is suggested that in housing choice scenarios the economic actor who sets
the conditions under which the choice is made – the choice architect – is able to
show particular properties to a potential buyer, creating a choice set that uses the
decoy option to manipulate preferences between a target option and a competi-
tor. The implication is that such a manipulation would be used to sway decision
makers towards options that the choice architect desires they favour. This leads
to our first hypothesis:
H1. Asymmetric dominance: the proportion choosing a particular
property increases when a decoy property is added that is asymmetri-
cally dominated.
The second choice set manipulation which is proposed can be used to influence
housing choices is known as the compromise effect. Simonson (1989) argues that
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individuals find it easier to make choices when there are available reasons to jus-
tify their choices. The compromise effect takes advantage of this by inserting a
decoy option into the choice set which makes another of the options appear like a
compromise. This provides a powerful justification for selecting it and is enough
to persuade individuals to choose it in greater numbers than if the decoy option
was not present.
This is depicted in Figure 4.2. The original choice set is as previously, {A, B}.
To take advantage of the manipulation a third choice is added, option E2. This
is not dominated by either of the original options, but it does offer an extreme
amount of Attribute 1 and less of Attribute 2. In this light, option B becomes a
natural compromise between the two original options. This provides a powerful
reason for choosing option B, which is enough to manipulate decision makers into
choosing it to a greater extent than they did when the options were {A, B}. This
leads to the following, related, hypotheses:
H2a. Strong compromise effect: the proportion choosing a particular
target property increases when it is made a compromise choice by the
addition of a decoy property to the choice set.
H2b. Weak compromise effect: the proportion choosing a competi-
tor property decreases when the addition of a decoy property to the
choice set makes the other original property the compromise.
Since option E is not dominated by option B (or option A) a decision maker whose
preferences are such that Attribute 1 is very important to him could choose that
option. This is the source of Hypothesis 4.2.1b: the addition of option E could,
reasonably, induce significant numbers who would have chosen B from a choice
set of {A, B} to choose E. But it should not take market share from option A.
As will be explored in Chapter 5 several economic experiments are used to test
these hypotheses in housing choice scenarios. Some of the experiments involve
simple trade-offs in a manner directly analogous to the above analysis. Other
2 This labelling scheme is used to provide consistency with the numbering used in Chapter 5.
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Figure 4.2: Compromise effect manipulation of preference between two options.
experiments use more complex information environments which closely replicate
actual choice situations.
4.2.2 Biases due to Viewing Order
Research has suggested that the order in which information is received is impor-
tant in decision making and judgement (Anderson, 1981; Hogarth and Einhorn,
1992), although little focuses directly on the role it has in preference formation
in buying decisions. Houses are naturally viewed in an ordered way and so is an
important part of the choice process in housing to consider.
There are competing hypotheses on the effect of viewing order:
H3a. Primacy: information received first will have excessive weight
in judgements over housing, thus houses seen first will be preferred
more, ceteris paribus.
H3b. Recency: information received last will have excessive weight in
judgements over housing, thus houses seen last will be preferred more,
ceteris paribus.
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The first of these hypotheses comes from the work of Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) who suggest that a psychological process called anchoring means that
initially-viewed information will be given excessive weight because adjustments
made from it will not be sufficient. In the case of housing this is expected to take
root in the following way. A consumer would like to purchase a two-bedroom
house. The first of these he views becomes his ‘anchor’ representing in his mind
what a two-bedroom house is like. All subsequent houses are viewed in reference
to this one, being compared and contrasted with it. This process, also known
as imprinting (Ariely et al., 2003) is enough to give the first-viewed property an
advantage and means it is likely to be chosen more frequently than if viewed in
other positions.
In contrast recency suggests that, faced with limited time and information com-
plexity, boundedly rational individuals (Simon, 1956) place an excessive weight
on information which is more recently received and so is easier to recall. The hy-
pothesis suggests that, when viewing a series of houses, individuals will be more
likely to choose a property if it is show last, ceteris paribus.
It should be noted here that the process of imprinting is a complex one, and
housing is a highly complex good, far more so than the goods considered in the
majority of the consumer choice literature. Thus it is difficult to say with precision
what the effect will be. Subjects may use an anchoring process, but the anchor
may not have a reliably positive effect. For example the first-viewed property
may be highly undesirable resulting in a negative effect which lasts to subsequent
viewings. Nevertheless, experiments which examine this proposition are consid-
ered in Chapter 5. The results, which explore all these issues, are reported in
Chapter 7.
4.2.3 Biases in Value Judgements
Humans often use short-cuts, or heuristics, to help make judgements. These can
serve a useful role simplifying decision-making; however significant research has
shown that it can also lead to serious errors in judgement. The psychological pro-
99
4.2 Methods of Manipulation
cess of anchoring, first explored by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggests that
value judgements may be biased according to some initial value in the decision
maker’s mind which they use as a basis for making estimation. These anchors can
be entirely arbitrary, having serious implications for purchasing decisions (Ariely
et al., 2003).
When faced with buying a house, establishing a ‘fair’ value is among the most
important decisions. As discussed in Chapter 1, given the large stakes, any error
is likely to cost the decision maker thousands of pounds. Yet housing markets are
generally decentralised and opaque. Information is difficult to obtain with most
being held by those experienced in the market – estate agents. For purchasers
who may only enter the market once or twice during their lifetime it is difficult to
know what the fair price for a given property is given current market conditions
and other factors.
In these circumstances the risk of being manipulated as a home buyer is high.
Decision makers are expected to sub-consciously use salient (available) valuations
to influence their estimations of value. These can be reasonable, for example by
looking at the prices of other, comparable, properties. However, it is hypothesised
that it is possible to establish arbitrary anchors in individuals’ minds too:
H4. Anchoring: individuals’ valuation judgements over housing are
biased by the presence of an arbitrary anchor.
Even with a strong incentive to judge accurately, if this hypothesis is correct in-
dividuals’ estimations contain a detectable element that is arbitrary. If arbitrary
valuations are possible then it remains open for a willing economic actor – in this
case most likely an estate agent – to influence valuations according to his pref-
erences, presumably inducing consumers to believe that houses are worth more
than is fair value to maximise their own profitability.
Carefully structured experiments which assess the nature of these biases, as well
as their duration, are presented in Chapter 5 and results in Chapter 8.
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4.2.4 Summary
With the motivations of this thesis expressed in Chapter 1 in mind, a series of
hypotheses on the nature and extent of choice and judgemental manipulations in
individual housing decisions have been proposed. These include: biases arising
from the choice set itself; biases from the order in which options are presented;
and biases in value judgements. If proved, these provide a significant insight into
the vulnerability of consumers in housing markets, as well as presenting ways in
which an estate agent may bias housing choice to their own ends.
4.3 Why Manipulate Choices?
The first part of this chapter suggests several hypotheses which involve a willing
economic agent – the estate agent – engaging in actions which manipulate the
choices of home buyers. The primary focus of this thesis is to investigate the
nature and extent of these biases, but it is important to establish why they might
wish to engage in this behaviour.
Principal-agent problems have been a focus of research in economics since at
least the early 1970s (for example Ross, 1973). The aim of this section is not to
provide a theoretical model of estate agent action3 but consider the circumstances
in which the agent may engage in the kind of manipulative behaviour that has
been hypothesised. Three conceptual scenarios are presented in the following
sections which illustrate entirely plausible justifications for agents to act in this
way.
Before discussing these conceptual scenarios, it is worth giving some background
about the role of estate agents in the UK housing market. Estate agents are
employed by vendors to manage all aspects of the process of buying a property.
They are responsible for marketing the property to potential buyers, including
advice about the most appropriate asking price to achieve a sale. Once an offer
has been made they represent the vendor in any negotiations and frequently play
3 For an example of that see Geltner, Kluger and Miller (1991), for example.
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a co-ordinating role in the legal aspects of the conveyancing process. Agents earn
fees paid out of the sale price. As discussed above, this results in significant
principal-agent issues between vendor and agent which have been the subject of
research. However, for present purposes, the aspect of this structure that is most
relevant is that agents do not have a legal or contractual obligation towards buy-
ers. The sections below consider how, given this, agents may be incentivised to
manipulate buyers in the ways hypothesised.
4.3.1 Manipulation and Value Judgements
Taking the latter area of manipulation – judgemental biases – first, it is clear
that there is a significant rationale for agents to engage in this behaviour if it
is possible. Getting a buyer to value houses, or a particular house, more highly
than its market-determined ‘worth’ is likely to lead to higher sales commission,
the earning of which is the aim of the agent as discussed above.
The process of establishing a property’s worth is complex because of the de-
centralised marketplace and heterogeneity of the good being purchased. Never-
theless, it remains true that, holding other factors constant, to increase a buyer’s
subjective valuation of a property would be a profitable thing for an agent to do
to increase their sales commission.
Although they focus on home sellers and use information asymmetry as the
source of decision making errors, Levitt and Syverson (2008) present evidence
which supports the claim that agents are motivated to manipulate their clients’
decisions to their own ends. In their investigation of 100,000 property sales in the
US state of Illinois, they find that where a registered estate agent is the owner
(rather than an ‘uninformed’ client) the property is held on the market for longer
and achieves a statistically significant higher price upon completion. This finding
suggests that agents are able to – and do – manipulate their clients into making
non-optimal decisions in their own interests.
It has already been argued that in property markets uncertainty presents an op-
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portunity to intercede in the buyers’ decision making process, something that is
confirmed by Levitt and Syverson’s work albeit from a different perspective. An-
choring is a subtle psychological mechanism which most decision makers are not
aware of and this makes it a powerful way of influencing perceptions. Moreover
Tversky (1977) has said that many manipulations of this type are reminiscent of
optical illusions: even after the ‘deception’ is uncovered it is difficult to reconcile
what our brain continues to tell us about what we see before us. Through the
use of arbitrary numerical anchors or, more likely, by showing ‘representative’
comparable properties which over-inflate a buyer’s sense of value, an agent could
increase their profitability from each transaction.
Conceptually the use of these strategies can be bundled as part of the agent’s
‘effort’ function, which has been explored extensively in earlier work (Yinger,
1981; Zorn and Larsen, 1986). Providing this extra effort produces more revenue
via sales commission the agent will find it profitable to do it. Clearly the payoff
from the strategies is itself a function of the difficulty and efficacy of putting them
into place. This is addressed by the hypothesis in the previous section and is the
primary focus of the research in this thesis.
4.3.2 Choice Bias and Property Turnover
The use of choice set biases is more complex. In the simple situation where an
agent has a portfolio of properties on his books with a brief to sell them, it is
not immediately clear why he might use one as a decoy. This would benefit a
particular alternative property, but leaves the agent with a property that proba-
bly won’t sell. To show how an agent might be motivated to take this action it
is necessary to think of the effect of the manipulative action in terms of another
variable: preference intensity.
It is reasonable to propose that the effect of using choice set biases – asymmetric
dominance and compromise effect – might go beyond swaying a buyer towards a
particular property. It is also expected to increase the strength of preference for
that property. Following this reasoning, if individuals feel more strongly about a
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property then it is likely that they would make the decision to buy the property
more quickly, ceteris paribus.
This being the case the manipulation of preference using choice set biases serves
two purposes: i) it matches buyers to sellers more quickly, increasing the property
turnover of the estate agent thus earning them more commission during a given
amount of time; and ii) it makes buyers more likely to cut short their search and
make the decision to go ahead and purchase the property that is subject of the
manipulation. This latter effect is valuable to the agent in a competitive market-
place where buyers could use other estate agents to find their property.
To re-state this proposition for clarity: in a competitive marketplace for estate
agents a particular agent has the attention of a buyer for a limited time and so
would clearly benefit from showing them the ‘perfect property’ – or helping them
believe they have found the perfect property – ensuring they transact with them
quickly over another agent. Thus even if it means designating several properties
as decoys which probably won’t sell there is a clear motivation if it increases the
preference intensity of buyers inducing faster property searches and greater sales
volumes.
This reasoning depends on the manipulations hypothesised having the effect of
increasing the intensity of preference towards the target property. It is worthwhile
making another hypothesis in this regard:
H5. Preference intensity: the strength of preference for a particular
target property increases when it is the subject of a choice set manip-
ulation.
Evidence to test this hypothesis is reported in Chapters 6 and 7 as part of the
analysis of the choice set biases.
The motivation to use choice set biases in this conceptual scenario is clearly
somewhat indirect. It suggests that an agent might not care which property he
has as a target or a decoy, simply that he will be motivated to use this approach
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in general terms to strengthen buyers’ preferences, increasing the number who
buy the property from him and the speed with which they do so. In the following
section a more direct way is considered in which, as the search and sale of resi-
dential property moves to online platforms, an agent may be strongly motivated
to use choice set effects to further their own interests.
4.3.3 Online Property Sales and Preference Manipulation
In recent years there have been many significant changes in the UK housing mar-
ket. Few, however, have been more dramatic than the migration of the market
to the online sphere. From almost nothing in the year 2000, property search
websites have revolutionised the way people search for property in the UK. In
the six months to June 2010, the market leading website – Rightmove – reported
over 3.2 billion page impressions. Ninety per cent of estate agents in the UK list
properties on the website4. For this reason a significant portion of the research in
this thesis is devoted to the online property search environment, a very different
decision frame (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) to that previously studied.
A particular feature of online search websites is that competing estate agents
come together to list their properties on a common platform, paying a fee to the
website for doing so. This situation mirrors an invention of an earlier age: the
Multiple Listing Service (MLS). These are centralised bodies which allow real
estate brokers to co-operate with each other by sharing listings in exchange for
splitting commission between the finding agent and the listing agent. Their ori-
gins are in the early 20th century in the United States, although they appear in
different forms in housing markets across the world today. A significant amount
has been written about MLSs, for example on their effectiveness and the optimal
contract design to appropriately incentivise agent behaviour (Frew, 1987; Geltner
et al., 1991; Miceli, 1991).
While the arguments in this section about the motivation for agent behaviour
4 Source: Rightmove figures. Page impression statistics audited by Audit Bureau of Circula-
tion.
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share some parallels with the MLS literature conceptually, there is a subtle dif-
ference between the role of the MLS and the property search website. The MLS
is effectively a forum for co-operative contracts to be designed between agents
(standardised to reduce information and administrative costs). In contrast, on-
line search websites are themselves businesses whose customers are estate agents
paying fees for listings. This changes the position of the agent somewhat and
provides a natural role for the choice set manipulations that are the subject of
this thesis to come to the fore.
By using the property search website, agents are pooling information about houses
(the market supply) across a common platform to reduce information costs among
buyers (the market demand) and promote increased activity. However they re-
main in competition with other agents, competing for the buyer to choose the
property they list. Given this competition it is clear there would be some gain to
a particular agent in using another’s property listing(s) to bias users towards his
own. If a particular agent could structure search results in a way that made his
property the target and another agent’s property a decoy, he would be motivated
to do so.
The ability to structure search results in this way lies with the websites, such
as Rightmove. They have no a priori reason for doing so, but, given the com-
petition among agents, we could expect them to be willing to pay Rightmove to
alter search results in this way. To re-cap: this conceptual reasoning suggests
that in the online environment there is a clear rationale – and potential market –
for the listing provider to manipulate search results in favour of fee-paying agents.
Academic research has yet to catch up with the changes that online decision
making environments have made to consumer decision making. Stibel (2005)
acknowledges that the presentation of information on the internet is important
and that understanding the mental processes of users is important in their online
experience, although his focus is primarily on designing websites to make them
as intuitive and compelling as possible.
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Several papers do examine online consumer behaviour. For example Kumar et al.
(2005) and Rose and Samouel (2009) examine how consumers search for infor-
mation on the internet. Wu et al. (2008) examine whether anchoring has a role
in e-commerce. They argue that typical designs in experiments, involving a com-
parative judgement followed by an absolute estimate, are not practical or realistic
in online situations. They go on to suggest an alternative design to assess the
impact of anchoring biases, hypothesising that even without comparative judge-
ments there will be strong anchoring by participants. They find support for this
hypothesis especially when anchor points are shown on multiple occasions. This
has implications for website design – and consumer welfare.
Wu et al.’s study is important because it directly addresses how consumers might
be manipulated in online environments, on this occasion in respect of value judge-
ments. Although Wu et al. do focus on consumer judgements, there is nothing
in their study or elsewhere considering how online decision frames could impact
preferences between different products. Grant, Clarke and Kyriazis (2007) call
for further research into online consumer behaviour. The research presented in
this thesis contributes significantly to this area of enquiry, building on Wu et al.’s
work by providing important evidence of online consumer decision making in one
of the online sphere’s most high profile markets.
4.3.4 Summary
In this section three conceptual scenarios have been described which explain why
estate agents could be motivated to engage in the behavioural manipulations
that have been the subject of hypotheses earlier in this chapter. Agents have a
clear rationale for engaging in actions which increase buyers’ subjective valuations
of property, ceteris paribus, since this is likely to lead to higher sales commissions.
If choice set manipulations are considered, it is plausible that if the manipu-
lation can increase the preference intensity of buyers, making them more willing
to go ahead and put an offer in on the property shown, thus cutting short their
search and removing the possibility of losing sales commission to a competing
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estate agent, the agent will do so. This could easily outweigh the cost of keeping
a decoy property on their books which is unlikely to sell. A further hypothesis
was made in this regard, which will be examined in Part III.
Finally, it seems reasonable to expect agents to find the use of choice set biases
in a common listing platform, such as online property search websites, particu-
larly valuable. This may be even to the extent that they would pay the listing
company to manipulate search results if it were possible.
4.4 Conclusion
Despite it being a fundamental part of everyday life, decision making in cer-
tain situations and markets can be difficult, particularly when information is
hard to obtain. Housing markets are one such situation. They are decentralised
and opaque with significant information asymmetries. Location is a vital factor.
Transaction costs are high and buyers must frequently rely on the services of an
estate agent with interests which may not be entirely aligned with his or her own.
Given this, and the arguments advanced at greater length in Chapter 1, there
is significant scope for buyers to be vulnerable to judgemental bias in their per-
ception, preference and choice. This chapter considered the precise form this
manipulation might take, drawing inspiration from the review of the theory of
choice and behavioural economics literature that was considered in Chapters 2
and 3. These fall under three headings.
Biases may result from choice set manipulation if the decision maker (the buyer)
sub-consciously uses the choice set itself as context when deciding between op-
tions. Rational choice models imply that options can always be considered in
isolation, with a ‘utility’ ascribed to each. Having completed this process all the
decision maker needs to do is pick the option which gives him the highest utility
to maximise his own happiness and make a ‘good’ choice. However, the work of
behavioural economists has shown that decision making with this kind of isolation
is very difficult to achieve and that it is possible to use the choice set itself, by
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introducing decoy choices, to manipulate perceptions of other options and so bias
choice outcomes. It has been hypothesised that two manipulations in particular
stand out as being possible in housing markets: asymmetric dominance, where an
inferior decoy option is introduced to provide a positive ‘halo’ (Simonson, 1989)
to a target option though dominating it; and compromise effect, where a decoy
is added to make a target option a compromise, the choosing of which has a
powerful psychological draw.
Biases may also result from the order in which properties are shown to buy-
ers. There are competing hypotheses on the effect of choice ordering. The first
suggests that initially-viewed properties will gain a special place in decision mak-
ing because of a process known as anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974);
whereas another suggests that given limited time and cognitive constraints, the
most recently-viewed property will gain an advantage. Either effect would be a
violation of rational decision making.
Finally biases in value judgement are also hypothesised, which are possible be-
cause of psychological flaws in our estimating and judgement apparatus. The
earlier-mentioned process of anchoring suggests that certain numerical values, if
they take root in our mind, can influence our estimation of values, even if these
numerical values are patently arbitrary. This has the potential to cost home buy-
ers significant amounts of money if it can be used by estate agents to influence
judgement, in a similar way to that which has been shown in other consumer
studies (Ariely et al., 2003).
In the light of these hypotheses, the second part of the chapter considered why
estate agents could find it in their interest to manipulate consumer behaviour
in this way. Three conceptual scenarios were reported. In first instance it was
argued that estate agents would always find it in their interests to influence the
subjective valuations of housing. Increasing home buyers’ perceptions of value
would be expected to lead to greater sales commissions, conditional of the efficacy
and difficulty of undertaking the manipulations.
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A further hypothesis was made about the effect of choice set manipulations. This
said that, as well as swaying participants towards a particular option (which was
H1 and H2) choice set manipulations also increased the intensity of preference
for a particular decision maker. That is, it guided them towards a particular
option and made them more certain of their choice. This is expected to increase
the speed with which choices are made, giving estate agents a way to increase
the turnover of their property stock and induce potential buyers to cut short
their searches, thus lessening the possibility of the buyer going to a competitor
agent. If the manipulation is powerful enough it is likely to outweigh the cost of
maintaining decoy properties which are unlikely to sell.
Finally the role of property search websites was also considered. These are im-
portant because of the explosive growth they have enjoyed in recent years, which
has affected a dramatic change in the way property searches take place. Here, on
sites such as Rightmove, agents list their properties across a common platform
but remain in competition for business. This situation is similar, but decisively
different to, a much older invention from the United States: the Multiple List-
ing Service. The common, but competitive, environment means that any agent
would be strongly motivated to use another’s properties as decoys to the benefit
of his own stock. The ability to do this via search results lies not with the agents
themselves, but with the independent company which runs the website. However,
given the value that could potentially gained from it there is a clear rationale for
agents to pay the website operator for manipulation of this sort in their favour.
Having set out the motivation for the study and the hypotheses that are to
be investigated, the thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 5 completes Part II by
considering the methodology to be used. It explores the discipline of experimen-
tal economics, finding that it offers the potential for significant insights into the
issues at hand. Part III reports the results of the experimental work split into
three distinct areas which match the hypotheses made here: choice set effects in
housing decisions (Chapter 6); ordering biases and housing choice (Chapter 7);
and judgemental biases and housing value (Chapter 8). Chapter 9 concludes the
thesis and makes suggestions for future work.
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Empirical Methodology and Data
This chapter describes the experimental studies which form the data
for the results in Part III. It begins by examining the field of exper-
imental economics, discussing how this methodological approach has
grown to become a valuable tool for economic enquiry, in particular in
the study of choice theory. It then describes the three experimental
studies themselves, considering what insights they can provide into
housing choice.
5.1 Experimental Economics: A Valuable Tool
To some, economics does not appear to be a subject suitable for experiments.
The word experiment suggests a specifically scientific method of inquiry involving
laboratories, controlled conditions and careful manipulations of complex systems.
Some economists have questioned whether this is a feasible (or even desirable)
approach for economists to take. Samuelson and Nordhaus (1985) exemplify
this view, saying instead that “[economists] generally must be content largely to
observe.” (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985, page 8). Yet today experimental eco-
nomics thrives as an important part of mainstream economic research. It is an
established methodology in its own right which offers a way to gain significant
insights into a variety of economic questions, including the existence and persis-
tence of judgemental biases in housing choice which are the focus of this thesis.
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Such a change in perception is not without precedent in science. According
to Freidman and Sunder (1994) biology is one such that was for a long time
considered inherently non-experimental because the subject matter was living or-
ganisms. But the 19th century saw the likes of Mendel and Pasteur introduce new
techniques that turned it into the experimental science it is today. The same is
true for psychology which has grown organically to include a significant experi-
mental tradition.
This section will explore how this change occurred and how we can benefit from
it in examining the hypotheses posed in Chapter 4. We will see how, starting
from a few isolated studies in the inter-war years of the 20th century, a distinct
tradition of experiments has evolved in economics with several fundamental prin-
ciples; principles which today help justify why the data gathered from using this
method can be used to further our knowledge of economic phenomena at hand.
5.1.1 Early History
Among the earliest economic experiments was carried out by Thurstone (1931)1.
He sought to determine experimentally individual indifference curves, being in-
terested in how practical it was to obtain consistent choice data to estimate the
curves. In his experiment subjects were asked to make a number of hypothetical
choices over certain commodities such as hats and coats or shoes and coats. He
concluded that it was possible to estimate a curve which fitted actual data for
these choices fairly closely and as such that it was a suitable way to go about do-
ing so. However, the work was latterly subject to critique by Wallis and Friedman
(1942). They questioned the whole basis of the study, saying that the experimen-
tal situation was artificial, rendering the choices made meaningless. They argued,
among other things, that for an experiment to be satisfactory it would need to
include “reactions to actual stimuli” (Wallis and Friedman, 1942, page 180).
1 Perhaps the very earliest recorded is Bernoulli (1738) according to Kagel and Roth (1995). It
achieved widespread attention when it was translated into English and published in Econo-
metrica in 1954 (Bernoulli, 1954).
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Rousseas and Hart (1951) used the criticism to help design their own experi-
ments on indifference curves. Their article, intended as a follow up to Thurstone
according to Kagel and Roth (1995), constructed a more realistic choice situa-
tion. Participants were asked to choose from several different breakfast menus
with each containing different amounts of eggs and bacon. Importantly once the
choices were made subjects were asked to eat what they had chosen there and
then. This added realism to the choice environment and so removed some of the
artificiality of the initial experiment.
Although there were still methodological concerns with the work2 the exchange
succeeded in providing the burgeoning field with several important themes which
remain relevant today, including the importance of stimuli and of careful design
in experimentation if the results are to be regarded as valid.
However, these isolated studies aside, there was as yet little interest among the
wider body of economists in developing experimental economics as a discipline.
Freidman and Sunder (1994) suggest that meaningful experiments in a discipline
are only possible when some of the key variables recognised by the discipline are
amenable to experimental control. In the 1930s and 1940s the prevailing view
in economics was that the variables of interest were not amenable to this type
of control. At the time economics was sub-divided into its micro- and macro-
forms. Macroeconomic systems were so large in scale that experiments seemed
impractical. They might also be somewhat immoral, given the weighty topics
under consideration.
Microeconomics seemed to be heading in a different direction too, but for dif-
ferent reasons. By the 1950s it was coming to full power among social sciences by
pursuing theoretical approaches. These abstract from reality and use mathemat-
ics to create important concepts such as optimization and equilibrium. As such
mainstream microeconomists were not interested in whether humans actually do
maximise utility or whether markets clear; rather they were interested in testing
the consequences of assuming these things, for example by investigating what will
2 See, for example, MacCrimmon and Toda (1969).
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happen to security prices in equilibrium if there are changes in the underlying risk
preferences of the market participants. Experiments in a laboratory situation are
not necessarily useful for testing the internal validity of these models. Thus, ac-
cording to Freidman and Sunder (1994), microeconomists were naturally quick to
reject the idea that experimentation could make a useful contribution. Far better
to judge the model according to whether its predictions meet with reality than
on its assumptions as per Milton Friedman’s famous “as if ” principle (Friedman,
1953).
But things were changing. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern pub-
lished their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944 to instant impact.
It was, according to Kagel and Roth (1995), both a more powerful theory of
individual choice and a new theory of interactive behaviour. It had a profound
influence on microeconomics, making series of predictions about individual choice
behaviour which were ripe to be tested in exactly the kind of controlled situation
that experiments could offer.
Individual choice experiments began to appear more widely. One article that
followed the spirit of Thurstone was Mosteller and Nogee (1951) who examined
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. Their method used ini-
tial tests to estimate each individual’s utility curve with respect to certain risky
gambles. These were used to make predictions about the individual’s preferences
over other, more complex, risks and compared to choices made by the individuals
when assessing those same risks. They concluded, cautiously perhaps3, that it
was possible to construct the curves experimentally and use these to make pre-
dictions about attitudes to other risky propositions.
Implicitly this paper’s important contribution was to recognise that the labo-
ratory, and the controlled conditions it provided, was a useful setting to examine
the von Neumann-Morgenstern choice model which, after all, was derived from
assumptions about individual choice behaviour.
3 Mosteller and Nogee noted that the results were: “[N]ot so good as might be hoped, but their
general direction is correct.” (Mosteller and Nogee, 1951, page 399).
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Freidman and Sunder (1994) see this as a change in what they call the ruling
paradigms of microeconomics. New topics were growing rapidly, presenting an
opportunity for experimentation:
“General equilibrium theory, social choice theory, industrial organiza-
tion theory, game theory, and voting theory matured to the point that
they could provide serious alternatives to one another as a foundation
for understanding economic phenomena... At this point the need for
a method of choosing among competing economic principles became
recognised.”
(Freidman and Sunder, 1994, page 123).
By the mid 1950s a growing band of economists were coming to the same conclu-
sion. Experiments could be very useful in determining which, among competing
models, was the best predictor of behaviour. Experimental studies began to pro-
liferate in many of these new fields in microeconomics including: game theory
(Flood, 1985, 1958); industrial organization (Chamberlain, 1948; Hogatt, 1959);
competitive bargaining (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960); and choice theory (Allais,
1953). Siegel and Fouraker’s work was perhaps the most comprehensive experi-
mental paper of its day including a lengthy discussion reflecting on their work.
In the 1960s the field began to grow significantly, gaining ground symbiotically
with the new topics in microeconomics that had come to the fore a decade earlier.
Kagel and Roth (1995) document over 100 papers using experiments in the 1960s.
Increasing thought was given over to the subject of experimental methodology:
Becker et al. (1964) outlined a procedure for establishing subjects’ true reserva-
tion prices for certain risky gambles, a procedure still in widespread use today.
A paper by Hogatt, Esherich and Wheeler (1969) was the first to use computers
in an economic experiment.
The 1970s and 1980s saw experimental economics being adopted more widely
in economics faculties across the United States in particular. The field also ex-
panded into new areas including, most significantly, social and public choice the-
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ory (Fiorina and Plott, 1978; Pearce, 1979). An important source of growth was
the new field of behavioural economics and the work of psychologists Daniel Kah-
neman and Amos Tversky. As noted in Chapter 2, in the 1970s researchers began
to notice, and document, increasingly prominent situations when human decision
making under risk did not seem to adhere to the axioms of rational choice the-
ory. For the first time the von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences model could be
comprehensively attacked on the basis of its predictions and a competing model
advanced.
Kagel and Roth (1995) say that by the 1990s the growth was explosive and
experimental economics began to display many of the hallmarks of a mainstream
discipline including the Journal of Economic Literature establishing a separate
bibliographic category for “Experimental Economics Methods” in the mid-1990s
and experimental methods being adopted as part of standard undergraduate eco-
nomics courses. Maurice Allais, a pioneer in choice experiments, was awarded a
Nobel Prize in Economics 19884.
Today experimental economics is an accepted tool used in a variety of economic
fields from industrial organization to finance theory and from public choice models
to environmental economics. But what are the key principles that make this ap-
proach valid for studying such issues as judgemental bias in housing choice? The
following sections examine this question, showing that two of the key principles
from the earliest work in experimental economics hold the answer: experiments
give significant control and so allow more powerful inferences to be made than
from natural sources of data; and careful design to isolate and leave unchanged
the underlying conditions allows researchers to induce how the results would likely
be played out in real world scenarios.
4 Also, in 2002 Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith were awarded the Nobel Prize, the latter:
“for having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis...”
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5.1.2 Experimental Control
In Section 5.1.1 we saw that in one of the first true economic experiments Thur-
stone used the control of a laboratory experiment to investigate indifference curves
of subjects with respect to certain consumption bundles. The data produced is
clearly experimental data compared with the happenstance data he might have
obtained from recording transactions for these goods in real settings5. The latter
data would have arisen as an outcome of what are fundamentally uncontrolled
processes, rather than the controlled conditions in an experiment.
Experimental data is valuable – and has been accepted as so across the scien-
tific world – because it is easy to interpret. As we will see in later sections of this
chapter, if option A is chosen more frequently when it is shown to participants
first among several choices, than when it is shown last, we can be sure that it
is this change in the order of viewing that is causing the change in preference.
Why? Because in a well-designed experiment this is only this variable that is
being manipulated, satisfying economists’ desire for ceteris paribus conditions. If
the data is happenstance we cannot be so confident in making causal conclusions.
The field of econometrics exists to pick through and minimise many of these
difficulties and has developed powerful tools for doing so. But many of these
tools rest on assumptions the veracity of which is difficult to gauge. Furthermore
in many cases happenstance data is definitely inadequate. It may be impaired
by omission of useful variables, which necessitates using proxies (thus introduc-
ing a further dilution in control), or by measurement error of unknown magnitude.
Experiments of increasing sophistication and application have removed many
of these considerable obstacles to analysis. Often utilising a careful process of
random allocation of subjects to treatments, one can be sure that in an experi-
mental environment the only variable being altered is the one varied according to
the treatment. The results are also replicable, an important way of establishing
5 This typology replicates that used by Freidman and Sunder (1994), pages 3-4.
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their validity6.
What about external validity? Is it generally possible to generalise inferences
from the laboratory into the real world? This is an issue which is often difficult
for those not familiar with experimental work. It remains an important task
of each experimental economist to explain how his work offers insights into real
world situations and behaviours. However, in doing so he can rely on some simple
but powerful inductive reasoning.
5.1.3 External Validity
Freidman and Sunder’s (1994) primer for experimental economists tackles the
issue of external validity in experiments. Unless you are an experienced experi-
mentalist, they note, the obvious instinct when designing a laboratory experiment
is to pursue what they call realism. That is to design the laboratory environment
in a way that resembles as closely as possible the real world environment. Alter-
natively the instinct might be to design the experimental along theoretical lines,
replicating as closely as possible the theories of interest. Freidman and Sunder
argue that neither of these approaches is correct. The goal of the researcher
should be to develop a design which balances both goals, for external validity
and theoretical exactitude. Their point is that the experimental situation will
inevitably not replicate the infinite complexities of the real world. It would be
futile to try since infinite amounts of detail will always be left out. Moreover,
complexity may dilute the control that is at the heart of the experimental method
or even introduce confusion to the participants and thus introduce a confounding
variable to the analysis.
That being the case, many economists have, quite reasonably, asked: how can the
data gathered in experiments really be representative of the real world7? Scep-
6 Some of the most famous problems in game theory and choice theory have been repeated
many hundreds of times, largely surviving unmodified, thus galvanising their validity. Exam-
ples include the Prisoner’s Dilemma formulated by Flood and Dresher (Flood, 1985, 1958)
and formalized by Tucker (Tucker, 1950).
7 Note this analysis closely follows the reasoning of Freidman and Sunder (1994) pages 15-16.
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ticism in the generalisability of experimental results has been present since at
least the time of Gallileo when his critics did not believe that the motions he
described in his pendulum experiments could be applied to the planetary motion
of celestial bodies. However, the compromising of real world complexity does not
automatically destroy the external validity of experimental work. The fact that
you have observed the sun rise every morning for twenty years does not logically
allow the deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. However people do make
this leap of faith. Why? This is the principle of induction.
The principle that induction provides is that regularities observed in systems
– such as behaviour in economic experiments – will persist in new situations pro-
vided the relevant underlying conditions remain largely unchanged. What counts
as ‘relevant’, and to what extent conditions are ‘largely’ unchanged is a matter
for theory and debate, but the principle of induction itself is an axiom of experi-
mental work, not a deductible proposition.
Vernon Smith calls this the parallelism precept (Smith, 1982). According to this
axiom it must be presumed that results will carry over to the real world. Thus
the sceptic has the burden of stating what is different about the real world that
might change the results observed in the experimental situation. The goal of the
researcher is to design and re-design the experiment to counter these points of
scepticism. As the following sections of this chapter discuss, significant effort was
made developing and evolving the experiments in this thesis with precisely this
in mind. Consequently the experiments described do allow for conclusions which
have applicability in real world housing choice scenarios.
Are there any principles which experimental economists have evolved to deal
with the most common criticisms of their method? Three important areas of
design are considered in the paragraphs that follow: incentives, randomization,
and subjects.
Incentives are an important part of any economic experiment. Whereas for psy-
chologists these are less of an issue, with participants usually asked simply ‘to do
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your best’, in economic experiments they are important in motivating subjects
and gaining control over the experimental outcomes. Vernon Smith calls this
induced-value theory (Smith, 1976). The idea is that by using a reward correctly,
the experimenter can gain control over the motives of the participant, so that
certain innate and heterogeneous aspects of individual behaviour become irrele-
vant.
Several of the experiments reported later in this chapter clearly demonstrate these
characteristics. In one experiment subjects making judgements on the value of
houses would earn more money through guessing accurately. In the choice set
research subjects did earn a fee for participating, or could win a prize for taking
part, but this was not strictly related to their performance in decision making.
Thus, although conducted using the controls associated with economic experi-
ments, these parts of the study are therefore not strictly experiments. They are
controlled surveys. The methodology for these surveys will be discussed exten-
sively in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 that follow. Furthermore in the case of the online
surveys the choice scenario was designed to replicate a particularly delicate part
of the choice process where prospects are initially weighed up and impressions
established. The decision frame was virtually an exact replica of the frame in
which decisions are actually taken, which lends the results a considerable exter-
nal validity, even given the lack of incentives.
Another important principle for experiments is randomisation. With human sub-
jects this is a vital ingredient in establishing external validity because it removes
significant and uncontrollable nuisance variables which can seriously damage the
results. Nuisance variables are a problem if they are correlated with the treat-
ment variable. Experiments must be designed very carefully with this in mind.
A big problem known to experimenters is the alertness and interest of subjects,
for example. It is likely a significant nuisance variable would be introduced to
the analysis if all the complex choice set experiments took place during the late
afternoon, when subjects might be tired after a long day, whereas the simple
ones took place in the morning, when they were bright and alert. A finding that
subjects performed worse in the complex experiments than the simple ones would
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be compromised by such a variable because the researcher cannot be sure that it
is the treatment variation causing the differential performance.
Similarly individual subjects can have many different characteristics which are
unobservable and uncontrollable by the experimenter. In this case randomisation
of subjects to treatments – and even positions within the experimental environ-
ment – has evolved as standard practice in experimental economics.
The nature of the human subjects chosen is, of course, a big part of the practice of
experimental economics. Freidman and Sunder (1994) discuss this topic at some
length, pointing out that the nature of the subjects chosen will depend ultimately
on the aims of the experiment at hand.
Student subjects are a very common part of the subjects, partly because of their
ready availability to academic researchers and the relatively low cost to motivate
them. There is a lengthy debate about the generalizability of results obtained
from using students subjects (Calder, Phillips and Tybout, 1981; Cunningham,
Anderson and Murphy, 1974; Shuptrine, 1975). A reasonable conclusion of this
literature is that student subjects can be used if they represent a good model of
a particular group under consideration, or if they point to behaviours which can
be corroborated by other experiments. For the research here students are useful
because they represent a cadre of individuals who are likely to be active in the
rental market in the coming years. Another reason that undergraduate students
may be a good subject pool is that they represent the sophisticated end of the
renter market. This presents an even stiffer challenge for the behavioural biases
hypothesised. In other words, it is possible to use the non-representativeness of
the subject group to strengthen the validity of the results obtained. If even so-
phisticated decision makers are vulnerable to simple behavioural manipulations,
what hope for the rest of us?
Experimental methodologies often build in repetitions that use different subjects
to extend the external validity. The research reported here does this too, by
including extensive testing on adult subjects who own homes and are, therefore,
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likely to have as much experience as is possible in choosing houses.
5.1.4 A New Platform for Experiments
Two of the research projects examining choice biases in housing scenarios were
undertaken using an online experiment8. Section 5.3 will discuss the method-
ology itself in detail, but it is important to consider here the contribution this
makes both to the external validity of the work and experimental economics itself.
Completing experiments into housing choice online is a vital part of the external
validity of the work because of the explosive growth of this medium for making
housing choices. The leading website, Rightmove, has over 20,000 estate agents
listing properties on their site, which is over 90% of the total. There are over one
million properties on that website alone. Today perhaps the majority of housing
searches begin with online searches. Mimicking this frame when conducting con-
trolled surveys is, therefore, an important part of the parallelism precept discussed
by Smith (1982). Significant attention was paid to designing and conducting the
survey so that it replicated closely how choices like this are made. This approach
enhances the validity of the results considerably.
It also represents a contribution to experimental economics and choice theory
more generally because little work currently exists to examine the importance
of choice biases in online settings, despite its increasing importance as a choice
frame. In many ways it is the perfect breeding ground for many of the behavioural
heuristics discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 to take effect.
Finally the key strength of the online methodology is that it replicates what
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have called the editing phase of decision making,
where the preliminary analysis of offered prospects occurs and simplifications take
place to allow cognitively easier decision making (see Chapter 2, page 55). The
exponential rise of online buying outlets has made biases in this phase of decision
8 The term “experiments” is used extensively in the text although, as discussed in Section
5.1.3, it is acknowledged that strictly these are controlled surveys.
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making more important than ever. This is particularly true with housing choice.
It is easy to imagine a process of housing selection where initial preferences – so
powerful in conditioning ultimate choices – are influenced by the initial phase of
searching and browsing online. The research in this thesis contributes by plac-
ing this part of the decision making process under a greater spotlight than has
previously been the case.
5.1.5 Summary
Experimental methods have followed, within the wider subject of economics, a
similar evolutionary path to that which experimentation has followed in other ar-
eas of scientific inquiry. It found a role in microeconomics and particularly choice
theory from the 1950s as the subject evolved and grew in sophistication, allowing
for competing hypotheses on a diverse range of topics which experiments could
be useful in modelling and testing. As in other experimental subjects, a body of
standard practices has emerged which help build upon the experiment’s ultimate
strength – the control it provides to allow firm causal conclusions to be drawn –
while also ensuring that as far as possible, the results have external validity and
can tell us something about the world outside of the laboratory.
The methodological approach in this thesis to investigate the hypotheses and
answer the fundamental question posed in Chapter 1 – to what extent, and by
what means, can housing choices be manipulated in non-rational ways by a will-
ing economic agent? – employs economic experiments and controlled surveys in
the tradition of experimental economics. They are carefully designed to replicate
essential features of housing choices, while abstracting somewhat from the rich
tapestry that is real world decision making. This is the best approach to provide
the control necessary to allow firm conclusions to be drawn, allow for maximum
generalisability and show a way forward for future research in the topic.
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5.2 Student Group Experiments
The experiments involving student participants were carried out at the Univer-
sity of Cambridge between November 2009 and March 2010. They were all in
a classroom setting in groups of between 10 and 40 students. A total of 283
students took part. Great care was taken with the recruitment and experimental
procedure for conducting the experiments to ensure the fidelity of the results,
following current best practices in experimental economics. This is discussed in
the following sections.
5.2.1 Recruitment
Volunteers were recruited using a variety of student-specific media throughout the
University. This included advertisements in local student newspapers, emails to
students groups and posters. Following guidance in Freidman and Sunder (1994)
all advertisements made only general references to the context of the experiments.
Volunteers were called for an “experiment in the economics of decision making”,
that would take around 45 minutes and for which they would earn £5 for partic-
ipating, and would have the opportunity to earn £10 or £20 more depending on
their performance9.
5.2.2 Pilot Study
As part of the development process for the experimental procedure, pilot exper-
iments were arranged in November and December 2009. Involving around 40
participants, these experiments were conducted as dry-runs of the full experi-
ments later. After the pilot studies subjects were asked to stay behind for 5-10
minutes and more in-depth feedback was solicited on an informal basis.
Several important alterations to the experimental design were made as part of
this process. Modifications were made to way certain properties were described
to ensure that all terms would be understood by all participants. For example
9 Incentives are discussed in Section 5.2.7.
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several subjects had not understood what a “maisonette” was. This is poten-
tially an important source of bias therefore presentation scripts were re-examined
modified to explain all these terms and more emphasis was placed on participants
being able to ask questions during the experiment itself to clarify matters.
The pilot study also allowed timings to be tested and modified so the whole
experiment ran more smoothly, without significant gaps or waiting periods. The
entire procedure for all classroom experiments lasted a maximum of 45 minutes
from beginning to end, which is important in retaining subject involvement and
ensuring their fatigue was kept to a minimum.
As part of the pilot study, consultations were completed with a local estate agent,
including advice about suitable properties to ensure the validity of the intended
manipulations.
5.2.3 Experimental Procedure
Experiments were designed to best practice in the field of experimental economics.
Much of the procedural design was taken from Freidman and Sunder (1994) and
Kagel and Roth (1995) whose texts remain the leading authorities on experimen-
tal methods.
The experiments were all conducted in a classroom setting which is illustrated
in Figure 5.1. Desks were lettered and clearly marked. Spacing was such that
it would be difficult – although not impossible – to see another’s answers. In
light of this subjects were reminded that it was important they did not look at
others’ answers and that being caught doing so would result in them forfeiting
all payments and being excluded from the experiment. At each desk was a pen,
answer sheet (which was turned over) and a consent form.
In common with standard experimental procedure, consent was sought from all
subjects before taking part. The consent form was designed from a template sug-
gested in Freidman and Sunder (1994). A copy is provided in Appendix A. During
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: Experimental environment for Student Group Experiments.
some experiments information would be received using a presentation therefore
all experimental environments had large overhead projectors which were in clear
sight from all desks.
Desk allocation was conducted using a randomisation procedure which ensured
the anonymity of the respondent. That the responses are anonymous – and seen to
be so by participants – is an important part of minimising experimenter-induced
biases where participants subconsciously give answers which they expect the ex-
perimenter wants to hear. When everyone was ready, subjects were asked to turn
over their answer booklets and read the instructions. These were also read aloud
at the same time.
This initial procedure was governed by an experimental protocol which detailed
to the experimenter how to conduct the experiment10. Part of this guidance is
reproduced in Appendix A. Throughout the experiments information was read
to them in this way to ensure that each experiment was identical, except for the
experimental treatment in each case.
Having completed the initial instructions, experimental treatments were carried
out. The procedure for these is contained in Section 5.2.4. Having completed
10 Note: the experimenter was the author of this thesis throughout.
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experiments students were asked to fill in a questionnaire with personal details
and other information, for example about the strength of their preference(s) for
their choice(s). The questionnaire was designed based on standard templates in
Freidman and Sunder (1994) and is reproduced in Appendix A.
At the end of the experiment payments were made to students. This was done in
cash (in envelopes). When the payments were all completed, subjects were asked
to leave, thus completing the experimental procedure.
The following two sections cover the precise nature of the experiments which
the student group took part in.
5.2.4 Written Choice Set Experiments
The simplest experiments that students took part in involved the written receipt
of information only. Students were asked to trade-off two features that they value
in a hypothetical scenario involving renting a property. This experimental set-up
matches the experiments pioneered by Huber et al. (1982) and Simonson (1989).
There were two main experiments conducted using this procedure: testing for
asymmetric dominance and compromise effects. Thus, these experiments were
intended to test hypotheses H1 and H2, which were discussed in Chapter 4
(page 96 and 97) and are reproduced below:
H1. Asymmetric dominance: the proportion choosing a particular
property increases when a decoy property is added that is asymmetri-
cally dominated.
H2a. Strong compromise effect: the proportion choosing a partic-
ular target property increases when it is made a compromise choice by
the addition of a decoy property to the choice set.
H2b. Weak compromise effect: the proportion choosing a competi-
tor property decreases when the addition of a decoy property to the
choice set makes the other original property the compromise.
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An example of one of the experimental scenarios that students were faced with is
presented in Appendix A. Participants were asked to trade-off commuting time
with the state of repair of the property.
Ordering effects are also tested in this example by varying the order in which
the options are listed. These were the subject of hypothesis H3, which was
discussed on page 98. It is reproduced below:
H3a. Primacy: information received first will have excessive weight
in judgements over housing, thus houses seen first will be preferred
more, ceteris paribus.
H3b. Recency: information received last will have excessive weight in
judgements over housing, thus houses seen last will be preferred more,
ceteris paribus.
Figure 5.2 represents the different choice treatments in the experiments on a
graph. As can be seen from this information, the options are set up so that
in the asymmetric dominance experiments Option C is dominated by Option B;
and Option D is dominated by Option A. In those examining compromise effect
Figure 5.2: Choice options for students participating in written experiments.
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Treatment Set and Order n
a:1 {A, B} 21
a:2 {B, A} 21
b:1 {A, B, C} 24
b:2 {C, B, A} 25
c:1 {A, B, D} 25
c:2 {D, B, A} 25
d:1 {A, B, E} 22
d:2 {E, B, A} 20
e:1 {A, B, F} 22
e:2 {F, B, A} 20
Table 5.1: Treatment classification for written student experiments.
Option E makes Option B a compromise; while Option F makes Option A a
compromise. The final numbers used were calibrated using feedback from the
pilot study to ensure that those who saw the simple choice set containing only
Options A and B were divided evenly between the two. As can be seen from
Table 5.1, the experimental treatments consisted of manipulating both the choice
set and the choice ordering. For clarity, those who were part of treatment a:1
saw the options {A, B} in that order; whereas those part of treatment c:2 saw
the options {D, B, A} in that order.
5.2.5 Visual Choice Set Experiments
As discussed in Chapter 3, the majority of papers which have examined choice
set manipulations have used very simple ‘dummy’ options to manipulate choices.
These were typically transparently dominated, or participants found it easy to
weigh up the simplified characteristics on show. The experiments described in
the previous section replicate this method to some extent. However, housing is
a highly complex choice scenario with many decision variables. To capture this
complexity and bring the choice frame into a more realistic setting, while still
testing hypotheses H1 and H3, a set of more realistic ‘visual’ choice set experi-
ments were also designed.
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Subjects were told that they were going to receive a presentation, which would
be a ‘virtual tour’, of several properties and afterwards asked which they liked
the most. The scenario was constructed in a similar manner to the written exper-
iments considered in Section 5.2.4: students were told to imagine they had got
a job in Cambridge and were looking at houses to rent for a couple of years. To
remove any income effects subjects were told throughout that the houses would
cost the same to rent and that they could afford to live in any of the properties
shown to them.
Three properties were chosen based on discussions with a local estate agent and
after considering the results of the pilot study. Apartment X was a two-bedroom
city-centre flat in a smart and modern complex. The fit out was clearly new
and it was obviously well equipped with modern technology. House Y was a
two-bedroom city-centre terraced property. It offered what are called ‘character
features’ in British housing markets that were not evident in the flat, given its
age, including a fireplace and old floorboards in places. It was in an excellent
state of repair also, with a new bathroom suite. This bathroom was, however,
on the ground floor of the property, which is an inconvenience in modern British
properties. References to location were non-specific. Both were said to be 0.7
miles from the city centre and close to amenities. Thus both properties offered
the same rent, distance to city centre and number of bedrooms, but were different
in terms of character features and facilities. Broadly Apartment X had less age
and character features, but better facilities than House Y. An excerpt from the
‘virtual tour’ of Apartment X is reproduced in Figure 5.3. Full reproductions of
the information for each property are presented in Appendix A.
In addition to Apartment X and House Y a third option, House Z, was added
to some treatments. This property was also a terrace. Thus it also offered age
and some period features. However, it was further away from the city centre
than both X and Y and was in a noticeably poorer state of repair than House
Y. It was therefore a decoy, placed so as to be similar in type and character to
House Y but ultimately dominated by it. Table 5.2 reports the treatments that
were used in this experiment. Thus for example, subjects who were exposed to
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: Example of the ‘virtual tour’ method.
treatment f:1 saw Apartment X followed by House Y, and subjects exposed to
g:2 saw {Z, Y, X} in that order.
Clearly given the significantly greater amounts of information available it is not
possible to control the experiment with the same precision as when there are
only two dimensions of value. It is far harder to make predictions about the way
these effects will run. Furthermore, significant experimental ‘noise’ compared
with more typical – highly controlled – experimental situations is expected. For
this reason the analysis which follows in Chapters 6 and 7 considers relationships
at the 10% level of significance.
Treatment Set and Order n
f:1 {X, Y} 39
f:2 {Y, X} 44
g:1 {X, Y, Z} 45
g:2 {Z, Y, X} 67
g:3 {Y, Z, X} 31
Table 5.2: Treatment classification for visual student experiments.
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5.2.6 Judgement Experiments
As discussed in Chapter 4, manipulating judgements, particularly value judge-
ments, is potentially an important part of consumer vulnerability when choosing
housing. The experiment used examined anchoring by giving participants an ar-
bitrary numerical value before asking them to estimate the sale price of a series
of four properties. Thus it is intended to examine hypothesis H4. This was
discussed on page 100. It is reproduced below:
H4. Anchoring: individuals’ valuation judgements over housing are
biased by the presence of an arbitrary anchor.
Once preliminaries had been completed, subjects were given instructions11. As
previously students received these instructions in written form and they were read
aloud. In order to provide a minimum level playing field for all subjects, given
their relative lack of experience in housing choice, all were given some background
information about current conditions in the housing market both on a national
and local level. This procedure also made the experiment more realistic because
in real housing choice situations decision makers would be expected to spend at
least some time familiarising themselves with their local market through research
on the internet local press.
Thus subjects were given a 10-minute presentation on the UK and Cambridge
housing markets which included facts and figures on the following:
• Commentary on current national house price trends
• Current average house prices as estimated by leading market researchers
• Regional market moves and average house prices
• Background on the Cambridge housing market
• Average house prices in Cambridge’s five central post-code areas
This method also presents a significant challenge to the anchoring manipula-
tion that was to follow because it presented subjects with many other potential
and highly salient anchors from which they could base their estimate. All the
information contained within the presentation was based on internet research
11 As with earlier instructions, these are reproduced in Appendix A.
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readily available to any real home buyer on websites including rightmove.co.uk
and primelocation.com.
Having listened to the market trends presentation the next phase of the experi-
ment began. Its aim was to give subjects an arbitrary anchor which might bias
their judgement. Subjects were told that before we viewed the first property
they needed to write down a number. This was the anchoring procedure. The
instructions for this procedure were exactly as below:
Before we view our first property I would like you to use the first
space [on the answer sheet] to write down the last three digits of your
mobile phone number. Write these down as a price in thousands of
UK pounds. So, if my last three digits were two-zero-four, I would
write down two-hundred and four thousand pounds.
This procedure uses as its inspiration the anchoring procedure developed by Ariely
et al. (2003) who used digits of US Social Security numbers to produce an anchor.
The exact procedure used is, in fact, somewhat more stringent their method,
because it leaves less room for the arbitrary anchor to take hold. In their exper-
iments, where student subjects were asked to value a series of household items
such as bottles of wine and computing equipment, the anchor was given then
subjects were asked to indicate whether they thought the item they were valuing
was worth more or less than the number they had just written down. Having
done this they were then asked what they thought the value was. In the housing
choice experiments reported here no reference at all was made to the anchor once
it was written down.
By asking participants specifically to appraise the item at hand in terms of the
anchor, Ariely et al. clearly gave the arbitrary anchor much more prominence in
the valuation process and so made it much easier for it to influence judgement.
Thus, as well as providing evidence about biases in a different area of choice, the
housing judgement experiments also provide a methodological test of Ariely et al..
133
5.2 Student Group Experiments
Having received the arbitrary anchor, participants were presented ‘virtual tours’
of the properties using information from the agents’ brochures as in the visual
choice set experiments in Section 5.2.5. The presentations for all four properties
are reproduced in Appendix A.
After each viewing, which lasted approximately 2-3 minutes, subjects were asked
what they thought the sale price of the property was. They were reminded that,
as per the instructions, the house was sold within the last four months and that
their incentives would be paid according to how close they were to that value.
The procedure was repeated. No price feedback of any kind was given in between
each valuation. The actual values of these properties are reported in Table 5.3.
Having completed the experiment subjects were asked to complete a question-
naire before incentive payments were made. Incentives schemes are discussed
specifically in Section 5.2.7 which follows.
In terms of experimental procedure, Freidman and Sunder (1994) suggest a pro-
cedure for efficiently incentivising subjects in multiple judgement scenarios. Stu-
dents were told at the beginning that accurate judgement would be rewarded,
but that payments would only be made on one of the properties. However the
property on which the payments would be made would only be determined at
the end of the experiments. Given these conditions participants’ best course of
action is to judge the value for all as accurately as they can since they do not
know which will offer the chance of earning extra money. This mechanism was
explained in full to participants at the beginning of the experiments as was their
House Sale Date Price
A 12 January 2010 £240,000
B 13 January 2010 £207,000
C 5 January 2010 £215,000
D 6 November 2009 £195,000
Table 5.3: Value of properties in anchoring experiment.
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Step Action Medium
0 Subjects welcomed –
1 Experiment instructions Written, read aloud
2 Presentation: UK and Cambridge market Overhead projector
3 Anchor procedure Read aloud
4a Presentation: House A Overhead projector
4b Valuation: House A Written
5a Presentation: House B Overhead projector
5b Valuation: House B Written
6a Presentation: House C Overhead projector
6b Valuation: House C Written
7a Presentation: House D Overhead projector
7b Valuation: House D Written
8 Questionnaire Written
9 Incentives calculated and paid Read aloud
10 Subjects dismissed –
Table 5.4: Summary of anchoring experiment procedure.
best course of action as a result. In full view of participants a house was selected
at random by asking one of the participants to pick a lettered tile out of a bag.
Based on the selection subjects were told the correct value and payments were
made accordingly. Having received the money and signed receipts the experiment
was over and subjects were invited to leave. Table 5.4 presents a summary of this
procedure.
5.2.7 Incentives
Incentive payments are an important part of economic experimentation, as dis-
cussed in Section 5.1. The induced-value theory of Smith (1976) suggests that
providing incentives correctly is a sufficient way to control the behaviour of re-
spondents in the desired way, despite their heterogeneous preferences and atti-
tudes. In the judgement experiments the intention was to induce participants to
estimate the value of one or several properties as accurately as they could, given
the information available to them. Incentives were thus designed for this purpose.
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Housing choices are among the most important that can be made in a lifetime by
any individual or household. As discussed in Chapter 1, this is part of the rea-
son that it is a vital – and very interesting – area to examine behavioural biases.
Many economic experiments employ incentive schemes which are graduated: par-
ticipants earn increasing amounts as they perform better and better with some
extra money almost guaranteed. Housing choice is like this, especially where
judgement of value is concerned. Judging incorrectly means paying thousands of
pounds too much, consigning the decision maker to years of paying above ‘fair
value’ for his purchase. Or perhaps it means paying too little, therefore missing
out on properties altogether and a stressful and extended search process. Both
result in significant, binary, effects on welfare and utility.
As such a binary incentive scheme was designed for the judgement experiments.
Subjects could earn one of two amounts, £10 or £20. They would earn £20 if
they estimated to within £2,000 of the true sale price, and £10 if they estimated
to within £10,000 and £2,000 of the correct price. Any judgements outside of
this boundary would not be rewarded12. All subjects earned a fee of £5 for par-
ticipating in experiments, which is standard practice in experimental economics.
Thus, for judging accurately, the student volunteers could earn up to 4x their
show up fee as a reward. This effectively motivated the student subjects tak-
ing part, as well as contributing to the realism of the experiment itself. Smith’s
(1982) parallelism precept13 says that inductive reasoning allows one to say that
behavioural regularities from laboratory experiments will persist in real world
situations as long as the relevant underlying conditions remain substantially un-
changed. The incentive scheme was high-stakes14 and it was binary, conditions
which match those in real world housing choices.
The incentive structure is another feature which distinguishes the experiments
12 Note that in one experimental treatment there was the possibility of earning a top prize of
£100 for the best overall estimate. This did not make a significant difference to the results.
13 This is discussed in more detail in Section 5.1.
14 The stakes were high both relative to typical practice in experimental economics and to the
student participants involved in these tests.
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here from the choice experiments of Ariely et al. (2003) who used a randomi-
sation device to force some participants to actually transact in the goods they
had valued at their stated prices. Such a methodology was clearly not feasible in
the case of housing choice! Approximately 10% of all participants earned some
extra money from this incentive scheme. The mean payout was £6, although
naturally this had a significant variance (90% earned £5, while 10% earned some
combination of £10 or £20).
5.2.8 Summary
In total 283 student volunteers took part in the experiments which examined
choice set and ordering effects from several perspectives with increasing complex-
ity, as well as judgemental biases in value estimation. Significant time and effort
was put into designing and implementing an efficient and effective experimental
methodology in accordance with current best practice in the field.
Some of the experiments broadly replicate methodologies developed in other pa-
pers including Huber et al. (1982), Simonson (1989) and Ariely et al. (2003).
However in several cases the procedure used represents a more stringent test of
the bias hypothesised than has been used previously. This adds to the credibility
of the result as well as providing an implicit test of the previous method.
Thus the results reported from these experiments in the chapters that follow
have credibility and can validly give us insights into real world housing decisions.
5.3 Rightmove Survey
The Rightmove Survey was generated from a large-scale online experimental sur-
vey of a self-selected group of 4,000 users of the property search website Right-
move. They survey was conducted over a period of one week in June 2010.
The student experiments described in Section 5.2 have many advantages, in-
cluding the ability to control and manipulate information in a classroom setting
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and conduct more lengthy sessions (up to 45 minutes). However there is a clear
weakness in that group – most students are in their early 20s and are unlikely to
have much experience in buying houses. Thus, while they represent a good proxy
for behavioural in rental markets, as has already been argued, the conclusions
might not apply to home buyers.
Thus, to investigate judgemental bias in housing choice more thoroughly it is
important to try and extend the scope of the experiments to a wider group of
participants in housing markets. This also allows for an implicit test of whether
age and experience are important factors in determining the vulnerability to the
behavioural biases hypothesised.
Another reason for conducting the survey in an online setting is that it provides a
different platform – and hence methodology – for conducting experiments. This
strengthens the findings and extends their validity still further so is good ex-
perimental practice for its own sake. However, getting beyond the classroom to
conduct an experiment online has another important advantage when studying
housing choices: it replicates the situation in which increasing amounts of hous-
ing choice takes place.
From almost nothing in the year 2000, property search websites have revolu-
tionised the way people search for property in the UK. In March 2010 figures
showed that the top four websites attracted over 7.5 million unique visitors15.
The leading website, Rightmove, has over 20,000 estate agents listing their prop-
erties on its site, which is 90% of the total. There are over 1 million properties
listed on that site alone. Today many property searches begin on these vast
databases.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, this part of the search process resembles
closely what Kahneman and Tversky called the editing phase of decision mak-
ing, consisting of an initial analysis and simplification of the prospects at hand.
Their foundational Prospect Theory discusses the violations of rational choice
15 http://www1.propertyportalwatch.com/2010/04/zoopla-co-uk-reports-more-growth/.
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theory that may arise from both the editing and later evaluation phases of deci-
sion making, but much of the consumer choice literature which followed does not
distinguish between the two. Such a distinction is vital in understanding choice
biases and ultimately choice manipulation. So by creating an experiment where
decision makers choose housing but are aware that they are not going to be ac-
tually completing any purchases the work focuses more explicitly on the editing
phase of choice and preference construction.
Thus studying judgemental bias in housing choice by employing an online de-
sign brings far greater realism to the methodology by replicating the context and
situation in which many of these choices are made. It is important to bear in
mind though, as discussed previously, that predictions about the effects of ma-
nipulations are far more difficult in this information-rich design than for simpler
experiments reported here and in existing literature.
5.3.1 Survey Design
The natural partner for administering the survey was an online property search
website and agreement was reached with the Rightmove website to help design
and administer the survey. Throughout the design phase the motivation was to
create a choice frame which matched, as closely as possible, the way in which
housing choices are made on the Rightmove website. With relatively few modifi-
cations this was possible.
Four houses were selected to form the experimental treatments and screen cap-
tures were taken to be used in the survey. One such is reproduced in Figure
5.4. Small modifications were made to this capture to remove certain confound-
ing variables from the analysis. Firstly all references to specific locations were
removed so that, even though all the houses were in Cambridge participants did
not know this. Research in professional valuation has shown that familiarity with
the local market can be an important determinant of valuation accuracy (Diaz,
1997; Diaz and Hansz, 2001). This was necessary to ensure a level playing field
among respondents in a UK-wide study.
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Figure 5.4: Screen capture of a property profile on Rightmove.
As with the classroom experiments discussed in Section 5.2, all price indications
were also redacted. Participants were told they were going to view houses which
were the same value (this was not true to the letter, but there was not much
difference between each one). Doing this removes any income effects from the
analysis which are also hard to control and may have a significant confounding
influence on the analysis. Also certain minor changes were made to the “Full
Description” section of the property profile so that there was more consistency
between the properties. A final important result of this design is that some of the
interactivity was lost. Most particularly participants could not toggle between
different photographs of the property. They were only able to see one main shot
in large size, with the others more thumb-nail sized as can be seen in Figure 5.4.
This was a necessary part of the survey design software.
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Overall the property profiles created for the survey very faithfully match the
terms under which properties are viewed and chosen in this environment. As
already discussed, this is a key strength of the methodology: survey participants
were asked to choose which house they favoured from a series which looked the
same as any other group of houses that might be returned from a casual search
of the website.
5.3.2 Recruitment and Incentives
Email invitations were sent out to a randomly selected group of 7,000 of these
users of the website who have previously indicated a willingness to take part
in surveys. As is reported in Chapter 6 they represent a wide demographic of
adults living in the UK16 whose only common trait is that they use, or have used,
property search websites. This is, if anything, a desirable feature of the sample
group because it means that they are at least familiar with how property search
websites work, giving them the best chance of avoiding the kind of choice biases
which are being hypothesised. In turn this means they form a stringent test of
those hypotheses.
There was no judgemental element to the experiments in this case, so incen-
tives could not be paid according to how ‘well’ a person performed. Subjects
were incentivised to take part however by being told that they could earn a prize
for participating. Fifteen prizes of between £20 and £100 were available in the
form of vouchers to a national department store. This conformed to standard
practice used by Rightmove and was administered by them. In total £440 was
paid out in prizes, which equates to a recruitment cost of just over 10 pence per
respondent.
5.3.3 Experiments
The experiments were designed to examine choice biases in a similar manner to
those considered by the classroom experiments in both written and visual form.
16 A very small minority currently live outside the UK.
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Having clicked on a link to the survey, participants were greeted by an intro-
ductory screen which gave instructions. They were very simple and made no
reference to the purpose of the study, just that they were asked to view a series
of houses then make a decision about which they preferred. The text from the
instructions page is reproduced in Appendix B.
Having clicked to enter the survey itself, subjects were shown either two or three
houses picked from the four pre-selected to make a choice set. There were three
choice sets: {A, B}, {A, B, C} and {A, B, D} where the letters correspond to
properties A to D respectively. These choices were arranged in all possible or-
dering combinations, resulting in 14 treatments. These are reported in Table 5.5
along with the numbers taking each. A total of 4,087 took part in the survey,
of which 3,786 were usable samples (with all necessary data). Having seen the
choices, participants were asked which their preferred property was before com-
pleting a questionnaire which asked for demographic details as well as about their
choices. A copy of the questions in the questionnaire is presented in Appendix A.
Having completed the survey questions, a space was left to leave contact details
for those who won prizes. This marked the end of the survey.
Full details of all the properties can be found in Appendix B. The main purpose
of the survey was to investigate the choice biases which were considered in Chap-
ter 4, in particular asymmetric dominance. Would it be possible to use a ‘decoy’
property to bias choices in favour of a ‘target’ property, in violation of rational
choice theory’s independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom? The specific hy-
pothesis which this experiment aimed to investigate was expressed in Chapter
4:
H1. Asymmetric dominance: the proportion choosing a particular
property increases when a decoy property is added that is asymmetri-
cally dominated.
To investigate four properties were chosen and labelled A, B, C and D. The aim
was to create options which adhered to the graphical representation in Figure
5.5. Properties were chosen after discussions with a local agent and representa-
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Treatment Choice Set and Order n
1 {A, B} 335
2 {B, A} 312
3 {A, B, C} 277
4 {A, C, B} 318
5 {B, A, C} 272
6 {B, C, A} 275
7 {C, A, B} 236
8 {C, B, A} 232
9 {A, B, D} 253
10 {A, D, B} 259
11 {B, A, D} 296
12 {B, D, A} 244
13 {D, A, B} 235
14 {D, B, A} 242
Table 5.5: Treatments in the Rightmove Survey.
tives from Rightmove to ensure that the properties did adhere to the intended
manipulations.
Properties A and B were chosen so that they offered different combinations of two
key characteristics: state of repair and age/ character. Property A was a modern
four-bedroom property. It was in an excellent state of repair and offered many
modern conveniences associated with family life today including a large kitchen
diner. It was in a better state of repair than Property B, which had clear evidence
of a lack of repair. Property B was, however, older looking and definitely offered a
greater quantity of features which, in British housing markets, might be referred
to as ‘character features’, including a mature garden and some internal features.
Thus neither property dominated the other, and a straight choice between them
involved trading off the relative merits of these two features.
Properties C and D were decoys. They were dominated by Properties B and A,
respectively. Property C was also an older property, solidly built with some pleas-
ant features, but it did not have as many as Property B, and was also in a worse
state of repair. The units and fittings were older, as was some of the decoration.
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Figure 5.5: Choice options for participants in the Rightmove Study.
Property D was also modern, and so similar in this respect to Property A. Many
of the fixtures and fittings looked new, as did the bright red painted door. But
it did not offer the features and character of Property A. Both decoys were also
smaller than their associated targets (although all had at least four bedrooms).
An illustration of how the properties looked is presented in Appendix B.
5.3.4 Summary
The Rightmove Survey has several important methodological advantages over and
above the classroom experiments conducted with student volunteers, aside from
the significantly larger scale of the study.
Firstly it uses a wider demographic more representative of those likely to have
made, and be making, housing choices. Indeed, the use of a self-selected group
of users of the property search website Rightmove brings a demographic which
is more likely than the general population to have looked, or be looking, for
property and so is a good test of the hypotheses at hand. The use of the online
survey design replicating almost exactly the conditions under which many hous-
ing choices are at least started today adds realism to the choice scenario. And it
allows research to focus on a new platform for consumer choices: online. This is
interesting because little has currently been done to focus on how such platforms
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may alter choice dynamics; and because it allows us to shed more light on the
vital initial phase of decision making where prospects are simplified before being
evaluated more fully, a process first identified in Kahneman and Tversky’s classic
1979 paper.
5.4 Stamford Adult Group Survey
This section describes a survey of 600 residents of the town of Stamford, Lin-
colnshire examining further the biases in housing choice that have been advanced
in this thesis. The survey was also conducted online, using specialist software.
5.4.1 Survey Design
The Stamford Adult Group Survey tests the same behavioural biases as the Right-
move Survey using the same information set. In other words it was designed the
test hypothesis H1 which was first expressed in Chapter 4 (page 96). The prop-
erties used, and the manipulations attempted, are the same as those described
in Section 5.3. As well as providing supplementary evidence on the existence
and persistence of choice bias in a housing scenario designing the study this way
offered a natural way to test the methodology of the Rightmove study itself.
The survey was conducted online using specialist survey software provided by
www.questionpro.com (hereafter referred to as “Question Pro”). This allows the
user to specify the layout and content of the internet pages which form the exper-
iment. The broad structure of the survey was the same as that described in the
previous section: participants were first greeted by an information screen telling
them about the experiment, then showed a series of properties before being asked
to state which they preferred and why. Finally there was a questionnaire to com-
plete the survey.
The text used to describe Properties A, B, C and D was the same as with the
Rightmove study as were the photographs. However there were subtle differences
in the layout and ‘look’ of the pages. In the Rightmove survey subjects were only
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able to see one photo in large size, with the others being thumb-nail size only.
This was a necessary part of the way the Rightmove-designed software worked.
Question Pro’s software on the other hand allowed for all the photos to be shown
in large size, thus naturally giving a more equal weight to each one. Also, the
placing of the “Next” button was altered so that participants in the Stamford
study were forced to scroll down through all the written information before going
on to the next viewing. Of course participants could not be forced to actually
read and take in all the information in detail, but this subtle alteration in the de-
sign did mean that Stamford survey participants were encouraged more strongly
to consider all the information available and not make snap judgements.
If the Rightmove design had the advantage of replicating faithfully how real
people view properties and form judgements about them, the Stamford design
offered the chance to investigate choice patterns among an adult volunteer group
who were very likely to have taken more time and considered each property more
carefully. This allows for a comparison to be made between the two sets of results
and implicit conclusions drawn about the overall importance of the method of
presentation. Would biases persist among this group? Or would they be reduced
when people took more time over their choices?
A final difference between the Stamford and Rightmove Surveys is that the Stam-
ford Survey included some location information about each property. Participants
were told that the properties were all located in Cambridge and were shown
zoomed-out maps of each property’s location. Stamford is located about 45 miles
from Cambridge itself so, while the majority of the respondents would have heard
of Cambridge and maybe visited at least once, most would not be expected to be
knowledgeable about its property market. Data about participants’ familiarity
with the Cambridge market was taken in the questionnaire and is examined in
Chapter 6. We believe this is a further strength of the design here because it adds
realism to the experimental scenario. It effectively made the choice frame more
concrete by making reference to a location known to most participants, without
compromising the overall aim, of conducting the experiment so that location was
largely removed from the choice scenario.
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Figure 5.6: Advertisment for participants in the Stamford Adult Group Survey.
5.4.2 Recruitment and Incentives
As discussed at the beginning of this section, the Stamford survey also used
adult volunteers, largely experienced in property. Some were recruited using
advertising in local media. The advertisement used is reproduced in Figure 5.6.
Volunteers were also sought by emailing local schools and asking if they would
be willing to advertise to their parent body. Several schools agreed, giving access
to large numbers of local residents many of whom would be home-owners and
‘experienced’ in property. In total 617 people started the survey, which resulted
in 388 usable responses. As in the Rightmove case there was no judgement
element within the survey therefore no way to pay incentives according to how
well a person performed. However to encourage people to take part a prize was
offered, with a value of £50.
5.4.3 Experimental Treatments
Because the survey was somewhat smaller than the Rightmove Survey only six
treatments were used. Table 5.6 reports these and shows that they allowed for
both choice set effects to be examined by including all three choice sets {A, B};
{A, B, C}; and {A, B, D}. Ordering biases could also be considered because all
three choice sets had their orders reversed completely (treatments 2, 4 and 6).
147
5.5 Conclusion
Treatment Choice Set and Order n
1 {A, B} 69
2 {B, A} 61
3 {A, B, C} 72
4 {C, B, A} 59
5 {A, B, D} 76
6 {D, B, A} 51
Table 5.6: Treatments in the Stamford Adult Group Survey.
5.4.4 Summary
The Stamford Adult Group Survey has an important role beyond providing fur-
ther evidence of judgemental bias in real estate choice from a different sample
set. Although still conducted online, the different software platform allowed sub-
tle variations in the way the information was presented.
Specifically, it gave more equal weight to visual material by reproducing all
photographs in equal size and implicitly forced participants to take more time
considering each choice by giving more prominence to all the information. The
choice frame was also made more real by telling participants that the houses were
in a specific city they were aware of, although not familiar with, in most cases.
This allows interesting conclusions to be drawn from the treatments about the
strength of the biases hypothesised and, by implication, the importance of the
information platform in producing judgemental biases and conditioning vulnera-
bility to manipulation.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter began by exploring the growth and development of experimental
economics. This methodology has grown to become an incredibly useful for tool
for many types of problems in modern economics, particularly choice theory. As
was discussed, a tradition has evolved which pays particular attention to harness-
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ing the control that experimental environments provide while also maintaining
the essential features of the situation under examination to ensure the external
validity of the results. Two Nobel Prizes in Economics have now been awarded for
the establishment of this field, firmly placing it in the modern economist’s tool kit.
For studies in choice theory, such as those proposed here, experiments are par-
ticularly useful because the control they afford is so vital in establishing causal
relationships. In addition they are considerably more feasible than comparable
empirical work would be, especially in terms of cost. Furthermore the online
research design for the controlled surveys offers a particularly valuable way of
completing research with experimental control in an environment that is virtu-
ally identical to the real choice frame. A strong case has been made that the
method is the most appropriate for the questions at hand, and can make a signif-
icant contribution to our understanding of both the dynamics of housing markets
and consumer choice theory.
The methodology for the experiments and controlled surveys in this thesis was
discussed in detail in the latter parts of the chapter. The design of the economic
experiments adheres to best practice in the field and was implemented after care-
ful development. There are two main platforms used: classroom experiments
involving student volunteers and online controlled surveys of adult participants.
The student volunteers taking part in the classroom experiments represent a spe-
cific demographic, young renters, which is an important segment of the housing
market, although not necessarily representative of the owner-occupier market.
The online studies were split into two: the Rightmove Survey which was a survey
of 4,000 users of the property search website; and the Stamford Adult Group Sur-
vey which was a survey of 600 residents of the town of Stamford, Lincolnshire.
Completing the surveys using an online choice frame is an important method-
ological contribution to choice theory and the consumer choice literature in its
own right because of the exponential growth in this form of consumer choice,
especially in property markets. It is possible realistically to claim that the exper-
iments described are as close to an empirical study as possible, while also allowing
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for the significant control that economic experiments provide.
Moreover, subtle variations in the presentation of information between the two
online studies provide important points of comparison and form an implicit test
of the strength of this methodology. Finally adult volunteers who own homes and
are experienced in housing choices are also clearly more representative of housing
choice at large.
Part III, which follows this chapter, reports the results of these experiments.
It is split into three chapters. Chapter 6 considers choice set effects from the
three studies described in this chapter: the Student Group Experiments; Right-
move Survey; and Stamford Adult Group Survey. Chapter 7 explores the ordering
biases that were present in the same studies. Finally Chapter 8 investigates judge-
ment biases in housing value estimates that were tested for in the Student Group
Survey. Part IV ends the thesis in Chapter 9 by providing conclusions as well as
considering the limitations of the work and how future research may build upon
it.
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Chapter 6
Choice Set Effects in Housing
Decisions
This chapter reports the results from several experiments examining
biases in choice patterns that can be induced by the use and placing of
‘decoy’ options as explained in Chapter 4. These are broadly termed
choice set effects. It finds significant evidence of these choice set effects
in housing choice scenarios including a new bias labelled the choice
pollution effect. The biases exist among both inexperienced and more
seasoned decision makers.
6.1 Student Group Experiments
This section presents the results from a series of economic experiments conducted
on student volunteers which investigate whether housing decisions can be reliably
influenced by a willing economic agent who is able to manipulate the selection of
properties shown to the decision maker, known as the choice set. The experiments
had two methodologies. In one, information about the choices was presented in
a highly simplified written form. Participants were given only two dimensions on
which to judge the houses – distance from a place of work and state of repair.
This method largely replicates methodologies used widely in experimental choice
theory literature and provides significant precision – by isolating effects clearly –
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Exp. 1a Exp. 1b Exp. 2
n 171 149 225
Male (%) 50 44 46
Aged (18-25) (%) 82 87 81
Own property (%) 6 5 6
Knowledgeable in property1 (%) 15 15 14
Table 6.1: Summary statistics for choice set experiment participation.
albeit at the expense of realism. In the second set of experiments house choices
were presented in visual form by means of a ‘virtual tour’ of each property us-
ing photographs and descriptions from the real property profiles of a local estate
agent. This significantly increases the complexity and realism of the choice frame,
although makes predicting the results more difficult. The hypotheses for these
tests were discussed in Chapter 4 and the experimental procedure is presented in
further detail in Chapter 5.
Summary statistics on the participants for each experiment are presented in Ta-
ble 6.1. The figures show little variability between experiments. Although not
reported here, tests conducted on these variables indicate no systematic difference
in answers according to age, ownership of property or among those particularly
knowledgeable about property (as indicated by non-significant p-values).
The figures clearly illustrate that the typical student participant was young and
inexperienced in making decisions over property. Subjects were classed as ’knowl-
edgeable’ if they identified themselves that way (with a reason) or if they admitted
to participating in three or more activities chosen as indicators of a particular
interest in property1. Just 15% fulfilled these criteria. As already argued in Chap-
ter 5, this group represents well at least one important set of participants in the
housing market – young renters. Many of the participants in this experiment will
make their first independent steps into the housing market via renting a property
in the next few years, so the insights gained here have a ready application.
1 To see these criteria used to determine if a subject was ‘knowledgeable’, see Appendix A.
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6.1.1 Asymmetric Dominance
Asymmetric dominance is a choice bias where the addition of an alternative to
the choice set which is dominated by one of the options, but not the other,
leads to a change in preferences in favour of the ‘dominant’ option (Huber et al.,
1982). This is irrational according to the von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)
rational choice axioms because it means in aggregate that individuals are choosing
A from a choice set of {A, B} but choosing B from a choice set of {A, B, C}. The
hypothesis describing this effect was expressed in Chapter 4. It is reproduced
below:
H1. Asymmetric dominance: the proportion choosing a particular
property increases when a decoy property is added that is asymmetri-
cally dominated.
The experiment to test whether asymmetric dominance manipulations can be
effective in housing choices asked participants to trade-off two features of value
in a hypothetical decision over renting a house. The two features were: i) the
distance from the town centre; and ii) the state of repair of the property2.
In the first treatment, subjects faced the simple choice set of {A, B} where neither
option was dominant. In other words, Option A was located a shorter distance
from the town centre (variable 1) but was in a worse state of repair (variable 2),
than Option B. In treatment 2 the choice set was expanded to include a domi-
nated alternative, C, making the choice set {A, B, C}. Option C was placed so
that its domination was asymmetric. That is, it was inferior to B (being further
from the town centre and in a worse state of repair) but not A (although much
further from the town centre than A, it is still in a better state of repair). This
makes Option C fundamentally similar to, and so naturally comparable with, B.
It thus makes that option the ‘target’ of the manipulation. Finally treatment 3
contained the choice set {A, B, D} where Option D was dominated by Option A,
making A the target3.
2 Note that income effects were removed by telling subjects that all houses would cost the
same amount which they should consider affordable.
3 This methodology is discussed further in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.4, page 127).
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Table 6.2: Asymmetric dominance among student subjects – simple form.
Row Choice Set A B C D p-value n
1 {A, B} 58 42 57
2 {A, B, C} 41 59** 0 0.029 64
3 {A, B, D} 67 33 0 0.141 49
Notes: The figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
** indicates significance at the 5% level.
Table 6.2 presents the results4. Rows are numbered for ease of reference in the
left-hand column. There is evidence of asymmetric dominance. The introduction
of Option C increases the proportion choosing the target option, B (row 2). The
increase is significant at the 5% level. When Option D is added instead, to make
A the target of the manipulation there is an increase in the proportion choosing
A – from 58% to 67% – however this is not strong enough to be significant at the
10% level (p-value: 0.141), a result indicative of the relatively small sample size.
This result is powerful because, as detailed in Chapters 4 and 5, this experi-
ment included an extremely simple choice problem, expressed in words with no
other cues, visual or otherwise. In aggregate it is a direct violation of the inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives axiom, a central pillar of von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s (1944) rational choice theory.
6.1.2 Compromise Effect
Compromise effects are a similar type of choice set bias to asymmetric dominance.
First suggested by Simonson (1989), they describe how preference can be influ-
enced by placing alternative options which make certain ‘target’ choices appear
as compromises. Individuals tend to show extremeness aversion according to Si-
monson and Tversky (1992) meaning that these compromise options are chosen
with greater frequency than when they are presented in isolation. This gives rise
4 Note that tests which illustrate the effect of altering the order of presentation are reported
in Chapter 7.
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to the possibility of placing alternatives to artificially create compromise options
which will be more preferred by decision makers, ceteris paribus.
In this experiment subjects were faced with an identical choice situation to pre-
viously but with the choices placed differently. Options A and B remained the
same, but Options E and F were added to treatments 2 and 3 respectively which
made the original options a compromise5. In the choice set {A, B, E} Option B is
the compromise target; in the choice set {A, B, F} Option A is the compromise.
The hypotheses tested in this experiment, discussed in Chapter 4 is reproduced
below:
H2a. Strong compromise effect: the proportion choosing a particular
target property increases when it is made a compromise choice by the
addition of a decoy property to the choice set.
H2b. Weak compromise effect: the proportion choosing a competi-
tor property decreases when the addition of a decoy property to the
choice set makes the other original property the compromise.
Table 6.3 reports tests of these hypotheses6. There is no evidence of a strong
compromise effect. The addition of Option E to the choice set increases the pro-
portion choosing B from 42% to 46% but this is not significant. The introduction
of Option F to the choice set actually decreases the proportion choosing A from
57% to 50% (p-value: >0.50).
The weak-form compromise effect requires the proportion choosing the option
that is not the target to decrease when the other option is made a compromise by
the introduction of the third alternative. There is significant evidence of weak-
form compromise effect (the p-values in the table are from weak-form tests).
When the choice set is {A, B} the proportion choosing Option A is 57%. The
introduction of Option E makes B the compromise choice. Its introduction causes
5 The precise nature of the choice placing is reported in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.4, page 127).
6 Note that tests which illustrate the effect of altering the order of presentation are reported
in Chapter 7.
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Table 6.3: Compromise effect among student subjects.
Row Choice Set A B E F p-value n
1 {A, B} 58 42 57
2 {A, B, E} 38** 46 16 0.020 50
3 {A, B, F} 50 21** 29 0.016 42
Notes: The figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
** indicates significance at the 5% level.
the percentage choosing A to fall to 21%, a highly significant decrease (row 2).
Similarly, in row 3 of Table 6.3 the addition to the choice set of Option F causes
a decrease in the proportion choosing B from 43% to 21% compared to the base
case where the choice set was {A, B}.
The implication of these results is that compromise effect manipulations can
have significant applications in housing choices. Specifically it appears that in-
troducing an extreme option to make another a compromise induces a shift along
the preference spectrum. The choices in this experiment were set up so that Op-
tion A was preferable for those who preferred a better state of repair relative to
commuting time; and Option B was preferable for those who preferred a shorter
commute relative to the state of repair. The introduction of the third option
significantly changed the proportion making these choices. When Option E was
added offering an even shorter commute (but at the expense of a worse state of
repair) significant numbers were induced away from the “good repair-long com-
mute” option (A) to one of the two “short commute-bad repair” options (B and
E). When Option F was added in an equal and opposite way (that is, it offered
an even better state of repair at the expense of a longer commute) the effect was
in the opposite direction. This further illustrates the power of the manipulation.
6.1.3 Complex Choice Set Effects
As emphasised earlier in this thesis, housing choices are very complex, with many
factors being traded off in the decision making process. In this section an experi-
ment is reported which introduces significant complexity into the decision making
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process and gets far closer to real housing choices.
As discussed in detail in Chapter 5 (page 129), in this experiment participants
were asked to choose between properties having been shown photographs and re-
ceived information about them by way of a ‘virtual tour’ based on real properties
supplied by a local estate agent. Despite this added complexity, the idea was the
same as for the previous sections: induce a tendency towards a particular target
property by adding a dominated alternative to the choice set.
The original choice set of {X, Y} contained the choice between a city-centre
apartment (X) and a similarly well located terraced house (Y). The third option
added to some treatments (Z) was another terraced property, but with an inferior
location and state of repair to House Y. Thus House Z was the ‘decoy’, used with
the intention of enhancing the prospects of House Y (which is the target).
The results are reported in Table 6.47. The addition of House Z has the effect
of decreasing the attractiveness of the target. The percentage choosing House
Y drops from 58% to just 35%, a highly significant fall. Although some chose
the ‘new’ choice, House Z, a significant number are driven towards favouring the
other original choice, Apartment X. The proportion who choose X rises from 42%
to 59% (the p-value for this change, not reported in Table 6.4, is 0.012).
This result has not been seen before in previously published literature and is
totally contrary to the theory of asymmetric dominance discussed previously (led
by Huber et al., 1982). It suggests that the addition of the dominated option,
House Z, to the choice set had a perverse effect on the target. In this case the
addition of a poorer terraced house (Z) made the other terraced house (Y) look
worse, causing a movement in preference away from it. This is labelled the choice
pollution effect.
7 Note that tests which illustrate the effect of altering the order of presentation are reported
in Chapter 7.
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Table 6.4: Asymmetric dominance among student subjects – complex form.
Row Choice Set X Y Z p-value n
1 {X, Y} 42 58 83
2 {X, Y, Z} 59 38*** 4 0.003 111
Notes: Figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
The explanation may lie in information asymmetry8. Akerlof (1970) was the
first to theorise that in market situations characterised by significant information
asymmetry, those on the wrong end of the asymmetry would take preventative
action to avoid being taken advantage of (sold a ‘lemon’ when paying for a good
quality car). This can have seriously distortive effects on markets, as his analysis
shows.
Housing choice is also characterised by significant information asymmetry. In
the typical scenario the home buyer will be aware that the seller, represented by
the agent, is in possession of far more information about the property than he
is and thus that he is vulnerable. In this scenario it is possible that information
from other choices in the set are used implicitly to send a signal about missing
information on the choice at hand. That is, the inferior terraced house presented
alongside the nicer terraced property sent a negative signal about the latter. Per-
haps it gave the signal that terraced houses may look superficially spacious (as
the target did), but really are quite small (as the inferior house was), or that
although they can be renovated to look good (again, as the target did), they can
also depreciate quickly and become run-down (as the inferior house was, rela-
tively).
Another explanation may be that the added complexity of this choice scenario
introduces significant uncertainty into the decision process and so adds significant
‘noise’ to the effects seen. It is clearly true that many economic experiments, by
8 I would like to thank Professor Colin Lizieri for pointing out this interpretation to me.
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simplifying decision making in laboratory scenarios, underemphasizes the com-
plication of real world choices. Thus in the very least this experiment suggests
that we may uncover more useful information by experimenting with scenarios as
realistic as possible.
6.1.4 Summary
The Student Group Experiments show evidence of several important choice bi-
ases. In housing choice scenarios involving only simple trade-off decisions there
is evidence of the effectiveness of asymmetric dominance effects, confirming and
extending the findings of Huber et al. (1982) and Simonson (1989) and of hy-
pothesis H1 (Chapter 4, page 96). Placing choices to create compromise options
and thus influence choice patterns is also possible in weak form (hypothesis H2b,
Chapter 4, page 97).
The most significant results come from the investigation of more complex choice
set effects in an information-rich environment. When shown profiles of real prop-
erties selected to produce the same choice set biases seen in the simple written-
information case the effect is significant, but runs in the opposite direction to the
existing theory. Participants display a phenomenon labelled the choice pollution
effect : the presence of an inferior decoy in fact confers a negative signal about the
quality of all similar properties and biases choices away from the target. This is
the first time that such an effect has been seen in experimental studies of choice
behaviour so represents a contribution worthy of further investigation. It may be
that the results of such investigation is that it is difficult to tell which effect –
asymmetric dominance or choice pollution – will dominate, limiting the effective-
ness of such strategies in real world situations. The next section will investigate
further by utilising a choice frame which replicates real world choice situations
even more closely.
The experimental group – largely undergraduate students with little experience
in property – is clearly not fully representative of all those who participate in the
rental market. Students living in Cambridge and studying at the University are in
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a unique position in some respects because accommodation is typically provided
by their colleges on site, and so they will, in most cases, not be using the pri-
vate rental market. Many will have never rented property independently before.
Thus the decision making of these subjects may not completely represent that
of more seasoned decision makers when renting property. However, young first-
time renters are a significant part of the market, so the conclusions are still useful.
In addition, the results thus far point to one further conclusion: that experience
may be important in housing choices. Is the vulnerability of decision makers to
choice set effects reduced when they are more seasoned in these markets and these
kinds of decisions? The next section attempts to answer this question through a
large-scale survey of a very different demographic.
6.2 Rightmove Survey
This section reports the results from the controlled survey of 4,000 users of the
property search website Rightmove. This large-scale study allows an extension of
some of the experiments of the Student Group Experiments in Section 6.1. The
size of the study is clearly important, allowing more treatments to be investigated
and a clearer picture sought. However the important aspect of this part of the
study is the nature of the participant group and the choice frame used.
As the statistics in Table 6.5 illustrate, respondents were typically much older
than their student counterparts: they have a mean age of 44. The majority
own their own houses and have done so for a reasonable period. Thus the re-
sults described in this section apply more directly to the owner-occupier market.
Furthermore, many regard themselves as being interested in property generally,
as the responses to the questionnaire show. Thus the subject group provides a
sterner test for the behavioural manipulations that have been hypothesised. Al-
though it has been claimed that housing choices are unique among consumer or
quasi-consumer decisions, because they are always made with limited experience,
this group represents the typical consumer of housing, who is likely to have at
least some experience with the process of searching for and choosing property.
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Age % Length of Occupation %
18-24 5 <1 year 21
25-34 25 1-5 years 39
35-44 24 6-10 years 18
45-54 23 11-20 years 13
55+ 23 20+ years 9
(a) (b)
Type of Occupation % Which of the following apply to you? %
Owner Occupied 71 I watch property shows on TV 76
Rented 20 I read property supplements 52
Other 9 I own properties as investments 13
(c)
I work in the property industry 6
Other 5
None of the above 11
(d)
Table 6.5: Summary statistics for the Rightmove Survey group.
The survey was completed by respondents viewing properties online through the
Rightmove website with properties presented in an almost identical manner to
how they are actually viewed in real choices9. Participants were asked to view
two (or three) houses and choose which they preferred, before completing a ques-
tionnaire. By replicating closely the actual choice frame in which decisions are
made – or at least initial preferences are formed – this experiment offers a signif-
icant insight into the nature of biases in housing choice. Although the significant
complexity that comes with the information-rich design makes it difficult to make
firm predictions about the effects we will see.
Four properties were used, all based on real profiles on the Rightmove website.
The set-up was similar to the experiment of complex choice set effects in the
Student Group Experiments, although the actual properties were different. It
is reported in full in Chapter 5. As previously, the aim was to place a ‘decoy’
property with the intention of altering preference in favour of a ‘target’ property.
9 Location information was removed. For full details see Chapter 5.
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Property A was a smart, modern family home, which offered less character, but
perhaps a better state of repair, than its comparison, Property B, which was older
and more solid in appearance. It had character and several features not present in
the modern house, but was in a more traditional state of repair than Property A.
Thus respondents were asked to trade-off age and character against the state of
repair of the property in an information-rich environment where properties were
viewed in an almost identical manner to how they would be on Rightmove.
Properties C and D were decoys. Property C was also a ‘character’ property
like B, but clearly offered less of the charm of B and was in a noticeably worse
state of repair. Property D was like Property A – modern and well maintained,
but without the overall impressiveness of A in terms of state of repair. As with
the earlier experiments, price was excluded from the analysis by telling partici-
pants that all the houses cost the same10. This removes significant complications
relating to income effects. The experiment had 14 treatments, allowing for each
combination of the choice sets and orders.
6.2.1 Full Sample Results
Table 6.6 reports the results from the full sample in aggregated form11. The aim
of this experiment is to test hypothesis H1, which was discussed in Chapter 4.
It is reproduced below:
H1. Asymmetric dominance: the proportion choosing a particular
property increases when a decoy property is added that is asymmetri-
cally dominated.
It is clear that Property A was significantly preferred in the simple choice set
consisting of {A, B}. The introduction of C to the choice set, intended to make
B a target, does not increase the proportion who choose B. It falls from 28% to
26%, a significant decrease at the 10% level (p-value: 0.078). This is not met
10 This statement was true to within £10,000. All four houses were definitely in the same ‘price
bracket’.
11 Note that tests which investigate the effects of altering the order of presentation are reported
in Chapter 7.
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Table 6.6: Choice set effects among the Rightmove Survey group.
Row Choice Set A B C D p-value n
1 {A, B} 72 28 647
2 {A, B, C} 69 26 5 NM 1,610
3 {A, B, D} 63 24 14 NM 1,529
Notes: Figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
by an increase in the proportion choosing A, which might be suggestive of the
choice pollution effect as described previously. Similarly the introduction of D
to the choice set, intended to make A the target, does not cause an increase in
the proportion choosing A. The percentage who choose it falls from 72% to 63%.
This is a significant decrease (p-value: <0.001). Once again though this is not
met by an increase in the proportion choosing B, which would point towards the
choice pollution effect.
If the decoy properties (C and D) were transparently dominated by the target
properties (A and B) this would suggest a significant irrationality: in the choice
set {A, B, C} 5% of respondents choose a dominated alternative by choosing C;
and in the choice set {A, B, D} 14% make an irrational choice by choosing D. How-
ever given the complexity of the decision variables involved in this information-
rich scenario, it is possible that some uncontrolled variable does favour Properties
C and D respectively. Thus the conclusion that individuals’ choosing C and D
illustrates irrationality can only be a tentative one.
6.2.2 Logit Estimation of the Determinants of Choice
As part of the controlled survey, all respondents completed a questionnaire giv-
ing demographic information such as age and gender, and various other variables
which indicate their knowledge and experience of property. Given the signifi-
cant noise present in the aggregated sample, and thus the difficulty in identifying
significant tendencies, another approach is to assess whether any of these other
variables have any power in explaining choice, and so whether bias is more present
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among one group of participants than another. Such a finding may contribute to
the work of economists who have sought to show that experience in choices can
reduce errors (such as List, 2004).
The dependent variable in this case is binary: whether the respondent chose
the target property. As such, logistic regression using maximum likelihood esti-
mation is an effective way to assess which variables have an important impact on
choice. The variables of interest are reported in Table 6.7. The first, complexset
indicates whether a decoy was present in the choice set when the choice was made.
When this is set to 1 the decoy – either Property C or Property D depending on
the suffix – was present, otherwise it is set to 0. The testing above suggests that
its impact might be significant, although not as intended in the manipulation.
This variable captures that effect and allows us to interpret within the model.
The variable prefstrength is based on the respondents’ own report of his strength
of feeling towards the choice made. It is rated on a scale of 0-5 where 0 is a
“Don’t Know” response. The strongest feelings are indicated by a rating of 5.
Standard variables for gender and age are included. The latter has six categories.
The variable ownprop indicates whether the respondent owns property, or has
done so in the past. This is intended as a possible proxy for experience with
buying property, since prior literature has suggested that experience might be an
important variable in determining whether individuals make ‘mistakes’ in choice,
or are vulnerable to manipulation. The penultimate variable, duration indicates
the length of time that respondents have been in their current property. It is a
categorical variable split into five categories ranging from under 1 year to over 20
years. This may also be a proxy for experience with housing, albeit in reverse.
Those living in their current property the longest are perhaps likely to be the least
knowledgeable about current property trends. The final variable, know, indicates
whether the respondent is particularly knowledgeable about property. It is com-
prised of those who declared themselves as being knowledgeable for a particular
reason (such as working in the property industry) and those who answered yes to
at least three of a series of statements reflecting their interest in property. These
can be found in Table 6.5 (page 162).
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Variable Description
choose The dependent variable indicating whether the subject chose the
target property
complexset-c A dummy variable indicating whether the choice set was ‘simple’
(ie. contained only A and B) or ‘complex’ (ie. contained A and B
and a decoy). The ‘-c’ indicates that the decoy present was C.
complexset-d A similar variable to that above except for the ‘-d ’ which indicates
the decoy present was D.
prefstrength The respondents’ strength of preference towards their choice, on a
scale of 0-5 (where 0 is the response “Don’t Know”).
gender The gender of the participant. A dummy variable where 1=male
and 0=female.
age The age of the participant. A categorical variable with six variables:
18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+.
ownprop Whether the respondent owned their own home. A dummy variable
where 1=owner occupier, 0=not owner occupier.
duration The duration the respondent had lived in his current property. A
categorical variable with five values: under 1 year, 1-5 years, 6-10
years, 11-20 years, 20 years+.
know Whether the participants are especially knowledgeable about prop-
erty. A dummy variable where 1=knowledgeable and 0=not knowl-
edgeable.
Table 6.7: Variables for logit regression of choice.
The logit regressions are reported in Table 6.8. Rows refer to the variables
discussed above, while each column represents a different specification for the
regression. Column (1) is based on the effect of adding Property C to the set,
whereas columns (3) and (4) report regressions where the effect of the addition
of Property D is compared with the ‘simple’ choice set of {A, B}.
Referring to Column (1) first, this shows that in the full model with all the vari-
ables, the effect of adding Property C to the choice set – the decoy intended to
increase the proportion choosing the target – is not significant.
The model finds that the variables prefstrength has a strongly significant effect
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Table 6.8: Logistic regression on the likelihood of choosing the target
property.
Prob. respondent chooses target
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept, α -0.200 0.053 0.001
(0.259) (0.240) (0.235)
complexset-c -0.118
(0.106)
complexset-d -0.404*** -0.396***
(0.041) (0.103)
prefstrength -0.215*** 0.157*** 0.157***
(0.043) (0.041) (0.041)
gender -0.194* 0.255** 0.254**
(0.103) (0.099) (0.099)
age 0.000 0.078** 0.061*
(0.043) (0.039) (0.035)
ownprop 0.009 0.000
(0.121) (0.112)
duration 0.016 -0.044
(0.046) (0.041)
know 0.331** -0.140
(0.145) (0.151)
n 2,257 2,176 2,176
Pseudo r2 0.014 0.014 0.014
Log-likelihood, χ2 35.89 43.05 40.96
Significance <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
on the likelihood of choosing the target. The odds ratio associated with this coef-
ficient is 0.807 implying that an increase of 1 unit in preference strength reduces
the likelihood of an individual choosing the target property by nearly 20%. The
variables gender and know indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels re-
spectively. Being male reduced by 0.194 the log-likelihood of choosing the target
property, a nearly 18% decrease in the odds ratio. Individuals who are classified
as being particularly knowledgeable about property are almost 40% more likely
to choose the target property than those who are not.
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Columns (3) and (4) report a similar procedure for the introduction of Prop-
erty D to the choice set. Here the inclusion of D does have a significant effect
on the likelihood of choosing the target property. Raising the coefficient to the
exponential yields an odds ratio of 0.667: the likelihood of an individual choos-
ing the target property falls by 33% when the choice set is expanded to include
D. The variable prefstrength is also significant here – a one unit increase in the
strength of preference towards the choice increases the likelihood an individual
will choose the target property by nearly 17%. Both gender and age are signifi-
cant determinants of the choice of the target property, although the latter is only
significant at the 10% level. Male respondents are more likely to choose the target
property which in this case is A. A one unit change in the category of age makes
a participant nearly 2% more likely to choose the target. Column (4) reports a
more refined version of this model dropping the insignificant variables. It models
the log-likelihood of choosing the target property with the variables prefstrength,
gender, and age.
These results help understand which variables are significant in explaining the
preference for the target property. The effect of the manipulation does not ap-
pear to be significant in the case of Property C, but the introduction of D does
have a significant effect, although perhaps not as expected. Men appear to make a
different choice to women; there is some evidence older participants make different
choices to younger ones; and when the target is B those with strong preferences
are far less likely to choose that target, whereas when the target is A those with
strong preferences are significantly more likely to choose it. But these conclusions
do not tell the full story about the susceptibility to behavioural manipulations.
To investigate this, the following sections take some of these significant variables
and split them out further.
6.2.3 Strength of Preference
Strength of preference has a significant influence on the likelihood of choosing
the target property upon the introduction of both decoys (C and D). But is
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Table 6.9: Rightmove Survey group results split by strength of preference.
Row Preference Choice Set A B C D p-value n
1 Weak {A, B} 67 33 240
2 {A, B, C} 60** 32 8 0.042 535
3 {A, B, D} 59 26** 15 0.021 621
4 Strong {A, B} 75 25 405
5 {A, B, C} 74 22 4 0.424 1,071
6 {A, B, D} 66 22 12 0.368 903
Notes: Figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
** indicates significance at the 5% level.
this indicative of choice bias? Preference uncertainty has been suggested as a
significant factor in the efficacy of strategies to manipulate preference construc-
tion in prior literature (Simonson, 1989), even in housing markets (Simonsohn
and Loewenstein, 2006). Table 6.9 presents the choice data split by preference
strength. Preferences were classed as strong – where the rating was 4 or 5 – or
weak – where the preference rating was 1, 2 or 3.
There is evidence that those with weak preferences were more strongly influenced
than those who were more certain. Among those with weak preferences the intro-
duction of Property C causes a fall from 67% to 60% the proportion choosing the
non-target, Property A (rows 1 and 2). This is a significant decrease (p-value:
0.042). However for those with strong preferences the effect was negligible: the
proportion choosing A only fell from 75% to 74% (rows 4 and 5).
Upon the introduction of Property D as a decoy in the choice set the propor-
tion choosing the non-target (B) falls from 33% to 26% among those with weak
preferences (p-value: 0.021), but only from 25% to 22% among those with strong
preferences (p-value: 0.368).
The susceptibility to the effects of the decoy is further corroborated by exam-
ining the decoys themselves. Those with weak preferences were much more likely
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to pick them. Those with weak preferences chose Property C 8% of the time
compared to 4% for those with strong preferences (row 2 and row 5). This is sig-
nificantly more (p-value: <0.001). And the same is true for D, which was chosen
15% by those with weak preferences against 12% by those with strong preferences
(p-value: 0.035).
This analysis suggests that those with less well formed preferences – those whose
choices were more uncertain – were significantly more likely to abandon the non-
target upon the introduction of the decoy and choose either that decoy or the
target property. This is a strong result, suggesting clearly to the estate agent
that his ability to manipulate choice is far greater when the buyer is not certain
of their preferences. This has a clear corresponding implication for buyers too.
6.2.4 Other Factors
The logistic regression indicated that age (variable: age) was a significant factor
in explaining the likelihood of choosing the target property (A) when the decoy
property (D) was added. Also, it suggested that gender (variable: gender) was
an important determinant of the likelihood of choosing the target upon the in-
troduction of either decoy (C or D). Finally the property-specific knowledge of
the participants (variable: know) was also important for when the choice set was
expanded upon the inclusion of Property C.
Analysis by splitting these variables out in the same manner as the previous sec-
tion indicates no clear patterns as to the susceptibility to bias. In other words,
although the probability of men choosing the target was significantly different to
the corresponding probability for women, it is not clear that men were signifi-
cantly more biased – in other words manipulated by the introduction of the decoy
choice into making an irrational choice – than women. Thus these results are not
reported here. The results seem instead to be part of the extra ‘noise’ that would
be expected from making the experimental scenario significantly more realistic
and information-rich, as the Rightmove Survey does.
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6.2.5 Effect of the Decoy on Strength of Preference
One of the important impacts from the choice set manipulations that was hy-
pothesised in Chapter 4 was that the introduction of the decoy would not only
increase the popularity of the target option, as measured by the aggregate pro-
portion who chose it, but that it would increase the strength of their preference
too. This hypothesis is reproduced below:
H5. Preference intensity: the strength of preference for a particular
target property increases when it is the subject of a choice set manip-
ulation.
Table 6.10 reports data which tests it. The first column shows the distribution of
preference strength for Property A among those who saw the choice set {A, B}.
This is compared to the distribution among those who also chose A, but saw the
choice set {A, B, D}, in other words with the decoy property present. There is
little evidence that the introduction of the decoy property increased the strength
of preference. Sixty-two percent of participants who chose Property A having seen
{A, B, D} rated their preference as ‘strong’12 which is less than the proportion
who felt as strongly in making the same choice having seen the simple choice set
of {A, B}, which was 65%. There is evidence that the distribution of preference
is altered though. A chi-squared test of goodness of fit is rejected at the 1%
significance level. This is tentative evidence that the more complex choice set
induced greater uncertainty in preferences.
When Property C is added, Property B is made the target. The strength of
preference for those choosing B is reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6.10. The
introduction of C increases the proportion who rate their preference as strong
from 56% to 58%, although this is not a significant increase. There is no evidence
that the distribution of preferences as a whole is altered by the introduction of
D. On the whole it is difficult to say that this evidence confirms the hypothesis
made in Chapter 4 (H5, page 104).
12 As in previous sections, an individual is classed as having a ‘strong’ preference if he rates his
preference as 4 or 5. Those with a preference strength of 1, 2 or 3 are classed as having a
‘weak’ preference.
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Table 6.10: The effect of the decoy on strength of preference.
Strength of Preference Choice Set
{A, B} {A, B, D} {A, B} {A, B, C}
1 7 6 8 8
2 8 8 8 8
3 19 24 28 26
4 47 41 42 43
5 19 21 14 15
χ2 21.59*** 0.98
Notes: Figures are all percentages.
Chi-squared tests of goodness of fit are completed with four degrees of freedom.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
6.2.6 Summary
The Rightmove Survey of 4,000 users of a property search website vastly increases
both the realism and complexity of the choice scenario in which this experimental
study takes place. Thus it is expected that the results obtained will be subject to
significantly more ‘noise’ than those seen in simpler experiments from the previ-
ous section. As such statistical conclusions are more tentative, notwithstanding
the increased sample size.
There is evidence that the introduction of decoy choices has an effect on the
likelihood of choosing the target property. When Property D is added to the
choice set the estimated likelihood of the participant choosing A (the target) falls
by 33%. Aggregate choices do not swing in favour of the non-target choice (Prop-
erty B) though, which would be a confirmation of the choice pollution effect seen
earlier in the chapter. This result is indicative of a weak form of irrationality
because it suggests that significant numbers of participants are drawn to choose
the decoy option which is at least weakly dominated by the already-rejected prop-
erty, A. However this conclusion is clearly limited by the decreased precision with
which extraneous variables can be controlled in an information-rich scenario13.
13 In other words it is not possible to conclude that the intended decoy is definitely dominated
by the target because there could be a variable of value to participants in which the decoy is
better than the target, but which has not been anticipated/ controlled for by the experiment.
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Splitting the results by strength of preference yields an important result – that
those with weak preferences are significantly more like to be influenced by the
decoy, and make irrational choices (in aggregate) than those with stronger pref-
erences. The conclusion of this chapter discusses the significance of this finding
further.
The logistic regression suggests that the age, gender and prior knowledge of
property of the participant are all variables which can influence the likelihood
of choosing the target property, but there is little evidence that any of these vari-
ables can help explain the susceptibility to choice bias. Finally, there is limited
evidence to prove the hypothesis that the introduction of the decoy property has
the added effect of increasing the strength of preference for the target.
As will be discussed further in the conclusion to this chapter, together these
results reflect the difficulty introduced by increasing the complexity of the choice
scenario, which, it must be fairly concluded, suggests that the real world ap-
plication of the hypothesised manipulations may be more difficult than simple
classroom experiments imply.
6.3 Stamford Adult Group Survey
This section reports the results of a survey of 600 adult residents of the town of
Stamford, Lincolnshire located around 50 miles north-west of Cambridge. The
survey used a similar design and explored the same choice set effects as the Right-
move Survey. However, the design allowed participants to explore the properties
in greater detail than the Rightmove Survey14. Furthermore the choice situation
was less hypothetical because respondents were told that the properties they were
viewing were located in Cambridge, a city all were aware of, but the vast majority
did not know in detail. This fixed the choice scenario more firmly in the minds
14 The survey was still conducted online but participants were able to see more photos of the
properties in large form and were forced to scroll through the written information on each
property before moving on to the next one. See Chapter 5 for further explanation.
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of participants, giving a more realistic edge to the results.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.11. Respondents generally were
similar to those who took part in the Rightmove Experiments. A large pro-
portion, 84%, were 40 or older and had lived in their current properties for a
significant period (64% over 5 years). Thus, once again, the results in this sec-
tion are focused on the owner-occupier market. Questions designed to elicit their
interest in – and knowledge of – property show that the majority are knowledge-
able. Thus, as with the Rightmove Survey, the survey group represents a firm
test for the behavioural manipulations hypothesised by trying to influence a set
of people experienced as one can be in making exactly these kinds of judgements.
Thirteen percent even reported that they are currently looking to move house, so
could be expected to have extremely current knowledge of the making housing
choices.
Finally, Panel (f) of Table 6.11 shows that the vast majority do not know Cam-
bridge well. Only 10% declare a significant knowledge of the city itself. As
reported in Chapter 5 those taking part were told (truthfully) that the properties
they were about to view were in the city of Cambridge. This puts the choice
scenario on a more realistic – less hypothetical – footing while not biasing the
results because of a significantly differential knowledge base of the target city.
6.3.1 Full Sample Results
Table 6.12 reports the results from the six treatments in the survey. The ex-
periments are testing hypothesis H1. This was discussed in Chapter 4 and is
reproduced below:
H1. Asymmetric dominance: the proportion choosing a particular
property increases when a decoy property is added that is asymmetri-
cally dominated.
Note that the property choices and resulting labels all correspond exactly to the
Rightmove Survey. Because the smaller sample size did not allow all combina-
tions of viewing orders – and so the ability to cancel out ordering effects – unlike
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Age % Length of Occupation %
18-29 1 <1 year 8
30-39 15 1-5 years 28
40-49 60 6-10 years 27
50-59 21 11-20 years 30
60+ 3 20+ years 7
(a) (b)
Type of Occupation % Which of the following apply to you? %
Owner Occupied 90 I watch property shows on TV 72
Rented 10 I read property supplements 55
Other 0 I own properties as investments 7
(c)
I work in the property industry 20
I am currently looking to move 13
Other 13
(d)
Interest in property % How well do you know Cambridge? %
1 = low interest 5 1 = not very well 34
2 11 2 29
3 27 3 24
4 33 4 8
5 = high interest 24 5 = very well 2
(e)
Don’t Know 2
(f)
Table 6.11: Summary statistics for the Stamford Adult Group Survey.
the Rightmove Survey, the results are presented separately. In rows 4-6 the view-
ing order is reversed compared with rows 1-315. There is clear evidence of choice
set effects among the respondents to the survey. The introduction of Property C
to the choice set (comparing rows 1 and 2), which makes Property B the target,
should cause an increase the proportion choosing that target.
15 Thus there are two tests of the effect of introducing the decoy, Property, C to the choice set:
i) comparing what happens when the decoy was placed last as in the comparison between
rows 1 and 2; and ii) comparing what happens when the decoy is placed first as in the
comparison between rows 4 and 5.
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Table 6.12: Choice set effects in the Stamford Adult Group Survey.
Row Set and Order A B C D p-value n
1 {A, B} 46 54 69
2 {A, B, C} 68 29*** 3 0.002 72
3 {A, B, D} 57 41 2 0.110 76
4 {B, A} 51 49 61
5 {C, B, A} 54 41 5 0.354 59
6 {D, B, A} 29** 55 16 0.011 51
Notes: Figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
**, *** indicates significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively.
However here it causes a move away from the target towards the non-target. The
proportion choosing Property B falls from 54% to 29% when C is added. This
is a significant fall (p-value: 0.002). These people instead choose the non-target,
A, which sees its proportion rise from 46% to 68%, another significant increase
(p-value: 0.005). This appears to be clear evidence of the choice pollution effect
as discussed in earlier sections. The effect of increasing the complexity of the
choice set by including a decoy option gave a negative signal about the quality of
the target biasing respondents away from choosing it.
However, when the order is reversed (comparing rows 4 and 5) the effect of the
introduction of C is much more muted – it only causes a rise in the proportion
choosing Property A from 51% to 54%, which is not significant, given the rela-
tively small sample size. This suggests that ordering effects might be important
and perhaps accounting for a large proportion of the effect seen. This is investi-
gated explicitly in Chapter 7.
When Property D is added to the choice set, making it {A, B, D} (comparing
rows 1 and 3) the choice set effect displays evidence of strong-form irrationality.
The proportion choosing the target, A, rises from 46% to 57% although this is
not quite a significant increase given the sample size (p-value: 0.110). This is
driven by a decrease in the support for the non-target, B, which falls from 54%
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to 41%. When Property D is added but placed first (comparing rows 4 and 6)
there is a decline in the proportion choosing the target – Property A goes down
from 51% to 29% – however this does not, in the main, flow to the non-target,
B (which would suggest the choice pollution effect), but the decoy, D, which
gains 16% of the choices. The decline in Property A is significant but together
these pieces of evidence are suggestive of ordering effecting being important in
the choice patterns so are taken up in Chapter 7.
6.3.2 Comparison with Rightmove Survey
An important feature of the Stamford Adult Group Survey was that the design
allowed greater exploration of the properties featured by looking at photos in
greater detail and by forcing respondents to scroll through the description of
the properties at hand. Comparing the results of the Rightmove and Stamford
Surveys, where they coincide, allows some estimation of the importance of these
effects given the demographic similarity of the response groups.
The relevant tests are reported in Table 6.13. The results suggest strongly
that Property A enjoyed a significant advantage in the Rightmove study, ceteris
paribus. This is particularly true in the case where respondents saw the simple
choice set, either {A, B} or {B, A}. Among the Rightmove group who saw {A, B}
70% chose A. Among those who saw this same choice set in the Stamford survey
that percentage was just 46%. This effect is repeated when among those who
saw {B, A} too. The information available to participants was identical in these
cases. The only difference was that in the latter participants were able to see
all photos in large size and were forced to scroll through the written information
before going on to the next property.
When the choice set was more complicated, {A, B, C} or {A, B, D}, the effects
are slightly modified. For those who saw {A, B, C} there was no significant dif-
ference between the Rightmove and Stamford groups. For the order {C, B, A}
there was a significant effect on Property A at the 5% level: it dropped from
68% among the Rightmove group to 54% among the Stamford group. This dif-
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Table 6.13: Rightmove and Stamford survey results compared.
Row Choice Set Group A B C D p-value n
1 {A, B} Rightmove 70 30 335
2 Stamford 46*** 54 <0.001 69
3 {B, A} Rightmove 73 27 312
4 Stamford 51*** 49 <0.001 61
5 {A, B, C} Rightmove 72 25 3 277
6 Stamford 68 29 3 0.269 72
7 {C, B, A} Rightmove 68 26 6 232
8 Stamford 54** 41 5 0.023 59
9 {A, B, D} Rightmove 60 22 18 253
10 Stamford 57 41 2 0.272 76
11 {D, B, A} Rightmove 58 26 16 242
12 Stamford 29*** 55 16 <0.001 51
Notes: Figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
**, *** indicates significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively.
ference was largely absorbed by an increase in the proportion choosing Property
B. This suggests that the ordering effect is also different between the Rightmove
and Stamford studies, which will be taken up in Chapter 7.
Similarly, while there was no significant difference between the proportion choos-
ing A out of the choice set {A, B, D}, there was a stark difference in the rate
of choosing of Properties B and D. Property B was far more attractive in the
Stamford study – and Property D correspondingly less so – which implies that
views of Property D were also affected by the method of presentation.
This result is an important part of interpreting the overall results. It makes
the evidence from the Rightmove study even more powerful because the manipu-
lations seen there survived the bias towards Property A evident simply from the
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Table 6.14: The effect of the decoy on strength of preference.
Strength of Preference Choice Set
{A, B} {A, B, D} {A, B} {A, B, C}
1 7 7 25 2
2 15 11 12 19
3 26 33 23 23
4 33 31 34 40
5 19 18 6 16
χ2 1.84 17.64***
Notes: Figures are all percentages.
Chi-squared tests of goodness of fit are completed with four degrees of freedom.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
method of presentation. This also clearly reinforces the power of the method of
presentation to affect choice patterns.
6.3.3 Effect of the Decoy on Strength of Preference
In Chapter 4, it was hypothesised (H5, page 104) that, as well as increasing the
proportion who chose the target property, the effect of the decoy would be to
increase the strength of preference on average among those who chose the target.
Table 6.14 reports the results of this analysis for the participants in the Stam-
ford Adult Group Survey. When Property D is added to the choice set there is
little evidence that this alters the strength of preference towards the target. A
chi-squared test of goodness of fit is not rejected.
However, the addition of Property C does have a significant impact on preferences
towards the target property (B). When the choice set is {A, B} 40% of partici-
pants who choose B rate the strength of their preference as being ‘strong’16. This
rises to 56% when Property C is added as a decoy. This difference is not quite
significant at the 10% level (p-value: 0.132) owing to the small sample size. A
chi-squared test of goodness of fit is rejected at the 1% level though, providing
16 As in previous sections, an individual is classed as having a ‘strong’ preference if he rates his
preference as 4 or 5. Those with a preference strength of 1, 2 or 3 are classed as having a
‘weak’ preference.
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further evidence of the effect of the addition of the decoy. Together this evidence
is strongly suggestive that participants find it hard to make a good comparison
when there are only two choices in the set, but when the choice set is expanded
to include a choice which gives context to one of the options (which is what the
decoy does to the target) the decision becomes more clear cut: participants are
more certain of their choices.
6.3.4 Summary
The Stamford Adult Group Survey presents further evidence that choice set ef-
fects are important in decision making over housing. As with the Rightmove
Survey, the participants were all adults generally in middle age and living in
their own properties. The results showed significant evidence of the choice pol-
lution effect seen in the Student Group Experiments which is contrary to earlier
hypotheses (H1, Chapter 4, page 96). Ordering effects also appear significant,
although an examination of them is left to Chapter 7. Importantly the survey
design allowed greater exploration of the properties at hand and analysis showed
that this did have an important impact on choice patterns, confirming the general
theme that presentation is vitally important in property choice.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter has reported experiments which examine whether a series of promi-
nent biases in choice can be used to manipulate housing decisions. Buying a
house is likely to be among the most important choices made during a lifetime,
so understanding the ways in which these biases have application is important to
individuals, policy makers and the estate agents who may seek to use them.
Having asked participants to choose their most preferred houses from a series
of options, attempts to manipulate individuals’ preferences were made through
the inclusion of ‘decoy’ options. These properties were intended to give context
to other ‘target’ properties in specific ways and thus increase the popularity of
these options. The precise ways in which this manipulation might take effect in
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choices and the motivation for doing so is considered in Chapters 3 and 4. Several
different experimental methodologies were used which altered both the method
of presentation and the characteristics of the participants.
The significant results can be summarised as follows:
• When the choices are presented in highly simplified written form to student
participants who represent a good model for educated first-time renters,
there is significant evidence of the asymmetric dominance first proposed by
Huber et al. (1982). The proportion choosing the target option increases
from 42% to 59% upon the introduction of a decoy to the choice set (Table
6.2), this is a conformation of hypothesis H1;
• When the choice scenario is made significantly more complex by the use of
real property profiles including photos and text description based on real
estate agent information a significant, previously unobserved, effect is seen
among student participants. In this situation the proportion choosing the
target house falls and significantly more choose the non-target apartment
instead. Upon the introduction of the decoy the proportion choosing the
target falls from 58% to 38% and the proportion choosing the target rises
from 42% to 59% (Table 6.4). This is labelled the choice pollution effect ;
• There is significantly more noise and identifying the effect of manipulations
is more difficult when the sample set is expanded to over 4,000 users of the
Rightmove property search website and the property profiles are viewed in
a near-identical manner to how they would be in real choice situations, in
another test of hypothesis H1. Factors which influence the likelihood of
choosing the target property are identified (Table 6.8) and include the age
and gender of the participant, but firm conclusions on the effect of the decoy
properties are difficult to discern;
• There is significant evidence that the certainty participants have over their
choices is a determinant of the efficacy of manipulation strategies. Partici-
pants who rated their own preferences as being ‘weak’ were far more likely
to change their preferences in response to the addition of the decoy. Eight
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percent of those with weak preferences choose the inferior decoy, Property
C, double the number who do if their preferences are strong (Table 6.9).
However there is limited evidence that the presence of the decoy increases
the strength of preference, which would be a confirmation of hypothesis H5;
and
• When the method of delivery is altered slightly to emphasise all the features
of properties (rather than just focusing on one ‘main’ photo) on a group
of 600 residents of the town of Stamford, Lincolnshire there is significant
evidence of the ability to manipulate choice even in an information-rich
environment. Choice pollution effects appear to dominate. The proportion
choosing the target falls from 54% to 29% upon the introduction of a decoy,
with participants instead favouring the non-target, which increases from
46% to 68% (Table 6.12).
Together the experiments reported in this chapter have found significant evidence
of important biases in housing choice scenarios. Effects were persistent across in-
experienced student respondents and those far more seasoned in housing choices
– mature adults who own their own properties and take an interest in property
and property markets. In this way the findings confirm and extend the results
first obtained by Huber et al. (1982) and Simonson (1989).
The analysis in the survey of 4,000 users of the property search website Rightmove
showed that when the realism of the choice scenario is increased, in this case to
a situation which almost exactly replicates the actual frame in which property
searches are made, a significant amount of noise is added which makes discern-
ing the effect of the manipulation far more difficult. Picking decoy properties to
influence choice patterns is complicated and the choice architect17 will not know
with precision the effect of his manipulations. This is an important result because
it illustrates the difficulty of putting the biases found in the laboratory into prac-
tice in real choice scenarios. However, as described in Chapter 4, estate agents
are exactly the sort of economic agent with the expertise (more accurately the
17 Recall that this is the name Thaler and Sunstein (2008) give to anyone who sets the conditions
under which a choice is made. Estate agents are perhaps the definitive choice architect.
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information advantage) and motivation to attempt such manipulations if shown
the broad direction. Further work is clearly needed in real choice scenarios to
understand in more detail how and when manipulation strategies will be effective.
An interesting result from the comparison of the Rightmove and Stamford Adult
Group Survey concerns the method of presentation of properties. This is possible
because the properties used were identical in both surveys, only the method of
delivery was different. In the Rightmove Survey preferences were formed and
choices made as they would be when browsing online, that is, very quickly and
based little more than a glance at the relevant information. The importance
of the photographs – in particular the ‘main’ photograph – was strongly em-
phasised. Contrary to what might be expected this did not prove conducive to
choice bias. In the Stamford Adult Group Survey, although completed online,
the information was presented far more evenly. This means that all aspects of
the properties were emphasised, not just key features. Participants had to scroll
through written and photographic information before continuing on to the next
profile. This slight change in delivery method resulted in preferences which were
far more considered. The effect was to produce more significant biases in all cases.
This finding is important for agents and individuals because it suggests that
they may become more susceptible to biases the more they consider their choices
in the case of housing. This is similar to the reasoning of Ariely et al. (2003)
who say, in the case of valuation anchoring18, that for an anchor to take hold, an
individual has to actually consider making the purchase at that price (a psycho-
logical phenomenon known as imprinting). It also runs counter to the assumed
wisdom of the defenders of neoclassical choice theory (such as Simon, 1957) who
say that greater consideration and thought over a particular choice problem will
tend to reduce decision making errors.
The most significant result concerns the finding of a new, previously unobserved
choice bias. This regularity has been labelled the choice pollution effect. It de-
scribes a choice pattern where the introduction of a decoy choice has a perversely
18 Note that this thesis will consider value anchoring in Chapter 8.
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negative effect on the intended target choice, decreasing the popularity of the
said target, in favour of an unspecified competitor option. This effect was seen in
both the Student Group Experiments and among older, experienced participants
in the Stamford Adults Group Survey. The explanation for this observation may
lie in information asymmetry. When making choices over housing, individuals
know they have significantly less information than the agent helping with their
search. Such an observation is true in many choice situations, but the nature
of housing choices suggests it may be more significant here than for most other
decisions. In this scenario participants may use other choices in the set as a signal
about the desirability of similar properties. In the student experiments the decoy
property was an inferior terraced house. However, instead of making the target
terraced house look good (the traditional halo effect explanation for the efficacy
of the strategy after Simonson, 1989) it appears to have sent a negative signal to
decision makers about all similar properties, emphasising their negative aspects.
Further study is clearly needed to explore this finding further.
Overall this chapter shows choice set biases are evident in choices involving hous-
ing, providing further evidence to support the behavioural paradigm of choice
theory. This evidence is significant in that debate because housing choices are
among the most important decisions made during a lifetime. This blunts a com-
mon criticism of behavioural work, which says that the choices considered are
usually unimportant, with investigations being largely confined to decisions over
simple consumer durables.
The findings are also important on a practical level for housing market partici-
pants and academics. Estate agents are motivated to use manipulation strategies
to increase their own profitability as discussed in Chapter 4. The results in this
chapter confirm the possibility of such actions although they do suggest they
may be technically difficult to put into practice and control effectively. Regula-
tors have shown concern with preventing the manipulation of consumers (OFT,
2010a). The results in this chapter suggest that a closer look at housing markets
may be useful. Finally, for individuals the results lay bare their vulnerability to
choice manipulation, an important contribution in its own right.
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Analysis of Ordering Biases
This chapter presents the results from several experiments examining
biases in choice patterns that can be induced by varying the order
of choice presentation as explained in Chapter 4. It finds significant
evidence of these ordering biases in housing choice scenarios. When
the choice set consists of more than two options, a property gains
significantly from being shown first, ceteris paribus. The results are
particularly strong in an online choice frame which forced participants
to spend time reading the information about each property in turn.
7.1 Student Group Experiments
This section presents the results from a series of experiments which investigate
whether preferences over housing can be reliably influenced by a willing economic
actor – the estate agent – who is able to alter the order in which properties are
shown to the decision maker. In this section, and throughout this chapter, the
hypotheses being tested is as follows:
H3a. Primacy: information received first will have excessive weight
in judgements over housing, thus houses seen first will be preferred
more, ceteris paribus.
H3b. Recency: information received last will have excessive weight in
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judgements over housing, thus houses seen last will be preferred more,
ceteris paribus.
These hypotheses are discussed in greater length in Chapter 4. The subjects in
the experiments in this section were students attending the University of Cam-
bridge. As discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of the subjects live
in rented accommodation provided by their colleges. Thus most will have never
experienced renting independently in the private rented sector before. The sum-
mary statistics for the participants, reported in Table 6.1 (page 153), bear this
observation out. The statistics show that the participants were aged 18-23 and
generally inexperienced in dealing with property. While this observation limits
the generalisability of the results, it has already been argued that the student
group does represent a good model of first-time renters who are a significant part
of housing markets in their own right. Moreover, by comparison with the results
from the other experimental groups, may allow us to uncover more about the role
of market experience in determining vulnerability to preference manipulation.
The analysis of ordering biases is completed using data gathered as part of the
set of experiments on housing choice which were reported in Chapter 6. Thus
the methodologies match those reported in Chapter 61. To recap, there were two
main experimental designs. In the first information about property choices was
presented in a highly simplified written form. Participants were able to judge
between houses on only two dimensions of value – distance from a place of work
and state of repair. This method replicates that commonly utilised in experimen-
tal choice theory literature (as surveyed in Chapter 3) and has the advantage of
precision – treatment effects can be isolated easily – with the disadvantage being
a lack of realism. Experiments 1a and 1b use this methodology to test primarily
for asymmetric dominance and compromise effects2. In the analysis below the
choice set effects reported in the previous chapter are held constant and the or-
der of presentation of the choices is varied. In this way it is possible to examine
whether ordering is an important part of the choice process.
1 The exact form and procedure for each experiment is reported in Chapter 5.
2 The results of these tests are reported in Chapter 6.
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In the second set of experiments (Experiment 2 in Table 6.1, page 153) house
choices were presented in a visual form by means of a ‘virtual tour’ of each prop-
erty using photographs and information drawn from the real property profiles of
a local estate agent. This significantly increases the realism of the choice frame
and the complexity of the information set. The result is an experiment which
more closely matches real decision making environments. The cost of this is pre-
cision. As Chapter 6 illustrated, the greater complexity makes is harder to isolate
treatment effects and introduces a lot of ‘noise’ to the results.
Behavioural literature has suggested two contradictory non-rational ordering ef-
fects. These are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The first derives from the
concept of anchoring first introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). It sug-
gests that properties which are viewed first gain a special significance in the mind
of the decision maker because he will use this first property as a cognitive ‘measur-
ing stick’ against which all other options are naturally compared and contrasted.
As such it is suggested that first-viewed options will be chosen more frequently
ceteris paribus. This bias has also been called primacy (Nisbett and Ross, 1980).
In contrast the alternative hypothesis is simpler. Known as recency it suggests
that cognitive limitations on the part of the decision maker will ensure that more
recently-received information will be over-weighted. Thus this hypothesis sug-
gests that the property viewed last will tend to be chosen more frequently on
average.
Both of these ideas, which were the subject of discussion and hypotheses in Chap-
ter 4 (page 98), run counter to the classical model of choice of von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944). That accords no special place for ordering effects. This is
a necessary part of the theory’s central concept of invariance3. Thus our null
hypothesis, expressed by the assumption of invariance, is that the ordering of
choices will make no difference to the pattern of preferences.
3 For a detailed description of the axioms of the classical choice model, including the assump-
tion of invariance, see Chapter 2, page 30.
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Table 7.1: Ordering effect among student subjects in asymmetric dominance ex-
periments.
Row Set and Order A B C D p-value n
1 {B, A} 59 41 22
2 {A, B} 57 43 0.471 35
3 {C, B, A} 32 68 0 25
4 {A, B, C} 46** 54 0 0.045 39
5 {D, B, A} 60 40 0 25
6 {A, B, D} 75 25 0 0.096 24
Notes: Figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
** indicates significance at the 5% level.
7.1.1 Ordering in Asymmetric Dominance Experiments
Table 7.1 reports the results from the first set of tests which explored asymmetric
dominance. By holding the choice set constant it is possible to complete tests
on the effect of varying the order of choice presentation. There is evidence of
ordering effects even though the method of choice presentation was extremely
simple which was expected to minimise these effects4.
There is no evidence of ordering for the ‘short’ two-choice case: when partici-
pants saw {B, A} they chose Option A with a frequency of 59% (row 1) which
was only slightly above the 57% of the time it was chosen when shown in the
form {A, B} (row 2). However, when the choice set becomes ‘long’, ie. including
a third option, ordering becomes important. The results clearly suggest that the
first-viewed option gains from being in that position which is suggestive of pri-
macy. The percentage choosing Option A when the choice set was {C, B, A} was
32%, however when the presentation was {A, B, C} this rose to 46%, a significant
increase. A similar magnitude rise occurs when the choice set is {A, B, D} versus
{D, B, A}, Option A rises from 60% to 75%.
4 The presentation was simple in the sense that the choices were presented next to each other
on the answer sheet.
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Table 7.2: Ordering effect among student subjects in compromise effect experi-
ments.
Row Set and Order A B E F p-value n
1 {E, B, A} 33 53 14 21
2 {A, B, E} 42 41 17 0.232 29
3 {F, B, A} 40 30 30 20
4 {A, B, F} 59* 14 27 0.055 22
Notes: Figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
* indicates significance at the 10% level.
It is also clear the ordering and choice set factors interact. Option A is cho-
sen the most when it is the ‘target’ and it is shown first (75%). It is chosen the
least when it is not the target and it is shown last (32%). This difference is highly
significant.
7.1.2 Ordering in Compromise Effect Experiments
The ordering effects associated with the experiments into the compromise effect
are examined in Table 7.2. When the viewing order was {E, B, A} Option A was
chosen 33% of the time. When the order was revered and Option A was shown
first it was chosen 42% of the time. This increase is not significant due to the
relatively small sample size but is suggestive of primacy.
There is a significant effect in the choice set containing Options A, B and F.
Here when Option A is shown last, ie. in the form {F, B, A}, it is chosen 40%
of the time. This rises nearly 20 percentage points to 59% when it is shown first,
ie. {A, B, F}.
As with earlier results, the effects clearly interact. Option A is chosen the most
when it is the compromise and is shown first (59%). It is chosen the least when
it is not the compromise and is shown last (33%). This is a significant difference.
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The same is true of Option B: it is chosen most when it is the compromise and
is shown before the other original choice (53%). When it is not the compromise,
and is shown after the compromise choice is it chosen dramatically less (14%).
These results are particularly interesting because of the simplicity of the experi-
ments. All information was conveyed in written form on a single sheet of paper,
with options listed alongside boxes to indicate preference. The only treatment
variation to create these biases was altering the listing order of the options. That
they persisted gives further credence to the general finding that ordering effects
are generated by a psychological bias which takes shape when an option comes
under consideration in the decision maker’s mind. It is natural to ask whether
such manipulations can be used in a more complex information-rich scenario,
which the following section considers.
7.1.3 Ordering in Complex Choice Set Scenarios
Table 7.3 reports the results from ordering tests in the more complex information-
rich choice environment that was created by making visual presentations to deci-
sion makers. In the short two-choice case there appears to be a tendency towards
primacy: Apartment X is chosen 46% when shown first (row 2) and only 39%
when shown last (row 1). This difference is not statistically significant, however.
It is not possible to discern significant results when the choice set is made longer
through the addition of a third, dominated option. As rows 3 and 4 of Table
7.3 illustrate, the percentages are not materially altered by reversing the order of
presentation.
This result continues a theme from Chapter 6, namely that when significant com-
plexity is introduced into the experimental design, reliable manipulation effects
are more difficult to discern. This is disappointing for the doubt it casts upon
the ability to put the manipulations into practice into real choice scenarios.
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Table 7.3: Ordering effect among student subjects in complex
choice set scenario.
Row Choice Set X Y Z p-value n
1 {Y, X} 39 61 44
2 {X, Y} 46 54 0.245 39
3 {X, Y, Z} 57 39 4 44
4 {Z, Y, X} 60 37 3 0.382 67
Notes: Figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
7.1.4 Summary
The Student Group Experiments provide some evidence of ordering effects. The
simple written-form methodology produces statistically significant results indi-
cating most reliably a tendency towards primacy, which would be a confirmation
of hypothesis H3a (page 98). This result is strongest when the choice set is ‘long’
in the sense that it contains three choices rather than two.
When the choice frame is made more complex through the use of detailed profiles
of real properties, including visual information, there is no clear effect. However
the next sections change the participant group significantly. The mature adults
in these surveys are a significant test for the manipulations hypothesised because
they represent the typical consumer of housing, who is likely to have at least some
experience with the process of searching for and choosing property.
7.2 Rightmove Survey
This section examines ordering effects from the results of the survey of 4,000
users of the property search website Rightmove that was reported in Chapter 6.
By holding constant the choice set and varying the order of presentation, it is
possible to use the same data set to examine the hypotheses at hand.
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As explained in that section, the large-scale study of a self-selected group of
adult volunteers interested in property or at least experienced with property
market dealings presents a significant opportunity and challenge for the biases
being examined. Table 6.5 on page 162 reports descriptive statistics for that
data set. Seventy-one percent own their own homes, and the average age of the
respondents is 44. Over three-quarters have lived in their homes for over one year.
The survey was completed by respondents viewing properties online through the
Rightmove website with properties presented in an almost identical manner to
how they are actually viewed in real choices5. Participants were asked to view two
(or three) houses and choose which they preferred, before completing a question-
naire. By replicating closely the actual choice frame in which decisions are made
– or at least initial preferences are formed – this experiment offers a significant
insight into the nature of biases in housing choice. Although, as noted in Chapter
6, the significant complexity that comes with the information-rich design makes
it difficult to make firm predictions about the effects we will see.
The experiment had 14 treatments allowing for all combinations of choice sets
and orders. A total of four properties were used, all real properties being adver-
tised on the Rightmove website. To summarise the properties again: Property
A was a modern, well-appointed family home which, which offered less charac-
ter but perhaps a better state of repair than its comparison, Property B, which
was generally older and more solid in appearance. It had character and several
features not present in the modern house, but was in a more traditional state of
repair than Property A. Thus respondents were asked to trade-off age/ character
against the state of repair of the property based on a profile page viewed in ex-
actly the same manner as they would be on Rightmove.
Properties C and D were ‘decoys’. Property C was also a ‘character’ property like
Property B, but clearly offered less of the charm of Property B and was in a no-
ticeably worse state of repair. Property D was like Property A, modern and well
maintained, but without the overall impressiveness in terms of state of repair.
5 Location information was removed. For full details see Chapter 5.
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7.2.1 Logit Estimation of the Importance of Order
One method for examining the importance of ordering effects in this large sample
is a logistic regression using maximum likelihood estimation. The broad hypothe-
sis on the importance of ordering effects can be split into three specific questions:
• Are ordering effects present when the choice set is ‘short’ ie. contains only
Properties A and B?
• Are ordering effects important in explaining the likelihood of choosing the
target when the choice set is expanded to include three options?
• Is there evidence of ordering effects when the likelihood of choosing the
decoy is examined in a set containing three options?
Table 7.4 presents evidence to answer the first question. The dependent variable
is whether the participant chose Property A6. The single independent variable is
binary, taking a value of 1 if the participant saw Property A first, and taking a
value of 0 otherwise. Thus the model estimates whether the order of presentation
– {A, B} versus {B, A} – alters the likelihood of choosing Property A. There is
no evidence that ordering effects are important in the short choice set case.
Table 7.4: Logistic regression on the probability
of choosing Property A.
Respondent chooses Property A
Intercept, α 0.982
(0.127)
prop-a-first -0.114
(0.175)
n 647
Pseudo r2 <0.001
Log-likelihood, χ2 -386.1
Significance 0.515
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
6 The dataset is filtered to only include those participants who saw the choice set {A, B}.
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Table 7.5: Logistic regression on the likelihood of choosing the target property.
Probability respondent chooses target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept, α -1.035 -1.077 -1.074 -0.460 0.526 0.524
(0.191) (0.070) (0.071) (0.363) (0.058) (0.064)
treatment-abc -0.007
(0.034)
treatment-abd 0.004
(0.031)
target-is-first 0.020 -0.101
(0.120) (0.141)
target-is-last 0.008 -0.046
(0.120) (0.113)
n 1,610 1,610 1,610 1,529 1,529 1,529
Pseudo r2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Log-likelihood, χ2 -914.6 -914.6 -914.6 -1,012 -1,012 -1,012
Significance 0.844 0.870 0.945 0.890 0.477 0.687
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 7.5 reports regressions analysing whether there is evidence of ordering
effects in the likelihood of choosing the target property when the choice set is
expanded to three choices7. As discussed in Chapter 5 this was done in two dif-
ferent ways: either through the addition of Property C to make the choice set
{A, B, C} or through the addition of Property D to make the choice set {A, B, D}.
In Table 7.5 columns (1) – (3) report tests of ordering effects when the choice set
was {A, B, C} and columns (4) – (6) report similar tests when the choice was set
{A, B, D}.
The dependent variable is always whether the respondent chose the target prop-
erty. When the choice set was {A, B, C} this is Property B; and when the choice
set was {A, B, D} this is Property A. There are several ways in which the order of
presentation could be taking effect. These are tested separately using three dif-
7 The dataset is filtered to include only those participants who saw choice sets containing three
choices.
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ferent independent variables. The first, treatment-abc and treatment-abd – where
the former is applicable when the choice set is {A, B, C} and the latter when
the choice set is {A, B, D} – is the simplest. It is a categorical variable which
assigns a number to each ordering. There are six combinations of orders of the
three properties, so it ranges from 1 to 6.
Alternatively the ordering bias could be specifically only applicable when the
choice is viewed first. This is tested by the variable target-is-first which is given
a value of 1 when the target property is seen first (irrespective of the ordering of
the other two choices) and 0 otherwise. Similarly to test for a bias based on the
chosen property being shown last the variable target-is-last is given a value of 1
when the target property is seen last and 0 otherwise.
The results from Table 7.5 suggest there are no relationships of statistical signif-
icance. Thus it is not possible to conclude that respondents are more likely to
choose the target property when it is shown first, or when it is shown last. This
is the case when the choice set is {A, B, C} and {A, B, D} – thus encompassing
two different target properties8.
The final question posed above relating to ordering effects was whether they
apply to the decoy. In the theoretical exposition of choice set effects considered
in Chapter 4 the decoy is strictly dominated by one other property – the target –
and so should not be chosen by any respondents. When the experimental testing
is simplified and all variables of value can be controlled, as they are in the Student
Group Experiments, this expectation was met. No one chose a dominated alter-
native. However, when the information set is significantly expanded, as it is in
the Rightmove Survey through the use of real property profiles including photos,
it is far harder to control all variables which determine the ultimate choice made.
Thus the decoy cannot be regarded as strictly dominated. A minority of respon-
dents are thus expected to choose the decoy property and useful information can
be gained by examining their choices.
8 In other words ruling out the possibility that it was something particular to one of the
properties.
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Table 7.6: Logistic regression on the likelihood of choosing
the decoy property.
Probability respondent chooses target
(1) (2)
Intercept, α -1.295 -1.861
(0.088) (0.088)
decoy-is-c -1.098*** -1.102***
(0.137) (0.137)
decoy-is-first 0.298**
(0.131)
decoy-is-last 0.035
(0.130)
n 3,139 3,139
Pseudo r2 0.004 0.038
Log-likelihood, χ2 -923.7 -925.7
Significance <0.001 <0.001
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
**, *** indicates significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Table 7.6 reports regressions which consider ordering effects on the decision to
choose the decoy. The dependent variable is whether the decoy is chosen, taking
a value of 1 when it is and 0 when it is not. The actual property that is the decoy
varies. When the choice set is {A, B, C} the decoy is C; and when the choice
set is {A, B, D} the decoy is D. There is a significant difference in the likelihood
of choosing Property C compared to D9 thus a control variable is included in all
the regressions in Table 7.6. This variable, labelled decoy-is-c, takes a value of 1
when the decoy is Property C and 0 otherwise (ie. when it is Property D).
Two different independent variables test whether ordering effects are important.
The first, labelled decoy-is-first, is a binary variable activated when the decoy is
shown first. As with the testing of ordering effects in relation to the target, if this
variable is significant it will show that the likelihood of the decoy being chosen is
influenced by it being viewed first versus being viewed in another position. Simi-
9 Based on unreported testing.
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larly the variable decoy-is-last considers the opposite case: whether being shown
last influences the likelihood of the decoy being chosen.
Considering column (1) of Table 7.6 first, the estimated regression suggests that
the likelihood of the decoy being chosen is increased by it being shown first. Tak-
ing the coefficient and raising it to the exponential gives the odds ratio associated
with that variable. Doing this for the variable decoy-is-first indicates that the
likelihood of the decoy being chosen is increased by over 34% when it is placed
first as opposed other positions. Remember, this controls for the difference be-
tween the popularity of decoys C and D. This is evidence of primacy: a way to
significantly increase the popularity of the decoy is to place it first in any set.
Column (2) adds to this conclusion because the variable decoy-is-last is not sig-
nificant. This means that being placed last does not significantly increase the
likelihood of choosing the decoy.
To summarise the preceding results: there is no evidence of ordering effects in the
short choice set, or in the likelihood of choosing the target in the long set. There
is, however, significant evidence of primacy when we consider the decoy. It is far
more likely to be chosen when viewed first than when viewed in other positions.
In Chapter 6 we saw that the vulnerability to choice set effects were partly deter-
mined by the strength of preference of the decision maker. It seems reasonable to
ask whether such factors also influence the vulnerability to ordering biases. This
is analysed in the following section.
7.2.2 Strength of Preference
Evidence in Chapter 6 suggested that the respondents’ reported strength of pref-
erence, believed to be a simple measure of the certainty of their decision making,
was important in determining the susceptibility to choice set bias. It is worth
considering whether the same may be true in respect of the ordering biases that
are the subject of this chapter. As in Chapter 6, strength of preference is split in
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Table 7.7: Ordering effects from the Rightmove Survey split by strength of preference.
Weak Preferences Strong Preferences
Position Position
Not Not
Row Set Choice First First p-value First First p-value
1 {A, B} A 65 69 0.291 75 75 -
2 B 31 35 0.291 25 25 -
3 {A, B, C} A 60 61 0.415 75 74 0.261
4 B 32 32 0.426 23 22 0.297
5 C 12*** 6 0.004 3 4 0.260
6 {A, B, D} A 59 58 0.399 64 66 0.270
7 B 26 27 0.409 25* 21 0.059
8 D 21*** 13 0.004 12 12 -
Notes: Figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
*, *** indicates significance at the 10% and 1% levels respectively.
two. Having been asked to state the strength of their preference on a scale of 1-5
respondents were labelled as having a ‘strong’ preference if they indicated a 4 or
a 5. A ‘weak’ preference was recorded if they rated their preference as a 1, 2 or
3. The results are presented in this way in Table 7.7.
There is evidence that ordering effects are more significant for those with weak
preferences than among those whose preferences are more certain. The majority
of the differences in the table are not significant. However for the decoys there is
a significant ordering effect. When the decoy property C is shown first it is chosen
12% of the time by those with weak preferences. When it is not shown first to
those with weak preferences it is only chosen 6% of the time – significantly less.
The same is true of decoy property D. Its popularity, measured by the proportion
choosing it, rises from 13% to 21% when it is shown first to those with weak
preferences.
No such relationship is evident among those with strong preferences. When the
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choice set is short, containing only properties A and B those with strong prefer-
ences make an identical choice whichever order they view the properties in. The
popularity of options appear invariant to their being shown first when the choice
set is made more complicated too. All are non-significant coefficients aside from
a fall in the proportion choosing Property B when it is not shown first in the
choice set {A, B, D}, which is significant at the 10% level.
These observations seem to confirm the conclusions from Chapter 6, that there is
some difference between the susceptibility to choice biases according to strength
of preference. Those with stronger preferences are less likely to be affected by the
order of presentation than those who report greater uncertainty. As the analysis
earlier in this chapter suggested, ordering effects seem most powerful on the decoy.
It is chosen by relatively few people total, but its popularity can be significantly
improved through being shown first.
It is important to note that the self reported measure of strength of preference
used in this analysis is clearly not an entirely objective and error-free variable.
Different respondents may have interpreted that question in the questionnaire
differently, for example10. Or some may have paid little attention to filling it
in, thus increasing the observation error. Thus it is not possible to say for cer-
tain that the measure reported here exactly represents ‘uncertainty’ in decision
making. This is notwithstanding the difficulty an agent may have in identifying
‘uncertain’ decision makers in advance in real world situations (with a view to
manipulating them). However the results do suggest that further investigation
into the influence of subject uncertainty in vulnerability to manipulation might
prove fruitful.
7.2.3 Other Factors
Demographic information about the respondents – such as their age, gender and
tenure history – was taken through the use of a questionnaire. Analysis in Chapter
10 Note that the questionnaire respondents filled in at the end of the Rightmove Survey is
discussed in Chapter 5. A copy of it is reproduced in Appendix B.
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6 considered whether these variables might have an impact on the susceptibility
to the choice set biases that were the focus of that chapter. For example it might
be the case that respondents who have never owned a property previously, and so
have never gone through the process of selecting a house, making an offer, com-
pleting the transaction and so on, are more susceptible to manipulation because
of their inexperience.
Logistic regressions were performed to test these variables in respect of order-
ing biases which are under consideration here. For example: are men more likely
to choose the first-viewed property than women? Do older respondents prefer
the most-recently viewed choice? However, the analysis indicates no significant
patterns in the data. There is no clear evidence that any of these variables exert
a consistent influence on the decisions of respondents. Thus these results are not
reported here. As was concluded in Chapter 6, the effects of these variables seem
instead to be part of the extra ‘noise’ which is expected from making the ex-
perimental scenario significantly more information-rich, as the Rightmove Survey
does.
7.2.4 Summary
The Rightmove Survey reveals several important ordering biases. Logistic regres-
sions showed that some ordering effects are present in the choice patterns of the
4,000 respondents to the survey.
There was no evidence of biases when the choice set was short and contained
only two choices. Similarly it was not possible to conclude that it is possible to
manipulate perceptions of the target property through the order in which it is
viewed.
The ordering effects that are observed in the Rightmove Survey group are seen
most strongly on the decoy properties. This is an interesting result partly be-
cause it is unique: published research into choice set manipulations rarely pauses
to consider the decoy at all. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, in simple
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experimental situations it is possible to ensure the decoy is strictly dominated
and so is chosen by no one. However in the information-rich scenario used in
the Rightmove Survey it is difficult to produce strict dominance, thus a small
proportion (always under 20%) of respondents chose the decoy probably because
they felt it was superior on some unidentified (and uncontrolled) scale of value.
An effective way to increase this proportion is to show that property first. Being
shown first versus any other position more than doubled the popularity of the
decoy option in some cases. This is interpreted as evidence in support of the pri-
macy hypothesis derived from the anchoring concept of Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) and hypothesised in Chapter 4 (H3a, page 98).
Using this ordering bias may prove an effective strategy for agents looking to
shift particularly ‘difficult’ properties from their books. If an agent has a prop-
erty which is ostensibly inferior to many in its class he may be able to improve
its popularity simply by showing it first in all his viewings of similar properties.
Buyers might also want to be made aware of this possibility.
Strength of preference was found to partially condition the ordering effects dis-
played, once again most particularly on the decoy property. In general those
with less fully-formed preferences were more likely to be influenced by ordering
effects, although the evidence cannot be said to be as firm as with the choice set
effects examined in Chapter 6. Finally there was no evidence that other factors
such as the age, gender or tenure status of the respondent have an impact on the
vulnerability to ordering effect manipulations.
The Rightmove Survey was designed so that it replicated almost exactly the
conditions in which properties are viewed on property search websites. This is
quite different to the decision making process used when physically viewing prop-
erties. When browsing online search results judgements are made, and preferences
formed, among many options very quickly based on readily visible features, prob-
ably with little in the way of detailed analysis. As discussed in Chapter 2, these
conditions match the editing phase which Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
discussed in their seminal Prospect Theory (1979). The results suggest that it is
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not easy to produce consistent and controllable biases in preferences in this forum.
As Chapter 6 concluded, such a result is perhaps counter to the interpretation of
human decision making (largely after Simon, 1957) which says that when deci-
sion makers form preferences quickly, with little consideration and using rules of
thumb, they are more vulnerable to biases than if they take time over the decision.
The controlled survey in following section uses the same properties as the Right-
move Survey, but its design forces respondents to spend more time considering
the properties in greater detail. As well as providing another test of the ordering
biases hypothesised, the results will provide interesting evidence as to the impor-
tance of time spent making the decision in moderating the vulnerability of that
decision to behavioural biases.
7.3 Stamford Adult Group Survey
The Stamford Adult Group Survey comprises an online survey of 600 residents
of the town of Stamford, Lincolnshire. As explained in Chapter 5, the survey
design was similar to the Rightmove Survey. However the method of adminis-
tration was slightly different, allowing participants to view all the photographs
of the property in larger size as well as forcing them to scroll through all the
written information before they went onto the next property. This is a subtle
change in methodology, but important because it encourages respondents to con-
sider each option in more detail, focusing on a wider range of features of value.
Ariely et al. (2003) state that in their experiment biases – they were looking at
valuation biases which are the subject of Chapter 8 – took effect only when the
decision maker actually contemplated making a particular purchase. Psycholog-
ical literature calls this process imprinting. The design of the Stamford Adult
Group Survey resulted in a far greater possibility of imprinting on the part of the
decision maker.
Thus, as well as providing further evidence of ordering biases in a housing choice
context from a demographic seasoned in housing choice, the design allows an
implicit test of the different methodologies. If the ordering biases found in the
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Table 7.8: Ordering effects in the Stamford Adult Group Survey.
Row Choice Set A B C D p-value n
1 {B, A} 51 49 61
2 {A, B} 46 54 0.306 69
3 {C, B, A} 54 41 5 59
4 {A, B, C} 68* 29 3 0.053 72
5 {D, B, A} 29 55 16 51
6 {A, B, D} 57*** 41 2 <0.001 76
Notes: Figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
*, *** indicates significance at the 10% and 1% levels respectively.
Rightmove Survey persist in this set of experiments, or are even stronger, it will
add to our knowledge not only of the nature of the biases themselves, but also
the conditions under which they can be created and sustained.
7.3.1 Full Sample Results
Table 7.8 reports the results of the Stamford survey so that it is possible to exam-
ine ordering biases. As discussed previously these tests are examining hypothesis
H3, which was outlined in Chapter 4 (page 98). There is no large ordering effect
on the ‘short’ choice set containing Properties A and B only. The proportion
choosing Property A rises from 46% to 51% when it is placed last, but this is
not a significant increase given the sample size. However, when the choice set is
expanded to its ‘long’ form containing three choices ordering effects become im-
portant. When the choice set is {A, B, C} the proportion choosing A rises from
54% to 68% by placing it first compared to last. This is a significant increase at
the 10% level.
When the choice set is {A, B, D} the effect is even more obvious. The proportion
choosing A is 29% when respondents see the choice set in the order {D, B, A}, in
other words with A placed last. When this ordering is reversed and it is shown
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first this figure rises to 57%, a highly significant result. That this is an ordering
effect is corroborated by looking at the effect on the decoy, D, which is swapped
with Property A in the treatment manipulation. Those who saw the choice set
{D, B, A} chose D with a frequency of 16%. When this was reversed and D was
placed last – {A, B, D} – the proportion choosing D fell to just 2%, a significant
fall.
This is an important result. As in the previous section the effect of ordering
is seen most strongly on the decoy. Simply by showing the inferior option first
(holding all other factors constant), it was possible to increase its popularity
eightfold from 2% to 16%. Once again it suggests an obvious strategy for increas-
ing the sales of difficult to sell properties, although it is clearly worthy of further
investigation given its novelty. Together these results constitute strong evidence
that primacy dominates in the choice set containing three choices, which is a
confirmation of hypothesis H3a (Chapter 4, page 98).
The choice set and ordering effects combine to produce significant variations in
choice patterns. Property A is chosen the most (68%) when it is not the target
and it is shown first (a combination of choice pollution effect and primacy). It
is chosen least (29%) when it is the target and it is shown last. This is a highly
significant difference (p-value: <0.001).
7.3.2 Other Factors
In Chapter 6 the data was split according to key demographic variables which
were taken from respondents through the use of a questionnaire. A similar anal-
ysis is possible when considering ordering biases. Ultimately the aim of this
procedure is to answer the following question: is there a sub-group of respon-
dents who are more vulnerable to behavioural biases than the population as a
whole? The Student Group Experiments go some way to answering this question
by focusing on young adults who are inexperienced participants in housing mar-
kets. Using the demographic data from the Stamford Adult Group Survey (as
with the Rightmove Survey) is a way of building on this.
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Table 7.9: Stamford Adult Group Survey results split by strength of preference.
Row Preference Choice Set A B C D p-value n
1 Weak {C, B, A} 50 39 11 18
2 {A, B, C} 61 33 6 0.218 36
3 Strong {C, B, A} 59 38 3 39
4 {A, B, C} 73 27 0 0.111 33
5 Weak {D, B, A} 33 40 27 27
6 {A, B, D} 48 50 2 0.124 40
7 Strong {D, B, A} 22 74 4 23
8 {A, B, D} 67*** 30 3 <0.001 33
Notes: Figures indicate the percentage making the relevant choice.
p-values are based on a one-tailed z-test of proportions.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Analysis of the data according to the age, gender, tenure and experience with
property of the respondents does not yield any significant insights into choice
behaviour. Variation can be observed – as would be expected – between different
sub-groups, but nothing strongly indicating a systematic weakness in one group
over another to bias. Thus these results are not reported.
A strong result from previous sections and the previous chapter was that self-
reported strength of preference is important in determining the vulnerability to
manipulation. Individuals who reported greater uncertainty were far more likely
to be affected by the decoy property, and to make less consistent choices in gen-
eral, than those who described their preference as ‘strong’. Table 7.9 considers
whether ordering biases are also conditioned by this uncertainty. It only reports
treatments involving long choice sets of three options because there is no signifi-
cant evidence of ordering effects in short two-choice sets.
To re-cap: the presumed direction of the effect is that ordering effects are stronger
among those with weak preferences and than those with strong preferences. How-
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ever, examining Table 7.9 does not produce conclusive evidence on this point.
Ordering effects seem to be important for both groups. When the choice set is
{A, B, C} in rows 1-4, being shown first helps increase Property A’s popularity
from 50% to 61% among those with weak preferences (comparing rows 1 and 2);
and from 59% to 73% among those with strong preferences (rows 3 and 4). These
movements are similar and neither statistically significant.
Moreover the most significant result comes from those with strong preferences.
The proportion who chose Property A is 22% when they view the properties in
the order D, B, A. When this is reversed and A is shown first this triples to 67%
a highly significant result. It is difficult to interpret this result in isolation, with
no a priori reason to expect such a strong change in preference.
Strength of preference does appear to be a moderating influence on the order-
ing effect seen on the decoys. Among those with strong preferences the decoy is
chosen by a small minority of respondents; a proportion that does not change sig-
nificantly whether the decoy is placed first or last (comparing the rate of choosing
of C in rows 3 and 4; and of D in rows 7 and 8). For those with weak preferences
however, the ordering effect on the decoy is strong, particularly for decoy D.
Being shown first rather than last increases the proportion choosing Property D
from 2% to 27% among those with weak preferences, a highly significant increase,
which reinforces the dominance of primacy effects.
7.3.3 Summary
The Stamford Adult Group Survey strengthens the findings of part of the Right-
move Survey by providing further evidence that ordering biases are important in
housing choice scenarios. In the long choice set containing three options primacy
dominates. As previously, this result is most strongly seen on the decoy prop-
erties. They gain most from being shown first. The magnitude of the increase
is striking. Decoy properties can have their popularity increased by as much as
eightfold by being shown first in some cases.
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In general the ordering biases are stronger than those in the Rightmove Sur-
vey, even given the smaller sample size. This suggests that the more in-depth
survey design, meaning respondents were able to view more information on the
properties – and for longer – contributed to the creation of ordering effects.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter has reported experiments which examine whether, in decisions over
housing, preferences can be influenced by the order in which properties are
viewed. Ordering effects have not been a significant concern of the literature
in behavioural economics or consumer economics, although isolated papers exist
(such as Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985, see Chapter 3 for a review). However there
are reasons to believe that housing choices may be an important scenario in which
they might flourish. The first reason for this expectation is that when making
housing choices in the ‘traditional’ sense, by which we mean travelling to and
viewing properties physically, the sequential nature of the viewing of the options
is strongly emphasised. It takes time and effort to view each option and a lot of
information must be taken in at each one because of the complexity of the choice.
When making the choice between two brands of dishwasher for example, a con-
sumer is able to easily switch his thoughts between them. They might even be
next to each other in the shop. This would tend to limit the extent to which the
order in which they are viewed matters. For housing choices this is not generally
the case. The buyer must consider one property, and form an impression of it,
before moving to another and another and so on11.
Another reason that housing choices are different is that housing searches have,
in recent years, migrated online. The growth of online search websites, such as
Rightmove, has been discussed extensively (in Chapter 5). Searching for property
online involves quickly forming impressions about properties to narrow down the
initial search result to a more focused group for greater consideration. In this way
it represents quite closely what Kahneman and Tversky have called the editing
11 Although of course in some cases a property search may cover a very restricted location so
the properties are more easily viewed inter-changeably.
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phase of decision making. Many researchers (led by Simon, 1957) have argued
that decision making based on quickly formed impressions using the most salient
information is the most vulnerable to bias. When narrowing down a search result
in this way it is plausible to hypothesise that the process is not invariant to the
order in which it is completed.
There are two competing hypotheses as to the nature of any ordering bias. The
first is known as primacy and says that first-viewed options will gain a special
significance in the mind of a decision maker, being the ‘yardstick’ against which
other options are compared. This results in it being favoured more frequently,
ceteris paribus. The alternative bias, recency, comes from cognitive limitations
on the part of the decision maker. It suggests the most recently-viewed choice
will be chosen more frequently simply because of the ease with which it can be
recalled. The theory of rational choice has no place for ordering effects. It says
that individuals will consider each option on its merits, ascribe a utility to each,
then pick the option which offers the highest utility.
The experiments reported in this chapter have found evidence of ordering bi-
ases in housing scenarios. The important results can be summarised as follows:
• Ordering effects do not appear significant when the choice set is ‘short’
containing only two options. This result applies across all experiments
examined;
• When choices are presented in a highly simplified written form to student
volunteers who are a good proxy for inexperienced users of property mar-
kets, there is significant evidence of primacy in ‘long’ (three option) choice
sets. Property A is chosen 32% of the time when the set is viewed as
{C, B, A}, but 46% when it is viewed as {A, B, C} (Table 7.1). This result
does not carry over to the information-rich experimental design involving
real property profiles however;
• In a controlled survey of 4,000 users of the property search website Right-
move there is limited evidence of ordering biases having an impact on the
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popularity of the target option (Table 7.5). However ‘decoy’ options do ben-
efit significantly from ordering manipulations. The likelihood of choosing
some decoys rises by as much as 34% when the option is viewed first (Ta-
ble 7.6) a confirmation of the primacy hypothesis. There is evidence that
strength of preference also plays a role in ordering biases. Respondents are
more affected by ordering manipulations – especially on the decoy – if they
rate their own preference as ‘weak’ versus ‘strong’; and
• There is significant evidence of ordering biases in the Stamford Adult Group
Survey which questioned 600 adults residents of a Lincolnshire town. Prop-
erty A increased its share of preferences from 29% to 57% by being placed
first versus last in the choice set {A, B, D} (Table 7.8). Decoy properties
also strongly benefit from being viewed first.
Taken together the findings support hypothesis H3a from Chapter 4 (page 98)
which suggested primacy would dominate choice patterns. It also confirms the
theoretical work of Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) and extends the work of Gal-
limore (1994) from professional real estate settings to the consumer marketplace.
For estate agents and home buyers there are two significant findings. The general
finding is that first-viewed options are given a boost by being in that position.
Agents should think carefully about which property they show to their clients
first because this is likely to set the tone for the whole search. However it is
important this result be tempered by the limitations that were also part of the
results. Primacy was not possible in all cases, especially in the Rightmove Sur-
vey where the effects were more faint. As with the choice set manipulations in
Chapter 6 it is clear that controlling preferences is inexact and cannot be done
with precision, although greater levels of research may refine our knowledge of
the conditions under which it is most effective.
A second important result concerns decoys. These inferior properties do exist
and it is not difficult to imagine a situation where the agent may hold such prop-
erties on his books for a considerable period unable to effectively market them.
The results in both the Rightmove and Stamford Adult Group Surveys showed
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that the popularity of these options can be dramatically increased by having de-
cision makers view them first. The result is a powerful illustration of a useful
way in which decision making biases can be utilised by an economic agent with
a motive to do so.
As in Chapter 6, the results from the Rightmove Survey show how difficult it
is to select properties in real situations to maximise manipulations. The best
characterisation of the biases uncovered in this survey is that they are fragile.
Further work is clearly needed to understand more about how to effectively pro-
duce and sustain behavioural bias in the online choice environment. Moreover,
the Stamford Adult Group Survey shows that the method of presentation is a
vital component in establishing effective manipulation strategies. In that survey
the information was identical to the Rightmove case, but the online design em-
phasised the features of the properties more evenly (rather than focusing on one
main photograph) forcing participants to spend longer on each property by mak-
ing them scroll through all the information before moving on. This produced far
greater evidence of ordering effects, once again particularly on decoy properties.
The results are interesting to estate agents for the insights they give into home
buyer decision making processes. They are relevant to real estate academics
studying housing markets because they shed a new light onto the dynamics of
housing markets using a framework which stands apart from the rational model
typically employed. Finally they are of interest to the most important group of
all: home buyers themselves. Buying a home is among the most important deci-
sions an individual can make. The results in this chapter are important because
they point the way towards home buyers being better consumers, making better
decisions.
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Chapter 8
Judgement Bias and Housing
Value
This chapter reports the results from experiments examining biases in
value judgements that can be created by placing arbitrary anchors in
respondents’ minds before value judgements are made, as discussed in
Chapter 4. Arbitrary anchors are a reliable determinant of ultimate
value judgements, even in the presence of significant incentives for
accurate judgement, in a group of student volunteers.
8.1 Anchoring in Value Judgements
Psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974) were the first to systematically examine deficiencies in human judgements
caused by the use of computational rules of thumb, known as heuristics. They
hypothesised that when making a value judgement individuals typically start
with an initial value then make adjustments based on receipt of new information
to yield a final answer. However this process, which they called anchoring-and-
adjustment, can lead to seriously flawed judgements because of deficiencies in
both the formulation of the initial estimate and the adjustments made to it.
The experiments at hand are concerned with the first part of this decision making
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process: the formulation of the initial estimate. More particularly they examine
whether judgements over housing value can be reliably influenced by the placing
of arbitrary anchors in the minds of decision makers.
As was argued in Chapter 1, housing choice represents perhaps the ultimate
test for consumer judgement and decision making, given the singular importance
it has for household finances. Paying too much based on flawed decision making
is likely to have significant implications for wealth and ultimately household hap-
piness.
The methodology used broadly replicates that of Ariely et al. (2003) who examine
anchoring in value judgements over everyday household goods. It is reported in
detail in Chapter 5. Subjects were asked to make a value judgement over four
houses having been given a ‘virtual tour’ using photos and information from an
estate agent’s brochure. They were told (truthfully) that the houses had sold
within the past few months and they were estimating what they thought each
had sold for. Participants made their judgements sequentially having been given
an entirely arbitrary ‘anchor’ value based on their mobile telephone number. This
was implemented by asking participants to write down the last three digits of their
mobile telephone number as a price in thousands of UK pounds. The example
given to students to ensure their understanding noted that if someone’s last three
digits were -204 then they should write £204,000 on their answer sheet. As with
Ariely et al. (2003), an arbitrary anchor, rather than something more relevant to
property decision making, is used to illustrate the power of the bias.
It is important to note at this stage that the procedure employed was in one im-
portant respect somewhat more stringent than that used by Ariely et al. (2003).
Their procedure delivered the anchor in a similar way by asking candidates to
write down the last two digits of their US Social Security Number as a price.
However when the valuation was to be made, subjects were asked first whether
they thought the value of the item under consideration (it was chocolates, bottles
of wine and computer equipment in their case) was worth more or less than the
number they had just written down. They were then asked what they thought
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that value was. This reference specifically to the anchor gives significantly more
opportunity for it to take effect in the subjects’ minds. In the procedure employed
here no further reference was made to the anchor after it was written down. In
other words the procedure employed here builds in an even sterner test of an-
choring processes than that used in Ariely et al. (2003). This should be borne in
mind when reading the results.
Returning to the aim of the experiments reported here, this was discussed, and
was the subject of a hypothesis, in Chapter 4. It is reproduced below:
H4. Anchoring: individuals’ valuation judgements over housing are
biased by the presence of an arbitrary anchor.
In other words the question which this chapter seeks to answer is: would arbitrary
values, written on the answer sheet, but otherwise entirely unreferenced, influence
the value judgements made?
8.1.1 Mean Valuation Judgements
Table 8.1 reports the raw results from the estimation of House A. The responses
are split according to the arbitrary anchor each participant wrote down. Anchors
are placed into ‘anchor buckets’ according to their first digit. Thus if the arbitrary
anchor that a subject wrote down was £125,000 they would be placed in bucket
1. If it was £576,000 they would be placed in bucket 5. Buckets 0 and 9 are
excluded for the entire analysis because they do not provide reasonable anchors.
Table 8.1: Value judgements amount students.
Anchor Bucket 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8
Mean, µ 246,100 251,800 257,800 268,200
Standard Deviation, σ 35,600 41,500 48,500 44,500
n 21 32 22 24
F 1.142
Significance F 0.336
Notes: Figures are in pounds sterling and are rounded to the nearest £100.
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Figure 8.1: Illustration of value judgement bias.
Finally buckets are grouped so that the data is effectively split into quartiles by
anchor1. Different methods are used to truncate the data and exclude extremely
inaccurate answers. In Table 8.1 the top and bottom 5% of observations listed
by error margin are truncated. This reduces the sample size to 99.
There is evidence that arbitrary anchors had an influence on value judgements
of houses. For example, those with an anchor of £100,000 to £299,900 on av-
erage estimated the property to be worth £246,100. While those with an an-
chor of £700,000 to £899,900 estimated on average that the property was worth
£268,200. However, there is a significant amount of noise in the data and an
F-test of the joint equality of means does not allow a rejection of the hypothesis
that they are equal (F=1.142, p-value: 0.336).
The results in Table 8.1 are presented in graphical form in Figure 8.1. On av-
erage a person who saw an anchor of between £100,000 and £299,900 thought
the property was worth over £22,000 less than an average person who saw an
anchor of £700,000 to £899,900. Figure 8.1 also shows that the effect of anchor
1 Ariely et al. (2003) split their data into quintiles, so this analysis is similar.
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on valuation was strictly increasing across the distribution of joint anchor buckets.
It is important to emphasise two points at this stage: i) the experiment’s proce-
dure randomly allocated subjects to anchors, and therefore anchor buckets; and
ii) participants were making their judgements in the presence of significant in-
centives for accuracy. The student volunteers could earn up to four times their
show up fee for judging the sale price of the property accurately. The payment
was binary: they either earned it, or they did not. There was no point in roughly
guessing a ball-park figure; those taking part were incentivised to give their best
efforts towards coming up with an estimate that would be as accurate as possible.
8.1.2 Regression of Sale Price Estimations
Another way to consider the relationship between the anchor and the valuation of
House A, the first house to be valued after the anchor and so the one expected to
be most susceptible to the behavioural bias of anchoring, is to use ordinary least
squares regression. A least squares regression of the relationship is presented in
Table 8.2. The regression estimated is of the following form:
Estimate = α + βAnchorBucket+  (8.1)
There may be non-linearity in the value estimates therefore these are taken as
natural logarithms2. Three different specifications for the independent variable,
Anchor Bucket, are reported. Each employs a different method for truncating
wildly inaccurate estimates. In Column (1) the top and bottom 5% of observa-
tions listed by error margin are removed3. In Columns (2) and (3) the truncation
is relative. Observations are removed if they are more than 50% (column (2)) or
60% (column (3)) above or below the true value. Two of the three specifications
result in significant coefficients. When the top and bottom 5% of inaccurate
estimates are truncated the model predicts that being in anchor bucket 1 will
produce an estimate of £240,700, whereas being in anchor bucket 8 will result
2 A regression with untransformed valuation estimates as the dependent variable is too noisy
to yield significant results. This is not unexpected (see Chapter 4).
3 This method is used to generate the data in Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1.
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Table 8.2: Regression of the relationship between anchor bucket and
value judgement.
Estimated Value of House
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept, α 5.470 5.458 5.452
(0.037) (0.036) (0.039)
Anchor 1 0.014*
(0.007)
Anchor 2 0.009
(0.007)
Anchor 3 0.013*
(0.008)
n 99 101 105
Adjusted r2 0.025 0.004 0.018
Significance F 0.063 0.227 0.088
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Anchor 1 : top 5% of observations truncated.
Anchor 2 : errors +/- 50% truncated.
Anchor 3 : errors +/- 60% truncated.
* indicates significance at the 10% level.
in an estimate of £264,800. The model is significant at the 10% level (p-value:
0.063).
Another way to analyze the data and remove a significant amount of the noise
which is present is to use the simple average of the estimates in each anchor
bucket as the dependent variable. This is reported in Table 8.3. Here there is
stronger evidence of a relationship between the anchor seen and the estimate
made. If the data is truncated as in Column (1), with the top and bottom 5%
of observations being removed, the average estimate increases by £3,730 for each
digit increase in the anchor with the coefficient significant at the 5% level. If
all errors of greater than +/− 60% are removed from the data the independent
variable exerts a highly significant effect on the ultimate value judgement made
(Column (3)).
Thus for the student sample the simple arbitrary anchor proved a reliable way
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Table 8.3: Regression of the relationship between anchor bucket and av-
erage value judgement.
Average Estimated Value of House
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept, α 239,218 237,810 236,276
(3,398) (3,893) (2,769)
Anchor 1 3,730**
(672.8)
Anchor 2 2,083**
(770.1)
Anchor 3 3,445***
(548.3)
n 8 8 8
r2 0.84 0.55 0.85
Significance F 0.014 0.035 <0.001
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Anchor definitions match Table 8.2.
**, *** indicates significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively.
to influence their judgement of House A’s sale price. Judgements, it should be
noted, that were far from being made in isolation. Students were not asked simply
to pick out a value for the house randomly based on only their own knowledge.
As detailed in Chapter 5, all received information about the UK and local hous-
ing market including average prices, recent trends and sales volumes immediately
prior to viewing the house and being asked to estimate its value. This is the
kind of information that might be obtained from basic research on the internet
by an interested buyer, or from a local estate agent. Information that provides
vital context (and other much more salient potential anchors) for decision making.
Finally it must not be forgotten that there were significant incentives for accurate
judgement just as in the high-stakes world of real moves on the housing ladder.
Yet these biases were clearly evident in the value judgements that subjects were
asked to make.
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8.1.3 The Determinants of Estimation Accuracy
As part of the student experiments, as detailed in Chapter 5, simple demographic
information was taken from subjects including their gender, age, nationality,
whether they own property and how knowledgeable they are about property
markets. It is worth considering whether any of these variables exert a signif-
icant influence on the valuation judgement. If these variables are found to have
influence it may help further our understanding of the susceptibility of certain
individuals to biases such as value anchoring. In this regard this analysis is simi-
lar to the logit and other tests performed on choice set biases in Chapters 6 and 7.
The dependent variable in this analysis is the valuation error (Error) in the es-
timate for House A. It is expressed as a percentage for all 139 participants. The
independent variables which make up the regression are presented in Table 8.4.
Taking them in turn, the first, Gender, is included largely as a control. There is
no a priori reason to expect either males or females to be more accurate in their
estimations. The variable Age is split into five categories. Evidence in Chapter
6 suggested that younger participants were more susceptible to bias than older
ones who may have more experience dealing in housing or may have developed
their decision making ability more generally. It should be noted however that the
bulk of participants in this experiment were aged 18-29, so this variable cannot
provide as much information as it can in the Rightmove Survey.
The variable Nation is a dummy variable to separate those participants who
were British against those of other nationalities. British participants might be
expected, on average, to be significantly more experienced with UK property and
housing markets generally simply through their residency in the UK for a longer
period of time. This may significantly improve their valuation accuracy. The
fourth independent variable OwnProp is another dummy which indicates whether
the participant owns their own property. Those who have bought a house could
be expected to be more experienced in making valuation judgements, which has
been shown to be important in decision making (List, 2003, 2004).
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Variable Description
Error The dependent variable expressing the error in the value estimation as
a percentage.
Gender The gender of the participant. A dummy variable where 1=male, and
0=female.
Age The age of the participant. A categorical variable split into five cate-
gories: 18-30, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60+.
Nation The nationality of the participant. A dummy variable where 1=British,
and 0=other nationalities.
OwnProp Whether the participant owns their own property. A dummy variable
where 1=owns property, and 0=does not own property.
Know Whether the participants are especially knowledgeable about property.
A dummy variable where 1=knowledgeable, and 0=not knowledgeable.
Table 8.4: Variables for a regression of value accuracy.
Finally Know expresses whether the participant is especially knowledgeable about
property. This is satisfied in one of two ways. Firstly participants could indicate
whether they considered themselves to be particularly knowledgeable in property
matters. Secondly they were asked to pick from a list of property-related activ-
ities which applied to them4. Those who ticked three or more were classed as
knowledgeable.
The multiple ordinary least squared regression is run as follows:
Error = α+ β1Gender+ β2Age+ β3Nation+ β4OwnProp+ β5Know+  (8.2)
The method of truncation used removes the top and bottom 5% of observations
from the sample based on valuation accuracy5. The results are reported in Table
8.5. Two specifications of the model are produced. The first, reported in Column
(1) includes all five regressors. The full model contains only one variable signif-
icant at the 5% level – Gender. However, Age is also close to being significant
(p-value: 0.122) therefore it is included in a restricted version of the model which
4 These were: study property at University; work(ed) in property markets; considered buying
a house; and interested in property in the media (TV and magazines).
5 This is the same procedure used to generate Table 8.1.
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Table 8.5: Regression of the relationship between val-
uation accuracy and other variables.
Valuation Error
(1) (2)
Intercept, α -0.002 -0.023
(0.044) (0.036)
Gender 0.071** 0.069**
(0.031) (0.030)
Age 0.046 0.052**
(0.029) (0.025)
Nation -0.031
(0.031)
OwnProp -0.005
(0.065)
Know 0.023
(0.048)
n 127 127
r2 0.045 0.059
Significance F 0.058 0.008
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
** indicates significance at the 5% level.
is reported in Column (2). In the latter model both coefficients are significant,
although it is clear there is a significant amount of noise in the data as evidenced
by the extremely low value of r2.
This is a surprise in two ways. Firstly Gender was included primarily as a con-
trol. It was not expected to be significant. However its coefficient suggests that
male respondents estimate with larger errors than female participants. A male
participant aged 18-29 would be expected to value the property 9.8% above its
true value according to the model, whereas a similarly-aged female would estimate
with a 2.9% error, on average. The sign of Age is also unexpected since it suggests
that older participants value property less accurately, by 5.2 percentage points
for each increase in age category. Because few of the respondents were in the
higher age groups in this sample, this result in particular should be interpreted
cautiously, however.
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8.1.4 Summary
This section has sought to explore whether anchoring biases, first uncovered by
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), have relevance in valuation judgements over prop-
erty. These have been observed in professional real estate settings (Diaz et al.,
2002) and in some real estate contexts (Simonsohn and Loewenstein, 2006; Levy
and Frethey-Bentham, 2010)6. Student participants were given an arbitrary an-
chor using a similar – but ultimately more restrictive – procedure to Ariely et al.
(2003). They were then asked to value a property having been given a ‘virtual
tour’ using real estate agent information (including photos). There is powerful
evidence that the anchor given does influence judgements, even in the presence of
significant, binary incentives for accurate judgement. There is also evidence that
male participants value property with greater inaccuracy than females, a result
not anticipated and not previously discussed in choice theory research.
There is a significant amount of noise though, far more than in experiments over
simple household items such as those considered by Ariely et al. (2003). This
is expected and still presents compelling evidence that, in a choice scenario in
which information is limited and decision makers typically have little experience,
they are vulnerable to even the simplest forms of manipulation.
The following section examines the extent to which judgemental biases, once es-
tablished, persist and continue to affect decision making, a cognitive effect known
as arbitrary coherence.
8.2 Arbitrary Coherence
Ariely et al. (2003) argue that once established, arbitrary anchors may become
coherent such that we continue to use them in our decision making. They dubbed
this effect arbitrary coherence. The experimental design reported in Section 8.1
allowed a test of this effect in a housing choice scenario. Having been given an
arbitrary anchor and asked to value a property (House A), subjects were shown
6 See Chapter 3 for a full review.
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(a) House B (b) House C
(c) House D
Figure 8.2: Illustration of arbitrary coherence.
three more similar properties and asked after each of them to make a similar
judgement. Does the initially placed arbitrary anchor prove a reliable guide to
the estimations of Houses B, C and D?
8.2.1 Persistence of the Anchor
Figure 8.2 reports the results from the analysis. The data is generated using the
same truncation procedure as for Column (1) of Table 8.2, namely that the top
and bottom 5% of observations listed by error margin are removed.
It is clear from Figure 8.2 that there is little evidence of arbitrary coherence in
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this dataset. The estimates of House B (in Figure 8.2a) do not show the same
kind of linear trend that is clearly evident in the estimation of House A. House
C is more as expected, but House D is not. Ultimately it appears the effect of
the arbitrary anchor decays quickly when it comes to making further estimation,
or at least that the noise present in the estimations is too significant to strongly
identify the effect of the anchor. Performing regressions on the data with similar
specifications to those used in Section 8.1 does yield not significant results either
and thus are not reported here.
8.2.2 Transitions Between Estimates
Another way to think about the effect of the arbitrary anchor is by considering
the transitions between houses. In Section 8.1 evidence was presented showing
that there was a relationship between the arbitrary anchor and the estimation of
House A. It is natural to ask whether a relationship can be found between the
valuation of House A and that of House B; between House B, and that of House
C; and so on.
The literature on anchoring, led by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), suggests
that in making judgements individuals will rely on the most salient anchor point.
Thus it seems likely that the most recently estimated house may form a new
anchor point for the estimation of the next property. In this scenario, having
estimated the price of House A, it may become salient in the judgement over the
value of House B, even in the absence of feedback about the accuracy of the first
judgement (of which the was none in the experimental design).
This is examined by Table 8.6 which shows correlations between the estimates.
There is evidence of a correlation between sequential estimates. Having estimated
House A, the correlation with the resulting estimate of House B was 0.195 which
is significant at the 5% level. There is some correlation between the estimates of
House B and C, but it is not significant. The greatest significance occurs between
the estimates of Houses C and D. The correlation coefficient of 0.397 is highly
significant.
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Table 8.6: Correlation between sequential house
price estimates.
House A B C
B
0.195**
(0.021)
C
0.109
(0.202)
D
0.397***
(<0.001)
Notes: Figures in parentheses indicate the p-value based on
a two-tailed t-test.
**, *** indicates significance at the 5% and 1% levels
respectively.
This result can be understood when we take a look at House C. This property
was a ‘wild card’ property. House C was significantly different to others in the
set in one critical factor – it was in noticeably shabby repair and would clearly
need some work in order to bring it up to a modern standard. This introduced
a significant source of uncertainty for the student participants: they knew that
it would get a reasonably large discount as a result, but had no clear way of
assessing how big that discount might be. In this scenario it seems reasonable
that there would be a ‘break’ in the transition structure from House B to C. It
is significant though that the use of the previous judgement as the most salient
anchor for the following one is quickly re-established. Estimates of House D are
highly correlated with House C.
An analysis of the transitions illustrates this point further. Table 8.7 reports
two transition matrices. Examining the matrix on the left-hand side first (Table
8.7a), we see the rows split the estimates of House A into quartiles. The columns
split the estimates of House B into quartiles. Thus the position in the matrix –
expressed in the form {row, column} – illustrates the transition from House A
to House B. The diagonals in the matrix represent individuals who stay in the
same quartile in the transition, so a transition vector of {2, 2} illustrates someone
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House A House A
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 H1 H2
H
o
u
se
B
Q1 29 38 18 15
H
o
u
se
B
H1 58 42
Q2 26 23 27 26 H2 41 59
Q3 26 23 26 26
(b)
Q4 17 17 31 34
(a)
Table 8.7: Transition matrix for transition from House A to House B.
who was in the second quartile for House A and the second quartile for House B.
Similarly {1, 4} – the top right-hand box – would be an individual who was in
the first quartile for House A and the fourth for House B. In Table 8.7a and 8.7b
the figures reported are percentages of the total. These sum by row. Thus the
table indicates that 29% of respondents who were in the first quartile of estimates
for House A remained in the first quartile for House B.
If the estimate for House B was unrelated to House A numbers would be dis-
tributed evenly across each row showing that a person, having being in Q1 of
estimates for House A, was as likely to be in Q1 as Q4 in their estimate of House
B. A test of this expectation using a chi-squared distribution with 9 degrees of
freedom can be conducted7. Here there is not significant evidence of a relation-
ship in the transition from House A to House B with a χ2 value of 8.45 (p-value:
0.489). Table 8.7b groups the quartiles so that the matrix shows whether partic-
ipants were above or below the median estimate (ie. in Half 1 or Half 2). The
interpretation is the same otherwise. Thus it shows along the diagonal that 58%
of participants who estimated below the median for House A (H1) remained in
that half of the distribution for House B. A chi-squared test of this matrix reveals
a significant relationship in the estimations of House A and House B (χ2 = 3.804,
p-value: 0.051): participants were significantly more likely to estimate below the
7 In a matrix such as this the degrees of freedom is given by (rows− 1) ∗ (columns− 1).
225
8.2 Arbitrary Coherence
House B House B
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 H1 H2
H
ou
se
C
Q1 32 21 21 26
H
o
u
se
C
H1 51 49
Q2 17 31 31 20 H2 49 51
Q3 29 20 29 21
(b)
Q4 20 29 30 31
(a)
Table 8.8: Transition matrix for transition from House B to House C.
median for House B having done for House A; and vice versa.
Tables 8.8a and 8.8b complete the same analysis for the transition from House
B to House C. Although the directionality is the same – Table 8.8b shows that
participants who estimated below the median for House B were more likely to be
below the median for House C also, this was not significant, whether the data
was split by quartiles (χ2 = 5.289, p-value: 0.751) or halves (χ2 = 0.064, p-value:
0.780).
Finally Tables 8.9a and 8.9b report on the transition from House C to House D.
The diagonals of the matrix show that participants tended to stay within the
same quartile in the transition between House C and House D. Forty-seven per-
cent of the participants who were in the first quartile of estimates for House C
remained in that quartile for House D. Among those in the fourth quartile, 49%
remained in the same quartile. There is a significant relationship when the data is
divided by quartile (χ2 = 31.576, p-value: <0.001) and into halves (χ2 = 10.940,
p-value: <0.001).
A final way to explore this data using transitions analysis is to consider the
evolution of estimates across all four judgements. In other words do participants
whose anchor is above the median tend to estimate above the median in each of
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House C House C
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 H1 H2
H
ou
se
D
Q1 47 18 12 24
H
ou
se
D
H1 64 36
Q2 26 37 26 11 H2 36 64
Q3 14 29 40 17
(b)
Q4 11 17 23 49
(a)
Table 8.9: Transition matrix for transition from House C to House D.
their judgements in the estimation phase (Houses A – D)?
Starting with the anchor, it is possible to produce a decision tree showing this
evolution. At each node (ie. each new estimation) participants’ estimates can
either be above or below the median. A participant whose estimates were always
below the median would have a route through the decision tree of H1-H1-H1-
H1-H1. One who was in the first half for the first three, then switched to being
above the median, before returning to being below the median for the final esti-
mation, would have the following route: H1-H1-H1-H2-H1. The paths of all 139
participants through the decision tree are reported in Figure 8.3. For clarity this
shows that seven participants (out of 139) were in H1 for all four estimations and
the anchor, in other words these seven individuals consistently estimated below
the median. At the opposite end of the distribution, 11 individuals estimated
above the median for all estimates. Fourteen individuals were in H1 for all four
estimates having been in H2 for the anchor.
Because the expectation is that the estimation of houses is independent, that
is individuals do not use a previous estimate as an anchor for their next estimate,
we can say a lot about how the decision tree should look. In particular if we take
as a random variable the number of times a participant is in H1, given indepen-
dence, we would expect this random variable to follow the binomial distribution
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Frequency of H1s Expected8 Observed
0 3 8
1 16 21
2 31 22
3 31 19
4 16 25
5 3 5
100% 100%
Table 8.10: Distribution of frequency of H1s as a test for independence in the evolu-
tion of house price estimates.
with p = 0.5 and n = 5. Using the binomial distribution we can extrapolate
how many of the participants should be in each category of the random variable.
Comparing this to what is actually seen will demonstrate whether there is a
tendency for individuals to stay in the same half of the distribution. The results
are reported in Table 8.10.
The distribution of frequencies of H1s appears to deviate from that expected.
Table 8.10 shows that 13% of participants remained in the same half of the
distribution for all estimations9 far in excess of the 6% expected. Forty-six percent
of participants were in the same half of the distribution for four out of the five
estimations (anchor included), also well in excess of the 31% expected. A chi-
squared test of goodness of fit is strongly rejected (χ2 = 32.764, p-value: <0.001).
The distribution of H1s violates the assumption that estimates are independent
because individuals do not use a previous estimate as a salient anchor for their
next estimate. Far from it, there is significant evidence that the presence of an
arbitrary anchor continues to influence the evolution of value judgements.
8 Using the binomial distribution Pr(K = k) =
(
n
k
)
.pk.(1 − p)n−k. Given p = 0.5 and n = 5,
Pr(2) = 0.3125.
9 Found by summing the percentage frequency of those with 0 H1s and those with 5 H1s.
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Figure 8.4: Internal consistency of house price estimates.
8.2.3 Internal Consistency
In analysing their experimental data, in which participants were asked to make
value judgements over a series of consumer items, Ariely et al. (2003) asked
whether there was internal consistency in the estimates. In other words, could
participants tell whether House A was more expensive than House B (which it
was), and whether House B was more expensive than House C (which it was not)?
Figure 8.4 shows that, overall, subjects’ estimates do not display a high degree
of internal consistency in this sense. House B was around £30,000 cheaper than
House A yet the average participant estimated it was slightly more expensive. On
the other hand, House C was in actual fact slightly more expensive than House B,
yet the average respondent thought it was cheaper than their estimate of House B.
Finally, House D was the cheapest of all, yet the majority raised their estimates
from what they judged House C as being worth. As indicated alongside the chart
the percentage who correctly guessed the direction change from house-to-house
was always below 50%.
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8.2.4 Summary
This section has presented several important results from the value judgement
experiments on the persistence of arbitrary anchors in decision making. Ariely
et al. (2003) found significant evidence that, although the relevance of the anchor
decayed over time, once established it could continue to influence estimations of
value. The results presented here back up that finding.
A first direct comparison between the arbitrary anchor and the estimates for
Houses B – D does not uncover much evidence of bias. This is probably because
of the significant noise in the estimation function, which has been a feature of all
the housing choice experiments. In turn this reflects the complexity of housing
decisions compared with the kind of consumer goods over which much of the
previous experimental work has been conducted.
An important method by which the arbitrary anchor might remain important
is by being transmitted from estimate to estimate (Chapter 5 details how the
estimates were made sequentially without feedback between estimates). There is
a significant correlation between the estimates for Houses A and B and between
Houses C and D. The latter is particularly strong. This latter finding is impor-
tant because it further suggests that decision maker uncertainty is an important
determinant of the extent to which choice and judgement biases can take effect.
Transition matrices confirm that, particularly for the transition between House A
and House B and House C and House D, individuals who were in the top half of
the estimate distribution for the first house remained there for the latter house,
and similarly for the bottom half.
Finally the evolution of price estimates across all four estimations was consid-
ered using a binomial decision tree which counted how times each individual was
in the bottom half of the distribution. Individuals were far more likely to remain
in the same half of the distribution across the estimates than would be expected
if estimates were independent.
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This is strong evidence that value anchors do affect sequential decision making
and an initial anchor can have a powerful impact well beyond the next judgement.
Ariely et al. (2003) only considered the binary correlations between each estimate
in a sequence, so in this sense these results go beyond their findings.
8.3 Conclusion
This chapter has reported experiments which examine evidence of biases in judge-
ment that can be created through the use of arbitrary anchors in housing sce-
narios. Buying a house is the most important purchase likely to be made in the
household’s lifetime, so getting valuations right is vitally important.
There is significant evidence that, even in the presence of significant incentives for
accurate judgement, participants are vulnerable to their judgements being biased
in estimates of housing value. In this way the results in this chapter confirm and
extend the work of Ariely et al. (2003). The results are also a confirmation of
hypothesis H4 (page 100).
Although subjects do not appear to be directly influenced by their initial arbitrary
anchor for subsequent judgements, there is evidence that they continue to use the
estimate immediately prior to the one at hand for making their judgement, which
gives support to the anchoring-and-adjustment mechanism proposed by Tversky
and Kahneman (1974). Furthermore strong evidence has been presented showing
the evolution of price estimates can be influenced by initial arbitrary anchors
because estimates are clearly not independent. This is a potentially significant
weakness in decision making if a first value can be established arbitrarily.
In interpreting the results of these experiments it is important to note that there
is not expected to be a literal relationship between viewing an anchor and in-
fluence on value judgements, in other words it is not possible simply to place
an arbitrary number in front of potential home buyers predictably to influence
their judgement. Instead the experiments illustrate the ease with which arbitrary
anchors can be established, and clung to, by buyers without extensive experience
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in such matters. As emphasised in motivating this thesis (Chapter 1) housing is
a novel choice setting in this regard because decisions are almost always made
by decision makers who come to the market with little prior knowledge. The
decision to buy a house may be made only once or twice in a lifetime making it
difficult to gain the experience that it appears may be necessary to avoid biased
judgements.
Chapter 4 illustrated that the estate agent has a powerful part to play in this
story. They have a significant information advantage over home buyers and are
able to set the conditions under which the choice is made by their choice of which
houses to show, and in what order, among other things10. Thaler and Sunstein
(2008) call this type of economic actor a choice architect. Although it is beyond
the scope of this thesis to fully model the principle-agent problem faced by home
buyers, Chapter 4 showed that, although it will be conditioned by how difficult it
is to actually do it, it is clearly in the interests of estate agents to convince home
buyers that a house – or a particular set of houses – are worth as much as possible.
The evidence in this chapter shows how to achieve this judgemental manipula-
tion. Importantly it does not involve explicitly tricking home buyers, for example
by lying about sale prices. Instead estate agents could use the flawed decision
making processes of home buyers, in this case through the process of anchoring
identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), to subtly influence estimations of
value. Perhaps by showing a more valuable, top-of-class property first, or by
sending a series of ‘expensive’ comparables to individuals prior to their viewings,
it is likely that the home buyers’ judgements can be compromised. This can have
powerful influences on their choices.
The findings in this chapter are clearly of interest to policy makers who set the
regulatory framework in which estate agents operate. However, it seems unlikely
that, given the subtlety of the manipulation here and the significant noise that is
inherent in value judgements, policy makers would be able to formulate a policy
10 Second order effects might include the time of day they show a house and the order in which
they show the rooms.
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response to this finding.
However, the party most interested in these results is surely us as decision makers.
Behavioural economists have consistently stressed that one of the fundamental
motivations of their work is to help us understand our decision making processes
better. By understanding our weaknesses – and our strengths – in decision mak-
ing we can hope to make better, more effective choices and improve our own
happiness. There can be few more important spheres to make better decisions
than in housing choice.
234
Part IV
235
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Research
This chapter concludes the thesis. It brings together the results re-
ported in Part III and discusses the relevance they have for the parties
considered in Chapter 1. The primary contribution is to place a new
emphasis on the role of estate agent behaviour in moderating housing
market outcomes. The estate agent is a true choice architect with the
power to influence decision makers in subtle ways, almost entirely out-
side of the dominant rational choice paradigm. All research has limi-
tations and these are also discussed. Finally areas of future research
are considered. Behavioural insights have a considerable amount still
to offer in the search for greater understanding of housing markets
and in the wider real estate economics discipline.
9.1 Summary of Results
The fundamental research question that this thesis has sought to answer is ex-
pressed in Chapter 1: to what extent, and by what means, can housing choice
be manipulated in non-rational ways by a willing economic agent? The answer
to this question is of interest to estate agents, policy makers, and of course to
all individuals as decision makers. Not making errors of judgement in housing
choices is important because they are among the most important decisions made
during a lifetime.
236
9.1 Summary of Results
Using the alternative paradigm of choice theory embodied in the field of be-
havioural economics, the research has examined - through five hypotheses - three
specific ways in which this behavioural manipulation might be possible. These
are: i) through the placing of alternative options in the choice set – ‘decoy’ prop-
erties – to influence the perception of certain ‘target’ properties; ii) by altering
the order in which options are viewed to favour certain options; and iii) by placing
value ‘anchors’ in the decision maker’s mind to influence his perception of value.
Three different experimental studies have been used to investigate these effects.
The first of these used classroom experiments on student volunteers at the Univer-
sity of Cambridge. Student volunteers are used widely in experimental economics,
most obviously because of the ease of recruitment for academic researchers and
the low marginal cost of their time (which makes recruitment significantly more
affordable on limited research budgets). While there are clearly concerns with the
generalisability of results gained from this sample set, it is held that they are a
particularly useful group to focus on for this study. The primary advantage of stu-
dents in this case is that they represent individuals in the rental market very well.
Two controlled surveys make up the remainder of the experimental work. The
first, a survey of 4,000 users of the property search website Rightmove, was de-
signed almost exactly to replicate the true conditions in which properties are ac-
tually viewed. The second was also completed online, but the design was slightly
modified, forcing participants to spend more time considering the information
about each property in more depth. It was conducted on 600 residents of the
town of Stamford, Lincolnshire. Chapter 5 discusses in further detail the merits
of experimental techniques to economics. Although slow to gain acceptance, ex-
perimental techniques are now widespread in the discipline. A body of research
has standardised methodologies and great care is taken to guarantee the accu-
racy and applicability of the results. A key early proponent, Vernon Smith, was
awarded the Nobel Prize in 2002. Experimental work will never substitute for
empirical study from the field, but it can offer a different – and very valuable –
perspective.
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Before discussing the results obtained from the experimental work, it is useful
to consider again the motivations for undertaking it.
Studying choices has been a preoccupation for economics for at least 100 years.
The fundamental economic problem is itself a choice: how to satisfy our infi-
nite wants with scare resources. The dominating paradigm of choice theory, the
Behavioral Decision Theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), proposed
formal axioms for the theory of choice and became synonymous with rationality.
These axioms are considered in detail in Chapter 2. A review of the literature re-
veals that, not long after the publication of this seminal work, doubts were raised
about its applicability and descriptive accuracy (the highest profile of which is
Allais, 1953). The criticisms led to reformulations of the original theory, and
attempts to relax or modify key assumptions (such as Markowitz, 1952; Chew,
1983). However the key insight of the criticism could not be patched over: the
axioms require a method of decision making that is not psychologically plausible.
A growing body of evidence concluded that individuals do not actually follow the
rules of the theory in practice, leading to significant areas where the predictions
of the theory do not match reality.
Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky were in the vanguard of this
behavioural critique. In a series of ground-breaking articles, they demonstrated
some of the key areas in which the rational choice theory is not descriptively
accurate (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
The work, coalescing around their alternative model of choice, Prospect Theory,
opened an alternative paradigm in choice theory that has challenged the founda-
tions of microeconomics in the past thirty years.
An overriding motivation for the work in this thesis, then, is to contribute to
this debate. It does this by providing evidence as to the applicability of the ratio-
nal choice model in an important and under-researched area of choice: housing.
Chapter 1 discusses in detail why housing is a novel choice scenario for this re-
search. In that chapter, housing choice was characterised as a high-stakes, one
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shot game, which is rare among the consumer choices typically studied. The re-
search in this thesis extends our knowledge of choice behaviour by focusing on
the nature of this choice specifically.
A second motivation for the research is to contribute to our understanding of the
dynamics of housing markets. Housing economics has been an interest of aca-
demics and policy makers for some time, with many different approaches used,
as Chapter 3 makes clear. This research contributes to our understanding by
focusing on the role of estate agents in moderating housing market outcomes.
The final primary motivation for the research is to help individuals make bet-
ter choices. This thesis produces evidence that illustrates the vulnerability of
decision makers. Particularly in housing markets, decisions are made at a sig-
nificant information disadvantage (something discussed further in Chapter 4).
Understanding the weaknesses in decision making apparatus which leave decision
makers open to manipulation should contribute to more informed and hopefully
better choices. This is a worthy aim.
Having considered the motivation for the work, let us look at the main results
from the three chapters which report the experimental work.
9.1.1 Choice Set Effects
Three hypotheses were advanced in Chapter 4 to test choice set effects. These
are reproduced below:
H1. Asymmetric dominance: the proportion choosing a particular
property increases when a decoy property is added that is asymmetri-
cally dominated.
H2a. Strong compromise effect: the proportion choosing a partic-
ular target property increases when it is made a compromise choice by
the addition of a decoy property to the choice set.
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H2b. Weak compromise effect: the proportion choosing a competi-
tor property decreases when the addition of a decoy property to the
choice set makes the other original property the compromise.
H5. Preference intensity: the strength of preference for a partic-
ular target property increases when it is the subject of a choice set
manipulation.
The experimental results which relate to choice set effects are discussed in Chapter
6. The results are summarised in the conclusion to that chapter as follows:
• When property choices are presented in highly simplified written form to
student participants there is significant evidence of asymmetric dominance,
confirming hypothesis H1;
• In a similar test with student participants, there is evidence of a weak form
of the compromise effect, which confirms hypothesis H2b
• When the choice scenario is made significantly more complex by the use of
real property profiles including photos and text description based on real
estate agent information, a significant, previously unobserved, effect is seen
among student participants. In this situation the proportion choosing the
target property falls and significantly more choose the non-target option
instead. This is labelled the choice pollution effect ;
• There is significantly more noise, and identifying the effect of manipulations
is more difficult, when the sample set is expanded in the Rightmove Survey
and hypothesis H1 is tested again. Factors which influence the likelihood of
choosing the target property include the age and gender of the participant,
but firm conclusions on the effect of the decoy properties are difficult to
discern;
• There is significant evidence that the certainty participants have over their
choices is a determinant of the efficacy of manipulation strategies, although
there is limited evidence that the presence of the decoy option increases
their level of certainty as suggested in hypothesis H5; and
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• When the method of delivery is altered slightly to emphasise all the features
of properties as in the Stamford Adult Group Survey, there is significant
evidence of the ability to manipulate choice even in an information-rich
environment. Choice pollution effects appear to dominate.
Thus the evidence from the Student Group Experiments confirms and extends
similar findings in other studies of consumer choice (led by Huber et al., 1982).
The Stamford Adult Group Survey in particular illustrates that such biases are
strong even among mature adult decision makers who largely own property. This
is evidence that there is great potential for estate agents to have a significant role
in the ultimate home buying decision, through manipulating the choice frame
and so the process by which preference is constructed. However, the Rightmove
Survey results are more uneven and suggest that using the biases to produce
predictable (and quantifiable) outcomes in real choice situations is likely to be
challenging.
The most significant finding is of a new form of behavioural bias that has been la-
belled the choice pollution effect. The ‘polluting’ of perceptions against the target
by the decoy is contrary to any previously reported results. Chapter 6 discuss the
belief that the effect may lie in information asymmetry and signalling. Further
research should seek to understand the conditions under which choice pollution
effects are produced in more detail.
9.1.2 Ordering Biases
Chapter 7 reported results from the same experiments as Chapter 6 but controlled
for the choice set to isolate the effects which are solely down to the order in which
options are viewed. This was, therefore, a test of hypothesis H3. It is reproduced
below:
H3a. Primacy: information received first will have excessive weight
in judgements over housing, thus houses seen first will be preferred
more, ceteris paribus.
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H3b. Recency: information received last will have excessive weight in
judgements over housing, thus houses seen last will be preferred more,
ceteris paribus.
The results are summarised as follows:
• Ordering effects do not appear significant when the choice set is ‘short’
containing only two options. This result applies across all experiments
examined;
• When choices are presented in a highly simplified written form to student
volunteers, there is significant evidence of primacy in ‘long’ choice sets
containing three options. This result does not carry over to the information-
rich experimental design involving real property profiles however;
• In the Rightmove Survey there is limited evidence of ordering biases having
an impact on the popularity of the target option. However decoy options do
benefit significantly from ordering manipulations. There is evidence that
strength of preference also plays a role in ordering biases. Respondents are
more affected by ordering manipulations – especially on the decoy – if they
rate their own preference as ‘weak’ versus ‘strong’; and
• There is significant evidence of ordering biases in the Stamford Adult Group
Survey. Both target and decoy properties strongly benefit from being viewed
first.
Taken together, the results reported in Chapter 7 support the hypothesis of pri-
macy (H3a). First-viewed options, particularly decoys, consistently get a boost
from being in that position, although the strength of the effect is often fairly faint.
There was a significant difference in the results between those who took the
Rightmove and the Stamford Adult Group Surveys with ordering effects being
far more prevalent in the latter. The difference between them was that the latter
forced participants to spend longer considering each property in more detail (as
detailed in Chapter 5). One of the arguments used to defend against evidence
of judgemental errors is that they are made most frequently when individuals do
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not take the time and effort to consider their decision. The results in Chapter 7
contradict that suggestion1.
9.1.3 Judgement Bias and Value
Chapter 8 reported results from experiments on student volunteers who were
asked to value a series of properties having been exposed to an arbitrary ‘anchor’
value, in this case based on their mobile telephone number. The procedure, which
is detailed in Chapter 5, is similar to that used by Ariely et al. (2003). This was
a test of hypothesis H4, which was discussed in Chapter 4. It is below:
H4. Anchoring: individuals’ valuation judgements over housing are
biased by the presence of an arbitrary anchor.
The results are summarised as follows:
• There is direct evidence that even in the presence of significant incentives
for accuracy, participants are vulnerable to their judgements being biased
in estimates of housing value;
• There is evidence that successive valuations are not independent. Partici-
pants appear to use the previous estimate as the basis for their next judge-
ment and are far more likely to remain in the same half of the distribution of
value judgements throughout the valuation series. This is interpreted as ev-
idence which supports the anchoring-and-adjustment mechanism proposed
by Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
When the two findings are placed together they become a significant confirmation
of hypothesis H4. Subjects, even in the presence of significant incentives for
accuracy, do use an arbitrary anchor to inform their judgement. And subsequent
judgements are not independent so that the judgements all contain a non-trivial
arbitrary element. This implies that agents may be able to place anchors, such
as high-value properties, to influence consumer judgements.
1 Note it is a suggestion made implicitly by Tversky and Kahneman too in their analysis of
the use of rules of thumb in decision making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
243
9.2 Relevance and Interpretation
9.1.4 Summary
This thesis seeks to answer the following question: to what extent, and by what
means, can housing choice be manipulated in non-rational ways by a willing
economic agent? It presents evidence based on the insights of the field of be-
havioural economics which addresses this question in three key areas: choice set
effects; ordering biases; and biases in value judgements. It employs experimental
methodologies encompassing three different studies: Student Group Experiments
based on classroom experiments of 250 student volunteers; the Rightmove Survey
based on a controlled survey of over 4,000 users of a leading property search web-
site; and the Stamford Adult Group Survey from an online survey of 600 residents
of the town of Stamford, Lincolnshire recruited through local schools.
Significant results were found to confirm several of the hypotheses made in Chap-
ter 4 especially H1 (asymmetric dominance), H3a (primacy) and H4 (anchor-
ing). The results suggest that the process buying a home is clearly open to
manipulation by the estate agent. As was made clear in Part III, in practice
this manipulation is likely to be subtle. For example it means placing options to
influence the perception of properties at the initial ‘filtering’ stage – where many
choices are considered briefly before being narrowed down for greater scrutiny
– or using anchors to influence the perception of value in a particular market.
Nevertheless given the stakes involved, these are important findings.
In the following section these results are interpreted further and their relevance
to the parties considered in Chapter 1 are discussed.
9.2 Relevance and Interpretation
Chapter 1 expressed the primary reasons for studying housing choice in terms of
the parties for whom the research is relevant. This section discusses the results
of the research and the conclusions that can be drawn for each of these parties
in turn.
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9.2.1 Estate Agents
For estate agents there is a clear interest because of the possibility of using the
strategies to their own benefit. As admitted above, the results suggest that fur-
ther study and refinement may be needed to understand how to control them
and produce predictable results. The results do, however, illustrate the nature of
decision making biases that may affect home buyers. There are two particularly
interesting results which go beyond the general conclusion that estate agents have
considerable power to influence property choices (which may not come as a sur-
prise to many agents).
The first is the result from Chapter 7 that one of the most powerful ways in
which ordering biases take effect is on inferior ‘decoy’ properties. These strongly
benefitted from being shown first in choice sets. As discussed in that chapter,
the psychological basis for such an effect is known as anchoring. It suggests that
in making decisions individuals will tend to focus excessive attention on some ini-
tially received information (the anchor). Adjustments are made upon receipt of
new information, but the anchor retains a powerful role in determining ultimate
judgements and choices. Thus in the case of housing choice it seems likely that
the first-viewed property becomes the psychological ‘yardstick’ against which all
others are naturally measured. This is enough to produce a bias in favour of this
option, an effect known as primacy.
Although primacy was observed across several types of properties, including su-
perior target options, it is the effect on inferior decoy properties that was the
most significant. In some cases being viewed first doubled their popularity. For
agents this may prove an effective strategy for helping market their more ‘diffi-
cult’ properties without significantly lowering their price. Such properties may
otherwise stay on the books of agents for a considerable time which is not in the
interests of either the agent or the vendor.
The second relevant result for agents lies in the illustration of the importance
of how properties are marketed in the online space. The difference in the results
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between the Rightmove and Stamford Adult Group Surveys illustrates that the
design of the choice frame is vital. In particular the results suggest that the
more time individuals spend taking in information about a particular property,
whether they are forced to by the design of the page or by making it more in-
teresting, the easier it is for psychological phenomenon such as primacy to take
effect. Finally the results show the key role the design of search algorithms may
have in moderating housing choices. If these can be manipulated by an agent,
there is significant scope for improving their own sales figures.
It seems likely that agents themselves would have an insight into consumer deci-
sion making processes and so have their own ideas as to how they might influence
choices. In the course of this research several anecdotal reports of this have been
received. The results contained here clearly inform that body of knowledge. The
natural next step may be a formal qualitative study using agent case studies to
shed more light on the topic. This possibility is discussed in Section 9.4.
9.2.2 Policy Makers
Regulators today have a significant hand in all markets in which consumers make
decisions. The main arbiter of consumer protection in the UK is the Office of
Fair Trading (OFT). Established by statute in 1972, the OFT today employs
nearly 700 people and has a budget in excess of £70 million. Its scope is wide
including aspects of market analysis, merger control and competition law. Its
mission, broadly stated, includes: “...the promotion and protection of consumer
interests throughout the UK, while ensuring that businesses operate in a fair and
competitive way.” (OFT, 2010b, page 10).
The results in this thesis are of interest to policy makers and regulators like
the OFT because they illustrate an important way in which consumers can be
manipulated when they make purchases. In general the results show that the
choice frame – the context in which the decision is taken – is important in deter-
mining the ultimate choice in non-rational ways.
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The insight into the new and rapidly growing market for online property searches
is particularly relevant because there is currently little regulation in this area.
Given the possibility of choice manipulation to promote one agent over another
through controlling the search results (discussed in Chapter 4) a future develop-
ment may be the creation of a market in property search results. In other words
search websites such as Rightmove could find it profitable to offer to control their
search results for a fee paid by the advertising agent2. This could operate in
a similar way to the auction system AdWordsTM used with spectacular success
by Google. Such a development would be of great interest to consumer pro-
tection bodies such as the OFT because unless implemented transparently – in
other words so that consumers were aware how their search results were being
determined – the possibility of market manipulation is considerable. The results
in this thesis prove that such consumer manipulation is plausible if, as it must
be admitted, the results do also show how difficult practicing the manipulations
may be in real choice situations. It may be that such manipulations are not yet
consistent or controllable enough to be economically viable, at least for the time
being.
Finally professional regulatory bodies are also likely to be interested in the results
since they relate directly to professional practice. The National Association of
Estate Agents (NAEA) produces a professional Rules and Code of Practice doc-
ument which sets out, in Rule 2(2) the rule that: “No Member shall do any act...
which: (a) involves dishonesty of deceitful behaviour; (b) involves professional
practice that is unfair to members of the public...” (NAEA Code of Practice,
www.naea.co.uk, 2010). The manipulation strategies studied would seem to di-
rectly engage this rule. Of course this thesis does not provide any evidence that
agents actually undertake these strategies, although it is suggested in Chapter
4 that there is a motivation for them to do so. Nevertheless, if evidence was
forthcoming which did confirm this practice in addition to the research here, it
would certainly suggest a need to modify codes of practice in the industry.
2 Note that there is currently no evidence that property search websites have any intention of
doing this.
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9.2.3 Academic Study
The results of this study represent a contribution to choice theory and so are of
interest to academics interested in this part of microeconomic theory. Chapter
2 charted the dominance of the rational choice paradigm followed by its gradual
undermining by the emergence of the field of behavioural economics. Housing is a
choice setting with several unique characteristics. It is to most people thought of
as a consumer choice, yet it is vitally important for wealth and happiness in the
long term. However, it is made very infrequently under conditions of significant
uncertainty. Thus, as was argued in Chapter 1, we can extend the applicability
of our ideas by studying choice in this different context.
The results support the belief, expressed in the hypotheses in Chapter 4, that
behavioural effects are prevalent in housing markets, leading to the possibility of
effective choice manipulation strategies. They also contradict several important
arguments used by those who defend the rational choice paradigm. Firstly they
suggest that, even when the choice is important and the decision maker may
wish to take greater care over their choice, they may still be vulnerable to biases.
The online controlled surveys reported in Chapters 6 and 7 show that the editing
phase of decision making, when choice sets are slimmed down and initial prefer-
ences are formed, is likely to have a lasting influence on choices. Although the
subject of the choice is vitally important, a fact appreciated by decision makers,
this element of it occupies a central place in the process of decision making and is
open to manipulation and bias. Furthermore in experiments of value judgement
bias (reported in Chapter 8) the presence of large, binary incentives for accurate
judgement does not alter the finding that individuals’ judgement can be influ-
enced by arbitrary anchors.
The results also cast doubt on the argument that judgement is more error-prone –
in the sense of departing from von Neumann and Morgenstern rationality – when
little time is taken over the choice as discussed above. A psychological process
known as imprinting may help explain this finding.
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The work in this thesis is important in contributing to our understanding of
the economics of housing markets. As explained in Chapter 3, there has been
an increased focus on understanding the non-rational micro-dynamics of markets
in recent years (for example Levitt and Syverson, 2008; Lin and Vandell, 2007).
This research takes the debate on further still by placing new importance on the
role of agent behaviour in moderating market outcomes.
It has already been argued that housing choices are different in many respects to
other consumer decisions. Another way in which they are different is the pres-
ence of the estate agent. He is an economic agent who has the ability to use his
superior information to control the parameters under which the choice is made.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) call anyone with this ability a choice architect. This
thesis has shed a new light on the role of choice architects in by showing the sig-
nificant ways in which the agent may use his position to influence choice. Pearce
(1979) produces stark evidence on the role of agents in moderating outcomes in
his study of racial segregation in US neighbourhoods. More recently Levitt and
Syverson (2008) show how seller behaviour can be distorted by the agent through
his superior market knowledge. This thesis focuses on home buyers and produces
a similar conclusion: there is considerable potential for the agent to manipulate
the behaviour of home buyers. This is an important conclusion for real estate
academics. One avenue for further research is to understand in more detail the
economic outcomes of these manipulations. This is considered in Section 9.4.
9.2.4 Individuals
The ultimate aim of the research in this thesis is to help all individuals make better
choices. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, who discuss the concept of framing
and choice architecture in their book, Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), express
a similar aim when they say: “One of our main hopes is that an understanding of
choice architecture... will lead others to think of creative ways to improve human
lives in other domains.” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, page 252).
For individuals this thesis is relevant because it illustrates some important ways
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in which their choice might be manipulated by taking advantage of weaknesses
in their decision making processes. First, the reasonable psychological desire to
form preference by comparing and contrasting items, rather than considering each
item in isolation, leads to the risk that choices will be placed to subtly influence
this process in favour of certain options. These are the choice set effects exam-
ined in Chapter 6. Secondly, a similar process that affects the way information
is processed through time means that information which is viewed first may gain
an excessive weight in the decision maker’s mind, resulting in a first-viewed item
being favoured simply by virtue of being viewed there. These are the ordering
effects seen in Chapter 7. Thirdly when individuals make value judgements they
may also be too strongly influenced by the numerical information available at the
time of the judgement. Even if this numerical information has no connection to
the judgement at hand – and so is arbitrary – it can influence decisions, as was
reported in Chapter 8.
Since this is among the most significant decisions an individual can make, it
is important that the choice be as error-free as possible. The most effective way
to achieve this is through knowledge. By being aware of decision making vul-
nerabilities, individuals can overcome the risk of manipulation and make better
choices.
9.2.5 Summary
The research contained in this thesis is of interest to a wide body of parties
from policy makers and estate agents to academics interested in choice theory.
Finally the results are of interest to all decision makers. Knowledge about decision
making weaknesses, those situations where individuals are most vulnerable to
being manipulated, is ultimately the most effective way to make better decisions,
a desirable outcome for all.
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9.3 Limitations of the Work
As with all research, the work reported in this thesis has limitations and it is
important that these are considered, in part so that future research can build
and improve upon it. The limitations can broadly be split into two areas: i)
limitations in methodology; and ii) limitations of interpretation. We will focus
on these in order.
Chapter 5 considered the field of experimental economics in considerable detail,
arguing that it has gained widespread acceptance in economics today. The ma-
jority of researchers accept the role that experiments can play in economic study,
namely that it offers the ability to tightly control information and so isolate vari-
ables of interest with precision. The clear cost is realism. Experiments are by
definition artificially constructed scenarios, usually held in classrooms. Although
efforts are made to create incentive structures which match the payoffs in the real
world, this is difficult to achieve precisely.
The choice set elements of the Student Group Experiments reported in Part III are
clearly limited in this sense. They took place in classrooms and involved entirely
hypothetical decisions. Participants were asked to imagine themselves buying or
renting a house in Cambridge and take decisions on that basis. Economists are
naturally suspicious of measuring the outcome of choice based on stated prefer-
ence. They would much rather consider choices based on individuals’ revealed
preferences, that is, what they do rather than what they say. Since the choice
experiments do not measure revealed preference because no individual actually
takes a decision that he will have to live with, the Student Group Experiments
are clearly limited in this sense.
Incentives were used in the experiments of judgement bias reported in Chapter
8. Subjects could earn up to four times their show up fee for accurate judgement
(and 20 times in one experiment). This mitigates the realism limitation to a
certain extent because the participants faced a real economic decision. However
it is self-evident that this payoff structure still did not – and could never have –
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completely replicated the real economic decision over buying a home.
The Rightmove Survey was designed very carefully to replicate almost exactly
the conditions under which real housing choices are made in the online forum.
Participants were asked to view several properties then pick the one they pre-
ferred the most. Thus the choice frame was clearly more realistic than for the
classroom-based student experiments. As was argued in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.3
page 55), the scenario also replicates fairly closely the initial search phase – known
as editing in Prospect Theory – which characterises many property searches to-
day. As Kahneman and Tversky argue, this phase is likely to be vital to the final
decision. However despite this, the general criticism of the experimental method-
ology remains: in the Rightmove and Stamford Adult Group Surveys the decision
is not real, it is hypothetical. Participants know they are taking part in a survey
which has no bearing on the future lives, an important methodological limitation.
The natural next step to answer these criticisms is an empirical study of real
housing choices based on survey work with estate agents in the field. This pos-
sibility was explored for this study although time and cost implications make it
impractical for a PhD project. How such a project might be designed is consid-
ered in Section 9.4.
Another important methodological limitation is that some of the more impor-
tant variables for determining housing choice were largely removed in most of
the experiments. For the Rightmove Survey, participants were only told that
the properties were in a city and for the Stamford Adult Group Survey respon-
dents were told that the properties were located in Cambridge, but not where
precisely. There is an obvious concern that if a Rightmove Survey participant
from the South West, for example, sees that the properties they are viewing are
located in Cambridge then they might give it less attention because they do not
know anything about the Cambridge property market. By emasculating location
in these instances, the survey design made the choice scenario more realistic for
all participants in that it made it easy to imagine looking for property like that
displayed in a location near to the scope of their experience.
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Price was also removed entirely as a variable. Participants were simply told
that all the properties had the same price. The removal of price as a variable
was discussed in Chapter 5. It considerably simplifies the analysis by removing
income effects which are complicated to model on a large sample of individuals3.
Removing the variables price and location in this way is a limitation because they
are clearly among the most important in the decision to buy a home. Trading
off these two variables in particular is likely to be a key determinant in ultimate
choices. This naturally limits our interpretation of the results. For example it
may be that decision makers are more effective at trading off features against
price, rather than against each other, for example, which is what the survey de-
sign forced.
A final methodological limitation lies with the treatments themselves. The Right-
move Survey consisted of 14 treatments based on four properties; the Stamford
Adult Group Survey used only six treatments with the same four properties. No
more than half a dozen properties were used in the Student Group Experiments.
This is to a certain extent a rather limited scope. It may be that the choice biases
seen are only applicable for the four-bedroom family homes that were the subject
of the Rightmove and Stamford Adult Group Surveys, for example. The Student
Group Experiments reported the phenomenon that was named the choice pollu-
tion effect in the comparison of small city-centre properties (terraced property
versus a flat). It is difficult to say whether this result extends far beyond this
context. It would have been preferable to illustrate the manipulation strategies
on a wider range of properties partly to illustrate the generalisability and partly
to understand more about whether the type of property also moderates the extent
of behavioural bias.
Another problem with this limited scope of properties is that it leaves open the
3 For example, to include price as a variable would mean that significant amounts of wealth
and income data would need to be taken from participants to use as control variables. Such
information is personal and many participants may not have wanted to disclose it in a survey
of this kind (or worse they may have consistently under- or over-stated it).
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possibility of particular features of the properties under consideration having an
impact which are not general to all properties. The results of the Rightmove
Survey clearly show that the Bosworth Road property was heavily favoured over
the St. Alban’s Road property (see Table 6.6, page 164). This was because the
main photograph used to represent the former was significantly more attractive
than the latter. Evidence for this belief comes from the Stamford Adult Group
Surveys, which used the same properties, but did not emphasise this single pho-
tograph as strongly. Initial preference was much more even in this survey (see
Table 6.12, page 176). While this result illustrates how important the choice
frame is in the formation of preference, in general the results would have been
more robust had they been repeated across many property sets.
Another sense in which the Student Groups Experiments are limited is in the
name itself: they use student volunteers. As discussed in Chapter 5, students are
widely used in experimental economics because of their ease of recruitment for
most researchers, as well as their low marginal cost of time, which allows for con-
trollable motivation payments. Significant care was taken with the recruitment
of the student volunteers in the experiments reported. As argued previously, this
group does represent a good model of inexperienced renters who are an important
part of housing markets. Also using University students is a good test because
they represent the sophisticated end of this market, including some who may have
knowledge of the formal terms of the rational choice model (and hence be more
likely to act according to it). Nevertheless the use of student volunteers clearly
limits the extent to which the results from these experiments can be generalised.
It is possible the biases reported would not persist among a more experienced
group. Such an extension will be left to future research.
Overall it is important to be realistic about the research presented in this thesis.
Being based on experimental data it can never give a truly comprehensive picture
of the nature of biases in housing choice. Indeed that was never the aim of the
project. Instead the aim was to shed light on the nature of the biases which can
aﬄict this important area of choice, providing a framework for our understanding
of the important areas of bias and platform for further work. Interpreted with
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this in mind the results give us plenty of useful conclusions and scope for fur-
ther work. The former have been explored earlier in this chapter, the latter are
explored in the next section.
9.4 Future Research
There are many avenues for future research, beginning with the areas of limitation
discussed above. Behavioural insights have significant amounts still to offer to
further our understanding of housing markets and real estate. It is a path of
research that is only just beginning.
9.4.1 Formal Study of the Choice Pollution Effect
One of the most significant results reported in Part III is the finding of a new form
of behavioural bias, labelled the choice pollution effect. This describes a choice
pattern where the addition of a ‘decoy’ option to the choice set did not have the
expected positive impact on the ‘target’ option. Instead the decoy appeared to
‘pollute’ the perception of the intended target, causing a significant decline in its
popularity. Future work could include a formal experimental test of this bias.
A suggested explanation for the bias lay in information asymmetry. It was sug-
gested that the inferior decoy option may reveal negative information – or make
it more vivid in the decision maker’s mind as per the bias of availability (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974) – about the target. The experimental work may seek to
understand this information signal in more detail: what are the main factors de-
termining whether a decoy has a positive or negative effect? What are the limits
of the effect? Does it exist in other choice scenarios or is it only relevant to choice
scenarios characterised by information asymmetry? To my knowledge there is no
published research in the housing choice or consumer economics literature which
considers negative, rather than positive, decoys, so research in this vein would
represent a significant contribution.
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9.4.2 Empirical Study of Buyer Manipulation
Beyond further experimental study, the natural next step to extend the results
in this thesis is an empirical study of home buyer manipulation. Attempts have
been made to use existing datasets to tease out behavioural implications in hous-
ing situations (such as Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Simonsohn and Loewenstein,
2006). However a more effective way to extend our knowledge of manipulation
strategies in a similar vein to those reported here would be an empirical study,
but which nevertheless attempted to use broadly experimental control.
The study would gather data with the co-operation of local estate agents. The
aim would be to follow a series of property searches from the beginning (when the
agent was first contacted by a buyer) to end (upon completion or withdrawal of
interest). To gain sufficient data perhaps hundreds of individual property searches
would be needed over several months. Broadly the design would be to have home-
buyers fill in a survey at the beginning of their search which asked demographic
data as well as key wealth and income parameters. It would also need to consider
the expectations and current living arrangements of the buyer(s). Perhaps the
most effective method would be to focus on one group of buyers at a time, for
example starting with first-time buyers, or those with young families looking to
upsize. Data would be recorded on what homes were viewed, and in what order.
At the end of the research a further questionnaire would be administered which
would establish the result of the search – whether it resulted in a decision to buy
– and why.
To take the research on further would require attempting some of the manip-
ulations discussed in this thesis. An agent would randomly allocate particular
choice sets to buyers. These would include different decoy properties to try and
manipulate decision makers in favour of particular targets.
Being focused on real decision makers who are actually contemplating buying
property, this study would be an effective way of taking the research in this the-
sis on further. It would be a particularly useful way to examine ordering effects.
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It must be noted though that in practice it would be complex to design and
complete. The risk of confounding variables is significant, and many hundreds
of individual searches would be needed to give statistical power to the results.
Clearly the gain of realism comes with a corresponding cost in terms of precision.
Nevertheless an empirical result which matches the experimental work reported
in this thesis would be of significant interest.
9.4.3 More on Housing Market Outcomes
A consideration of recent research in real estate (Chapter 3) found that the micro-
economic dynamics of housing markets have become a significant focus in recent
years. This research made a contribution to that body of research by focusing
on the non-rational dynamics of housing choice. In particular the focus here was
on the importance of the estate agent in moderating decision outcomes. Future
research might build upon this platform. There are two broad paths. The first is
to follow on to the next stage and ask in more detail: what are the housing mar-
ket outcomes that result from home buyer manipulation? Pearce’s (1979) study
of the segregating effect of inadvertent racial biases in housing has already been
mentioned as have others on the topic of ‘redlining’ (Munnell et al., 1996; Jones
and Maclennan, 1987). Future research might consider in theoretic terms what
the effect of these buyer manipulations is. Does it result in a broadly inefficient
market for housing? Are there location-specific implications?
A second promising path for research is to consider other implications of non-
rational behaviour terms of housing outcomes. One perspective comes from the
insight that when making choices involving risk (a class of decision which buying
a house clearly falls into) individuals are particularly concerned with what others
think of them, especially how skilful they are seen to be. Failure in gambles –
and investments – is embarrassing not just because of the effects on wealth, but
also because of the embarrassment of being shown up for making poor choices.
Several papers examine the effect that this might have on decision making. Har-
baugh (2008) calls it skills signalling. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) show that
individuals can be drawn to irrationally ignore their own private signals about
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the success of a project and simply mimic the decision of a first-mover where they
are concerned to maintain a reputation. They call this embarrassment aversion
in the context of a body of research known as the career concerns literature which
considers managerial decision making.
There is a natural application for this non-rational effect on behaviour in housing
markets. The decision to enter the housing market as an owner occupier (buying
a first home after renting) can be analysed in a similar framework. In the typical
situation an individual is deciding whether to buy his first property. He has a
private signal about the future direction of the housing market and is concerned
about losing money (ie. he has a standard utility function over his wealth). But
he is also concerned about his reputation among his friends and peers. They
have all already bought properties and are apparently doing well ‘on the ladder’.
The social pressure imposed upon the prospective buyer by his concern over his
reputation – that he will be thought of as having poor judgement because he is
‘missing the boat’ – is enough to tip him over the edge into buying.
This framework is similar in spirit to the kind of irrational exuberance models
suggested by Case and Shiller (1989) and Shiller (2007) with respect to housing
markets. Individuals are drawn to ignore their own private signals because of
the presence of others who bias their choices. It differs from the Shiller model
in a critical respect however. The driver of continued buying is not a belief that
others will continue buying after you – the essence of irrational exuberance – but
a specific concern over the reputational effect of not acting.
9.4.4 Other Applications of Behaviour in Real Estate
There is significant scope for further study of behaviour in real estate. A large
body of literature already attempts to use the insights of behavioural economics
in real estate (see Diaz and Hansz, 2007). There is a significant focus on the
behaviour of professional valuers, which was discussed in Chapter 3. The future
will undoubtedly bring further studies of this type.
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Perhaps the most obvious area for continued work is commercial real estate in-
vestment. Non-rational aspects of behaviour, such as the Kahneman and Tversky
concept of loss aversion, have been shown to affect investors in stock markets
(Odean, 1998). But little evidence currently exists to consider these effects in
commercial real estate markets. Do commercial real estate investors seek to at-
tenuate their losses in the same way that private buyers do (according to Genesove
and Mayer, 2001) for example?
9.4.5 Summary
Future research to take the results of this thesis further is just the beginning for
behavioural research in real estate. The behavioural insights of Kahneman and
Tversky radically altered economists’ theories of choice and this shift has been
felt across economics. Behavioural insights have a considerable amount still to
offer in the search for greater understanding of housing markets and in the wider
real estate economics discipline. It is an exciting research agenda.
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Materials from Classroom
Experiments
The figure below is a reproduction of the consent form used in all classroom experiments.
Consent forms are available at the request of the author. Other materials associated
with the Student Group Experiments are presented in the following pages.
Figure A.1: Consent form for participation in Student Group Experiments.
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Figure A.2: Example page of experimental protocol.
261
Appendix A
Figure A.3: Example of written choice set experiment. This is treatment 1a.
Figure A.4: Example of written choice set experiment. This is treatment 1b.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure A.5: Information seen about Apartment X: Rustat Avenue.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure A.6: Information seen about House Y: York Street.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure A.7: Information seen about House Z: Cowper Road.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure A.8: Information seen about House A: Riverside.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure A.9: Information seen about House B: Russell Street.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure A.10: Information seen about House C: Warwick Road.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure A.11: Information seen about House D: Ventress Farm Court.
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Figure A.12: Experimental Questionnaire Page 1.
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Figure A.13: Experimental Questionnaire Page 2.
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Question 5 of the Questionnaire asked participants to indicate whether they had any
other engagement with matters to do with property. The items listed were:
• Study it at University
• Work in the insdustry
• Considered buying a property
• Take an interest in property in the media
Participants were marked as “knowledgeable” about property if they ticked three or
more of the above criteria, or marked “Yes” in response to Question 6 which asked
them to self-designate an interest in property.
272
Appendix B
Materials from Online Surveys
The figure below is a reproduction of the initial instructions shown to all participants in
the Rightmove Survey. A similar one was used for the Stamford Adult Group Survey.
Other materials associated with the Rightmove and Stamford Adult Group Surveys are
presented in the following pages.
Figure B.1: Instructions for the Rightmove Survey.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure B.2: Photographic information seen about Property A: Bosworth Road.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
Figure B.3: Photographic information seen about Property B: St. Albans Road.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure B.4: Photographic information seen about Property C: Bowers Croft.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
Figure B.5: Photographic information seen about Property D: Moore Close.
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